Estate of Burks v. Ross
Decision Date | 18 February 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 20261.,20261. |
Citation | 438 F.2d 230 |
Parties | ESTATE of Richard BURKS, Lucille Burks, Administratrix, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Leon ROSS, Dr. Rosalie Ging, C. Dozauer, J. Treado, R. Rosendall, J. Stigail, Oliver B. Coleman, James Hampton and Robert Fletcher, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Virginia C. Dare, Detroit, Mich., for appellant.
Thomas J. Press, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert V. Zener, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Robert J. Grace, U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., on the brief, for appellees.
Before WEICK, EDWARDS and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is from an order of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in an action for damages for wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent, against nine members of the staff of the Veterans Administration Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where the decedent had been confined as a mental patient in a locked ward. It was alleged that the Director and Administrator of the hospital, Dr. Leon Ross, the Director of Neuropsychiatry, Dr. Rosalie Ging, nurses J. Treado, R. Rosendall, J. Stigail and C. Dozauer, and psychiatric nurses' assistants Oliver B. Coleman, James Hampton and Robert Fletcher, all of whom are federal employees, were negligent in the custodial care of the decedent, as a result of which negligence he escaped from the hospital and was struck and killed by a train of the New York Central Railroad.
The District Judge, in granting summary judgment, held that the federal employees had absolute immunity from suit under the doctrine sometimes referred to as executive privilege and upheld in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), and its companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 79 S.Ct. 1331, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959).1
Decedent was committed as a mentally ill person by the Probate Court of Genessee County, Michigan. The court psychiatrists diagnosed him as overly depressed, psychotic, suicidal, and a potential danger to himself. A few days after his commitment he was transferred to the Veterans Administration Hospital at Ann Arbor, as a closed ward patient, which meant that he was not allowed to go from the ward without special permission and without supervision. Dr. Ging, who was the admitting physician, gave instructions that he should be involved in activities such as occupational therapy, group therapy, and recreational therapy.
One afternoon at about 3:00 p. m., the decedent was taken with a group of patients to see movies in the hospital auditorium. During the showing he disappeared and was not missed until around 4:30 to 5:00 p. m. At about 7:30 p. m. he was found lying near the tracks of the New York Central Railroad; he died two days later from his injuries.
The duties of the hospital staff were outlined in the affidavit of Dr. Arthur J. Klippen, Director of Hospitals, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans Administration Central Office in Washington D.C. as follows:
Barr v. Matteo, relied on by the District Judge, was a libel action against the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization, brought by former employees of the office who alleged that they were damaged by a press release issued by the Director.
In the majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Harlan, the court referred to the fact that the law of privilege as a defense to civil damage suits for defamation, was largely of judicial making,2 although the Constitution gave an absolute privilege to members of Congress.
The reasons for the privilege were stated by Justice Harlan:
It is the protection of executive discretion which must support any claim of official privilege in the present case.
Discretion is not a concept which has easily lent itself to precise definition; however, it is a concept with which the federal courts have had much experience. The concern for protecting discretion is found not only in the absolute executive privilege from tort liability, but also in actions for mandamus and in the "discretionary function" exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). As observed in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 at...
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