Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills

• Decision Date: 11 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-10036.,04-10036.
• Citation: 406 F.3d 375
• Parties: ESTATE OF Troy DAVIS, By and through its Successor Administrator, R. Dyann McCULLY and Lisa Jean Davis, Individually; et al., Plaintiffs, Estate of Troy Davis, By and through its Successor Administrator, R. Dyann McCully and Lisa Jean Davis; Barbara Jean Davis, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS; et al., Defendants, Tom Shockley, Chief of Police, Individually and in his official capacity; J.A. Wallace, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants. Barbara Jean Davis, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. City of North Richmond Hills; et al., Defendants, Tom Shockley, Chief of Police, Individually and in his official capacity; J.A. Wallace, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

406 F.3d 375

ESTATE OF Troy DAVIS, By and through its Successor Administrator, R. Dyann McCULLY and Lisa Jean Davis, Individually; et al., Plaintiffs,

Estate of Troy Davis, By and through its Successor Administrator, R. Dyann McCully and Lisa Jean Davis; Barbara Jean Davis, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS; et al., Defendants, Tom Shockley, Chief of Police, Individually and in his official capacity; J.A. Wallace, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.

Barbara Jean Davis, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. City of North Richmond Hills; et al., Defendants, Tom Shockley, Chief of Police, Individually and in his official capacity; J.A. Wallace, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 04-10036.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 11, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey H. Kobs (argued), Mark A. Haney, Kobs & Haney, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

George A. Staples, Jr. (argued), April Marie Virnig, Taylor, Olson, Adkins, Sralla & Elam, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a denial of summary judgment to supervisory law enforcement officials in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the request for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding supervisory liability and the objective reasonableness of the supervisors' actions. Persuaded that the record cannot support a conclusion that supervisory liability would attach, we reverse.

I

Police Officer Allen L. Hill, a member of the North Richland Hills Police Department ("NRHPD") SWAT team, shot and killed Troy James Davis during the execution of a no-knock search and arrest warrant at the residence of Troy James Davis and Barbara Jean Davis. The circumstances of the raid are sharply contested.

Asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, Davis's estate and Davis's mother, Barbara Jean Davis sued Chief of Police Tom Shockley, Police Officer J.A. Wallace, and Police Officer Allen Hill.¹ Plaintiffs asserted that while executing the search and arrest warrant, Officer Hill used excessive force against Davis, shooting and killing him. Hill was the first SWAT team member to enter the home and he shot Davis within the initial two seconds. At the time, according to Plaintiffs, Davis was in his living room, unarmed, arms outstretched and repeating "don't hurt us." According to the police officers, upon entering the home, Hill was immediately confronted by an armed Davis standing at the end of the hallway, pointing a gun at Hill.

Plaintiffs further contended that Officer Wallace and Chief Shockley, two of Hill's supervisors, should be held liable under section 1983 for their inadequate supervision and training of Hill, resulting in Hill's use of excessive force during the raid.² According to Plaintiffs, Wallace and Shockley knew prior to the shooting that Hill was "prone to use excessive and/or deadly force without cause," that Hill had "a reputation for displaying lewd and criminal behavior while on and off-duty," and that Hill's "employment history branded and identified him as dysfunctional and unfit for police work."

Shockley and Wallace, along with the other defendants, moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court determined that Plaintiffs produced evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact whether Shockley and Wallace were deliberately indifferent to Hill's propensity to use excessive force, whether their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional law.

The district court noted that the following evidence supported supervisory liability: testimony from Ann Shelton, a former member of the NRHPD SWAT team, indicating that Hill fired his weapon on three occasions during training exercises when the scenarios did not call for the firing of a weapon; a background investigation report indicating that Hill had a tendency to act too aggressively; and testimony of Randy Cole, a citizen who was pulled over by Hill for a traffic violation, indicating that Hill behaved "like a psycho" and was "going to kill somebody."³ The district court found that the seriousness of the SWAT team training incidents was magnified when laid against Cole's allegations. Further, the district court found evidence that Hill had a reputation for exposing himself, including during a team photograph at SWAT team training—a reputation that earned him the nickname "Penie."

The district court concluded that Shockley and Wallace were not as a matter of law entitled to qualified immunity on the supervisory liability claims and also denied summary judgment to Hill on the excessive force claim.⁴ Shockley and Wallace ("Appellants") filed this appeal.⁵

II

We must first address our jurisdiction. Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment because such a decision is not a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.⁶ However, "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."⁷

"When a district court denies summary judgment on the basis that genuine issues of material fact exist, it has made two distinct legal conclusions: that there are `genuine' issues of fact in dispute, and that these issues are `material.'"⁸ "`[W]e can review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not their genuineness.'"<sup>9</sup> "An officer challenges materiality when he contends that `taking all the plaintiff's factual allegations as true no violation of a clearly established right was shown.'"¹⁰ We determine whether a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable by "look[ing] at the legal argument advanced."¹¹

Appellants argue, inter alia, that even if Plaintiffs' factual allegations are taken as taken as true, they are "not sufficient to constitute either gross negligence or deliberate indifference by the supervisors." The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference for supervisory liability is a legal issue that this court may review on interlocutory appeal.¹² Appellants challenge the materiality of the disputed facts, and we have jurisdiction.¹³

III

In an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, "we do not apply the standard of Rule 56 but instead consider only whether the district court erred in assessing the legal significance of the conduct that the district court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment."¹⁴ We review de novo "the district court's conclusions concerning the legal consequences—the materiality— of the facts."¹⁵ We consider the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-moving party.¹⁶

IV

Appellants argue that Plaintiffs have not overcome the bar of qualified immunity—that there are no material issues of fact because, even in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate supervisory liability. We agree.

A

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."¹⁷ Qualified immunity is

an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law. The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ....¹⁸

As we recently noted, "[b]efore this court—or any court—can adjudicate the merits" of Plaintiffs' claims, they "must overcome the bar of qualified immunity."¹⁹ Once raised, a plaintiff has the burden to rebut the qualified immunity defense "by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. We do not require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established federal rights; our precedent places that burden upon plaintiffs."²⁰ Qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."²¹

B

Plaintiffs have alleged the violation of the constitutional right to be free of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.²² Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Appellants Wallace and Shockley liable as supervisors of Hill. Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinates, such as Hill, on any theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability.²³ Rather, Plaintiffs must show that the conduct of the supervisors denied Davis his constitutional rights.²⁴ When, as here, a plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise, "the plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference."²⁵

With respect to the third prong, we have on several occasions reversed a district court's denial of qualified immunity, persuaded that support was lacking for a conclusion of deliberate indifference on the part of a supervisor.²⁶ "`[D]eliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action."²⁷ "For...