Estate of Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux

• Decision Date: 11 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 27086.,27086.
• Citation: 861 N.W.2d 519
• Parties: ESTATE OF Wayne Kenneth DUCHENEAUX, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Douglas DUCHENEAUX, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

861 N.W.2d 519

ESTATE OF Wayne Kenneth DUCHENEAUX, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.Douglas DUCHENEAUX, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 27086.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Nov. 18, 2014.

Decided March 11, 2015.

Terry L. Pechota of Pechota Law Office, Rapid City, South Dakota, Brad A. Schreiber of The Schreiber Law Firm, Prof. LLC, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

Casey N. Bridgman, Clay A. Anderson, of Bridgman & Anderson Law Firm, Prof. LLC, Wessington Springs, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.

Opinion

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] The Estate of Wayne Kenneth Ducheneaux appeals the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and that court's dismissal of the Estate's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Estate argues Wayne Ducheneaux (the Decedent) lacked the requisite mental capacity, or was unduly influenced by Douglas D. Ducheneaux (Ducheneaux), when the Decedent transferred two quarter sections of Indian trust land located in Tripp County, South Dakota, to Ducheneaux. Although the Estate acknowledged the circuit court had no authority to directly return title of the trust land to the Estate, the Estate nevertheless asserts the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Ducheneaux and, therefore, could have compelled Ducheneaux to make application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to transfer the two quarter sections back to the Estate. We agree that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the parcels held in trust by the United States and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 2.] The Decedent was an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and a lifelong resident of Tripp County, South Dakota. During his final years, the Decedent suffered from a number of adverse medical conditions. After suffering a fall in May 2011, the Decedent was admitted to the Winner Regional Hospital on May 18, 2011, and then transferred to the Winner Nursing Home on May 25, 2011. At this time, two of the Decedent's daughters—Darnel Swanson and Debra Calloway—jointly held power of attorney for their father. The Decedent modified his power of attorney on June 1, 2011, to include a third daughter, Dawn Daughters. The three daughters were unable to agree on a care plan for the Decedent, and after a disastrous meeting at the nursing home on June 13, 2011, the nursing home requested a guardian be appointed for the Decedent.

[¶ 3.] Ducheneaux filed for guardianship of his father in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court on July 1, 2011. Ms. Swanson and Dana Mercer—another of the Decedent's daughters—instituted a guardianship proceeding in the same court on July 5, 2011. After the Decedent withdrew power of attorney from Ms. Swanson and Ms. Calloway on July 6, 2011, Ms. Daughters—who still had power of attorney—removed the Decedent from the nursing home on July 7, 2011. Thereafter, the Decedent resided with, and was cared for by, Ms. Daughters and Ducheneaux, the Decedent's son. The circuit court appointed Ducheneaux guardian of the Decedent and Gary Fenenga, CPA, as conservator of the Decedent. The Decedent passed away on November 18, 2011.

[¶ 4.] Prior to his passing, the Decedent transferred three quarters of land located in Tripp County to Ducheneaux, who is also an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. Tripp County lies in the diminished portion of the original Rosebud Indian Reservation. See generally Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977). Two of the quarters are held in trust by the United States. The Decedent transferred the first quarter¹ to Ducheneaux in July 2011, prior to Ducheneaux's appointment as guardian. The Decedent transferred the second² and third³ quarters to Ducheneaux in August 2011, after Ducheneaux's appointment as the Decedent's guardian. The first parcel was owned and held by the Decedent and is not at issue in this appeal. The second parcel was held in trust by the United States for the Decedent. The third parcel was held in trust by the United States for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, for the benefit of the Decedent.

[¶ 5.] In November 2011, the court-appointed conservator filed an action against Ducheneaux and Ms. Daughters seeking, among other things, to recover the transferred parcels. The circuit court dismissed that action in February 2012, due to the Decedent's death, but the matter was pursued again by the Decedent's personal representative in August 2012. The Estate introduced testimony from Teresa A. Marts, M.D., expressing her opinion that the Decedent was not competent to make important decisions at the time the Decedent transferred the parcels. The Estate moved for partial summary judgment, requesting the circuit court find that Ducheneaux did not, and never did, have an interest in the parcels that the Decedent transferred to him. The circuit court denied the Estate's request, determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parcels held in trust by the United States, and dismissed the action. The circuit court directed the entry of final judgment pursuant to SDCL 15–6–54(b).

[¶ 6.] The Estate raises one issue in this appeal: Whether the circuit court possessed the equitable power to compel Ducheneaux to make application to the Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of Indian trust property to the Estate.

Standard of Review

[¶ 7.] A challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is a question of law that we review de novo. State ex rel. LeCompte v. Keckler, 2001 S.D. 68, ¶ 6, 628 N.W.2d 749, 752. As such, “this Court gives no deference to the circuit court's conclusions of law.” Cable v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2009 S.D. 59, ¶ 19, 769 N.W.2d 817, 825. Because “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is conferred solely by constitutional or statutory provisions[,] ... [it] can neither be conferred on a court, nor denied to a court by the acts of the parties or the procedures they employ.” Id. ¶ 20, 769 N.W.2d at 825 (quoting Application of Koch Explor. Co., 387 N.W.2d 530, 536 (S.D.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 8.] The Estate argues the Decedent was not mentally competent to transfer land to Ducheneaux and that Ducheneaux exerted undue influence on the Decedent in order to prompt the transfers. The Estate does not argue the circuit court had jurisdiction over the trust land itself. Rather, the Estate argues that, because the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Ducheneaux, the circuit court could have compelled Ducheneaux to “make application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to return the two quarters of trust land to the estate.” In essence, the Estate suggests the circuit court did not need to have subject matter jurisdiction over the trust land in order to effect its transfer back to the Estate. Because the circuit court did not decide this case on its merits, the ultimate question of whether the parcels at issue should be transferred back to the Estate is not properly before us. On the jurisdictional question, we agree with the circuit court and affirm.

[¶ 9.] It is correct that courts have long recognized that “[a] court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person.” Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8, 30 S.Ct. 3, 6, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909).

[W]hen the subject matter of a suit in a court of equity is within another state or country, but the parties within the jurisdiction of the court, the suit may be maintained and remedies granted which may directly affect and operate upon the person of the defendant, and not upon the subject-matter, although the subject-matter is referred to in the decree, and the defendant is ordered to do or refrain from certain acts toward it, and it is thus ultimately but indirectly affected by the relief granted. In such case, the decree is not of itself legal title, nor does it transfer the legal title. It must be executed by the party, and obedience is compelled by proceedings in the nature of contempt, attachment, or sequestration.

Id. at 11, 30 S.Ct. at 8. However, this exception to the normal territorial limitations of a court is limited and well defined. Id. at 8, 30 S.Ct. at 6. “[T]he power to convey must not be a power given by such foreign court, but a power conferred either by statute or by act of the holder of the legal title....” Joy v. Midland State Bank, 26 S.D. 244, 251, 128 N.W. 147, 149 (1910). Here, the United States holds legal title to the trust land at issue. The Estate argues this doctrine is applicable because the Estate asks only that Ducheneaux be compelled to make the appropriate applications to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for transfer of the trust land. Because the United States would still retain its usual power to grant or deny the application, see 25 C.F.R. § 152.23 (2014) (requiring federal approval for any contemplated “sale, exchange or gift of trust or restricted land”), and because the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Ducheneaux, the Estate concludes such a compulsion is within the power of the circuit court.

[¶ 10.] There is no contested issue that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Ducheneaux. However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized two additional restrictions “to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by federal law. Second, it may unlawfully infringe ‘on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142–43, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980) (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) ). Furthermore, South Dakota's Constitution expressly acknowledges the supremacy of the federal government in matters pertaining to Indian lands. It...