Estate of Dalton, In re

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: REINHARD; AHRENS, P.J., and CRIST
• Citation: Estate of Dalton, In re, 854 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. App. 1993)
• Decision Date: 15 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 63238,63238
• Parties: In re ESTATE OF Donald Dexter DALTON, Jr., Deceased.

Page 860

854 S.W.2d 860

In re ESTATE OF Donald Dexter DALTON, Jr., Deceased.

No. 63238.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division One.

June 15, 1993.

Arthur G. Muegler, Jr., Stephen M. Hereford, Muegler & Niesen, Clayton, for appellant.

David L. Rapp, Murphy & Seltzer, David Richard Bohm, Danna, Saraghan, Stockenberg & Shaw, Clayton, for respondent.

REINHARD, Judge.

Decedent's former wife (petitioner) appeals from a dismissal by the probate division of the circuit court of her petition which sought to revoke the appointment of decedent's father, Donald Dalton, as personal representative and to revoke letters of independent administration. We reverse and remand.

Decedent died intestate on July 10, 1992. His heirs were his father, his sister, Kathleen Dalton, and his brother, Kim Dalton. The following is a procedural history of the probate case relevant to this appeal:

July 17, 1992 Donald Dalton petitioned for letters of administration seeking to be named personal representative of his son's estate.

July 21, 1992 Decedent's heirs filed consent to independent administration.

Letters of independent administration issued to Donald Dalton.

July 24, 1992 First publication of Notice to Creditors.

September 21, 1992 Inventory and appraisement of decedent's estate filed, showing equity of $125,000 in house and $358,520.03 in personal property.

On July 27, 1992, petitioner filed a petition in the circuit court seeking specific performance by Donald Dalton, individually and as personal representative, Kathleen Dalton, and Kim Dalton (specific performance petition).

The petition alleged that she and decedent were married on November 22, 1967, and that the marriage was dissolved on July 16, 1970. It further asserted that decedent had orally contracted to devise his entire estate, with the exception of some stock in a closely held corporation, to petitioner if she did the following:

(a) [A]cquiesce[d] in [decedent]'s actual and ostensible representation to [his] friends and associates from time to time after Divorce, and during [his] lifetime, that [they] were husband and wife;

(b) [Did not] change [her] residence from [his] actual residence from time to time after Divorce and during [his] lifetime;

(c) [L]ive[d] with [him] after Divorce and for the rest of [his] lifetime;

(d) [R]efrain[ed] from marrying another during [his] lifetime;

(e) [P]erform[ed] services such as cleaning the family home, preparing meals and other services customarily performed by a wife after Divorce and for the remainder of [his] lifetime; and,

(f) [R]emain[ed] a friend, companion and advisor to [him] after Divorce and for the rest of [his] lifetime.

It also alleged that petitioner had fully and faithfully performed all of her contractual obligations and that decedent had breached the contract by failing to execute a will conveying his entire estate, with the exception of the stock in the closely held corporation, to her. ¹ It further claimed that the oral agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds, § 432.010, RSMo 1986, because (1) she had fully performed all of her obligations under the contract before decedent's death, and (2) the contract was capable of being performed within one year of its inception.

On December 1, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the probate division of the circuit court which sought, under § 473.833, RSMo 1986, to have Donald Dalton removed as personal representative and to revoke the independent letters of administration (petition to revoke). ² A copy of the specific performance pleading was attached to this petition. At this point, no claims had been filed against the estate.

The petition to revoke asserted that petitioner had standing to sue because her alleged oral contract with decedent rendered her an "interested person" as the term is defined in § 472.010(15), RSMo 1986, and used in § 473.833, RSMo 1986. It further alleged that as personal representative, Donald Dalton had "caused waste of decedent's probate estate" by "filing [a] frivolous unlawful detainer lawsuit" against petitioner. She contended that he would continue to act adversely to the estate's best interests and that none of decedent's other heirs were qualified to act as personal representative because their interests conflicted with petitioner's regarding the distribution of the estate's assets.

On December 9, 1992, petitioner filed a "contingent claim" against decedent's estate in the amount of "$2,890.00 plus $578.00 for each month after 12/6/92, plus interest." This represented the mortgage, utility, and maintenance expenditures which petitioner had allegedly made on decedent's home subsequent to his death.

Personal representative and heirs filed a motion to dismiss the petition to revoke claiming that petitioner was not an "interested person" as contemplated by §§ 472.010(15) and 473.833; thus, she did not have standing to challenge the independent administration. The court sustained the motion.

On appeal, petitioner claims that the court erred in dismissing her petition to revoke because she had standing as a non-nominally "interested person". She contends that the court's order should be reversed and the case remanded for a hearing on her petition to revoke.

Section 472.010(15) provides, in relevant part:

"Interested persons" mean heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors or any others having a property right or claim against the estate of a decedent.... This meaning may vary at different stages and different parts of a proceeding and must be determined according to the particular purpose and matter involved. (emphasis ours)

Section 473.833 sets out the following procedure regarding revocation of independent administration:

1. An independent personal representative, or any interested person, may, at any time, file a petition to revoke the provisions of letters testamentary or of administration authorizing independent administration.

2. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall determine the extent of petitioner's interest in the estate and, if it shall find that such interest is more than nominal, the court shall order a hearing on the petition.... If, upon motion of any interested person, the court finds the petitioner's interest is nominal, the court may dismiss the petition.

In her brief, petitioner premises her "interested party" status upon the following bases: (1) her oral contract with decedent, (2) the estate's unlawful detainer suit filed against her, and (3) her claim as a "contingent creditor" of the estate.

The amounts that petitioner claims as a "contingent creditor" and that she allegedly owes as a debtor are clearly nominal when compared to the size of decedent's estate; thus, her motion to revoke will survive dismissal only if her specific performance suit makes her a non-nominally "interested person" within the meaning of § 473.833.

Personal representative and heirs contend that petitioner is neither an heir, devisee, or spouse of decedent, and thus "if she has any interest in the estate based upon her specific performance suit, it is as a creditor or other having a property right or claim against the estate." See § 472.010(15). In support of their position that petitioner's specific performance lawsuit is not a "claim against the estate", they cite L.G. v. F.G.H., 729 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.App.1987) (court held that a suit for specific performance of an oral contract to make a will is neither a probate claim nor a debt on the assets of the probate estate), and Bailey v. Richardson, 667 S.W.2d 720 (Mo.App.1984) (court held that an action for specific performance of a contract with decedent to devise real or personal property does not constitute a claim against the estate). Both of these cases focus on whether the specific performance suit was a "claim against the estate" for purposes of the time limitations contained in § 473.360, RSMo 1986.

Personal representative and heirs support a narrow interpretation of the term "interested person", limiting the definition to those parties listed in § 472.010(15). It appears that no appellate cases have discussed this term in reference to its application to § 473.833.

In the case of In re Dugan, 309 S.W.2d 137 (Mo.App.1957), the Southern District, while not ruling on the issue we are confronted with here, discussed the breadth of the phrase "interested persons". The court stated:

In section 472.010 we find, first, a statement as to what persons ... are interested. This first statement, taken alone, would not include any persons not specifically named and thus would omit administrators.... But effect must be given to the following words, "this meaning may vary at different stages and different parts of a proceeding and must be determined according to the particular purpose and matter involved." We cannot ignore them. The legislature intended them to mean something, and that meaning must be either to narrow or to broaden the words of definition which precede.... But if we adopt a liberal construction, as we should and must do, we will give broad meaning to those words and interpret them together with the whole statute and the whole code and in the light of previous decisions concerning similar or related statutes.

Dugan, 309 S.W.2d at 144. (emphasis ours).

The Dugan court analyzed the term "interested person" in relation to a party's standing to appeal under § 472.160. This section provides that "[a]ny interested person aggrieved thereby may appeal" from certain enumerated orders of the probate court. In defining "interested person", the Dugan court relied in...