Estate of Chilton, Matter of, No. 18488

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: SABERS; MILLER
• Citation: 520 N.W.2d 910
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Jack Parker CHILTON, Deceased.
• Docket Number: No. 18488
• Decision Date: 24 August 1994

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520 N.W.2d 910 In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Jack Parker CHILTON, Deceased. No. 18488. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Argued April 26, 1994.
Decided Aug. 24, 1994.

Lloyd C. Richardson of Richardson, Groseclose, Kornmann & Wyly, Aberdeen, for appellants, England, Head, Hardin, Jarrett, Ayres, Heatherly and Ellis.

Richard L. Kolker of Kolker, Fritz, Hogan & Johnson, Groton, for appellee Norwest Bank, Adm'r.

Kennith L. Gosch of Bantz, Gosch, Cremer, Peterson and Oliver, Aberdeen, for appellee, Ellsbury.

Raymond M. Schutz of Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, Aberdeen, for appellees, Coles and Doane.

SABERS, Justice.

The half-blood heirs appeal, claiming the trial court erred in holding that the Estate consists only of "ancestral property" to which the whole-blood heirs are entitled to the exclusion of the half-blood heirs. We reverse in part and remand.

FACTS

Jack Parker Chilton (Decedent) died intestate. He left surviving him one aunt as his closest living relative. She disclaimed any interest in the "ancestral property" and is presumed to have predeceased him.

Ronald Ellsbury (Ellsbury), Blanche E. Chilton Coles and Audrey M. Chilton Doane are whole-blood cousins in the fourth degree to the Decedent. They will be referred to as the whole-blood cousins.

Audrey Alexander England, Noralyn Adams Head, Robert Chilton Hardin, Mary Ann Davis Jarrett, Jerry L. Ayres, Paula Kay Heatherly, and Carl Sanford Ellis, Jr.,

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are also cousins of the fourth degree. This group of cousins descends from the same grandfather as the Decedent but from a different grandmother, thus are cousins of the half blood. They will be referred to as the half-blood cousins. An ancestral chart is attached for the reader's convenience. ¹

Procedurally, on March 10, 1993, a Stipulation and Agreement was entered into by all of the parties interested in the Estate. A Petition for Distribution Pursuant to Stipulation and Agreement was filed requesting approval of the Stipulation and Agreement and an Order authorizing and directing the Executor to distribute the residue of the estate pursuant to the Stipulation and Agreement. None of the individual Appellants signed the Stipulation and Agreement. On May 21, 1993, a Notice of Appearance was made by Lloyd C. Richardson, Jr., on behalf of the half-blood cousins. A Hearing was held on June 22, 1993. The circuit court issued an Order Determining Heirship and Approving Distribution on July 26, 1993 approving the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Agreement and denying the claims of inheritance of the half-blood heirs. The half-blood cousins appeal.

Whether all of the inheritance came to the Decedent by descent, devise, or gift from ancestors of the whole-blood cousins under SDCL 29-1-13?

This case involves the interpretation of SDCL 29-1-13. "The proper construction to be given a statute is a question of law which is fully reviewable. Accordingly, the questions presented are reviewed de novo." Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 899 (S.D.1991) (citing Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989); Border States Paving v. Department of Revenue, 437 N.W.2d 872, 874 (S.D.1989)).

The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used.

Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language of a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is not reason for construction, and the [c]ourt's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.

U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 505 N.W.2d 115, 123 (S.D.1993) (citation omitted).

SDCL 29-1-13 provides:

Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance c[a]me to the intestate by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from such inheritance.

We find the language of SDCL 29-1-13 clear, certain, and unambiguous. Therefore, our only function is to declare the meaning as clearly expressed. U.S. West, 505 N.W.2d at 123.

Under SDCL 29-1-13, the half-blood cousins inherit equally with the whole-blood cousins because they are all kindred of the 4th degree, "unless the inheritance c[a]me to the intestate by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from such inheritance."

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SDCL 29-1-13 (emphasis added). The half-blood cousins argue that the exception found in SDCL 29-1-13 is not applicable because the Decedent's estate does not contain property he received from his grandmother, Sarah Fulcher. According to the half-blood cousins, "[p]roperty Jack received from anyone else on the Chilton side would be divided equally among all the cousins because everyone but Sarah on the Chilton side is of the blood of every other cousin who may have been an ancestor." The half-blood cousins further argue that "[i]f Jack's estate contained property received from his mother's side [Rapp], then 29-1-13 would not be applicable since it deals only with inheritance rights among whole and half bloods."

Although we do not accept this last statement, we do agree with In re Estate of Kirkendahl, 43 Wisc. 167 (Wis.1877), a case cited by the half-blood cousins, which states:

The statute is elliptical, and the words "all those" mean "all those kindred of the half blood." The word "persons" cannot be supplied after the words "all those," because that word is not the subject of the main proposition; and because supplying that word would blot out the exception. The rule of the statute then is, that the kindred of the half blood shall, in general, inherit equally with kindred of the whole blood; but that, as to ancestral estate, half bloods not of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate...