Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo

Decision Date16 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-1896,96-1896
Citation115 F.3d 1388
PartiesESTATE OF Jeffrey L. DAVIS, by Mark L. OSTENFELD, Public Administrator of the City of St. Louis, Appellee, v. Paul K. DELO, Gregory Dunn, Greg Conaway, David McPeak, Billy Davis, Jim Underwood and Phillip Wade, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Paul M. Rauschenbach (argued), St. Louis, MO, for appellants.

Joe D. Jacobson (argued), Clayton, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, 1 District Judge.

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Appellants, correctional officers and prison administrators, appeal from an order 2 entering judgment against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court found that appellants had violated inmate Jeffrey Davis-El's constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force while removing him from his prison cell. The court awarded plaintiff $10,000.00 in compensatory damages against seven defendants jointly and severally, and awarded punitive damages of $5,000.00 each against two of the defendants. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Use of Force

Jeffrey L. Davis-El ("Davis") was an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center ("PCC") in Potosi, Missouri. In November 1992, Davis filed a complaint alleging that prison guards used excessive force against him while removing him from his cell on October 3, 1992. At that time, defendant Paul Delo was the Superintendent of PCC. Defendants Gregory Dunn, Gregory Conaway, David McPeak, Billy Davis, Jim Underwood and Phillip Wade were corrections officers at PCC.

On October 3, 1992, prison officials conducted a routine search of Davis' housing unit. Each inmate was required to "cuff up" before corrections officers entered and searched his cell. Each inmate was required to stand with his back against the cell door and place his hands behind his back and through the food slot in the cell door to allow officers to handcuff him. Davis was ordered to "cuff up," but instead of placing his back to the door, he faced the door and inserted his hands through the slot. An officer ordered Davis to turn around. Davis slowly removed his hands from the slot and turned his back to the officers. The officers construed Davis' slow movements as a refusal to obey an order, and shut the food slot before he had finished turning around. Davis then requested the presence of a higher-ranking corrections officer.

In response, defendant Dunn, a zone lieutenant, assembled a "movement team," the object of which is to restrain and remove an inmate from his cell with physical force. A movement team is comprised of five corrections officers, each of whom is assigned a role in restraining the inmate. One restrains the inmate's head and upper torso, one restrains each of the inmate's arms, and one restrains each of the inmate's legs. The officers wear protective padding and a helmet, but do not carry weapons.

The trial court made findings of fact regarding the PCC's policies with respect to the use of movement teams. The movement team's objective is to gain physical control of the inmate with minimal risk of injury to the corrections officers and the inmate. Once the decision to employ a movement team is made, physical force is used to restrain the inmate, regardless of whether he resists. The officers are not authorized, however, to use physical force beyond that which is necessary to maintain or regain control. The court found that if each member of the team competently performs his assigned task and the inmate does not resist, the probability of injury to either the officers or the inmate is remote, and that 200 instances of use of a movement team at PCC had resulted in only two serious injuries to inmates. One was the injury at issue in this appeal; the other was an incident in which an inmate's arm was broken.

Missouri Department of Corrections procedures require that each member of the movement team and any other official observing the use of force submit a written report of the incident which should include a description of any injuries sustained by corrections officers or inmates. The incident is also videotaped. There is an official process for review of the movement team's activity. A "use-of-force packet" is assembled which includes officers' reports, the videotape, medical reports, any allegations of abuse by the inmate, a conduct violation report issued to the inmate, and the outcome of any internal investigation.

The packet is reviewed by a series of supervisory personnel, beginning with the officer in charge of the exercise, and ending with the prison superintendent. The prison superintendent reviews the use-of-force packet and makes a determination as to whether the movement team used appropriate force. The packet is then sent to the central office of the Missouri Department of Corrections, where it is reviewed by the security coordinator, the assistant director of adult institutions, and an internal affairs officer. The packet is also reviewed by the Missouri Department of Public Safety and a citizens' advisory committee which does not have the authority to order an internal investigation.

The trial court also made findings of fact regarding the movement team exercise in Davis' cell on October 3, 1992, and the aftermath of the exercise. Defendant Dunn was the designated supervisor of the movement team. The movement team was comprised of defendants McPeak, Conaway, Davis, Underwood, and Wade. McPeak was responsible for restraining the inmate's head and upper torso, Davis and Conaway were each responsible for one of his arms, and Wade and Underwood were each responsible for one of his legs. Another corrections officer was responsible for videotaping the movement team's activities. A licensed practical nurse ("LPN") was present to observe and to examine Davis following the use of force.

Dunn chose McPeak to lead the movement team because of his stature, agility and ability to quickly regain control of inmates. Dunn arrived at Davis' cell at approximately 1:25 p.m. Davis attempted to explain his response to the order to "cuff up." Before he had finished, Dunn ordered him to lie face down on the floor with his head opposite the cell door. Davis immediately complied and the movement team entered his cell in a single file. The trial court found that McPeak lunged onto Davis as he lay unmoving on the cell floor. The court also found that McPeak then repeatedly struck Davis about the head and face, and smashed Davis' chin against the cell's concrete floor. Although appellants Davis, Conaway, Wade and Underwood were in a position to have seen or heard the assault, as they were securing Davis' limbs, each testified that they did not see McPeak strike him. The trial court specifically found that this testimony was not credible.

After Davis was restrained, he was carried from his cell, the cell was searched, and he was carried back into the cell. The LPN wiped blood from his head, face, and chest and off the floor. Davis requested further medical treatment, but refused to be treated while lying on the floor in his cell in restraints. The LPN construed Davis' statements as a refusal of medical care. Davis was instructed to remain on the floor and his leg restraints were removed. The movement team left his cell. The door to the cell was locked and Davis' hand restraints were removed.

The movement team disbanded at approximately 1:34 p.m. Davis continued to complain to corrections officers that he needed medical treatment for a cut on his chin. He was transported to a medical center some time after 4:00 p.m. The cut on Davis' chin required internal and external sutures. The treating physician also ordered x-rays of Davis' head, torso and extremities due to the existence of numerous other contusions and lacerations.

B. The Institution's Response

Each member of the movement team submitted the required written account of the movement team's activities to the appropriate supervisor. None of these reports mentioned any injury to plaintiff. Superintendent Delo reviewed the use-of-force packet, and observed from the videotape that Davis was bleeding immediately after the use of force, but he did not immediately order an investigation. The videotape of the incident was lost after it was forwarded to the Missouri Department of Corrections and had not been located as of the date of trial.

The day after the incident, Davis saw defendant McPeak. As Davis passed by, McPeak pointed at him, laughed, and said, "Keep your chin up. Next time it will be your teeth." Plaintiff saw McPeak again the next day. McPeak pointed at him and laughed.

On October 9, 1992, six days after the incident, James Bush, district assistant for the fourth senatorial district of Missouri, visited Davis at PCC. Bush is responsible for investigating and responding to inmate complaints of mistreatment by corrections officers. At that time, Bush observed that Davis' eyes and the right side of his face were bruised and swollen and saw the sutures in his chin. Davis told Bush that McPeak had beaten him.

Defendant Delo, as superintendent of PCC, was responsible for investigating all inmate claims of excessive force. Delo testified that he could not recall any prior report of abuse or excessive force by an inmate against McPeak. PCC does not track inmate complaints against individual corrections officers; thus, there is no official record of the frequency of complaints of abuse against a particular corrections officer.

The trial court found, however, that Delo had received several complaints about McPeak in the past. Davis had drafted letters to Delo on behalf of other inmates on a number of occasions complaining that McPeak had used excessive force. Delo had not ordered any internal investigations, but had nevertheless concluded that these claims lacked merit. James Bush had also expressed...

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