Estate of Eagle v. Eagle
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1145-21-3 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF RALPH EAGLE, BY MELISSA CUPP, EXECUTOR v. BARBARA EAGLE |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY Thomas J. Wilson, IV Judge.
Dana J. Cornett for appellant.
Grant D. Penrod (Nicole D. Faut; Hoover Penrod PLC, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Decker, Chief Judge, Humphreys and Friedman Judges Argued at Lexington, Virginia.
Appellant the Estate of Ralph Eagle, appeals the circuit court's interpretation of a premarital agreement between Ralph Eagle and Barbara Eagle. Appellant assigns error to the circuit court's finding that two savings certificates, and any money derived from them, were joint property under the terms of the agreement. Appellant also asserts the circuit court improperly divided the couples' property under equitable distribution concepts rather than by the terms of the agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We view the evidence, and reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to Barbara, the prevailing party before the circuit court. See e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va.App. 673, 678 (1999).
The parties were married in 1997. Prior to their marriage, Ralph and Barbara entered into a premarital agreement (the "Agreement"). At the time of their marriage, Ralph had significantly more financial means than Barbara. His attorney drafted the document, and Barbara signed it the day she first saw it. The couple married three days later. The couple sought a divorce in 2019 under the terms of their Agreement.
The parties waived spousal support and other rights in the Agreement, and agreed to terms governing their property. The Agreement sought to explain which property holdings would be "separate" property, free from any form of marital property designation-and which would be joint and shared. The parties agreed on the following definitions in classifying their existing and future property:
For purposes of this appeal, it is significant that the language of the Agreement allows any property that was separately acquired to remain separate property, including any proceeds accrued on the separate property. The joint property definition provides that "any property . . . which shall now or be held in the joint names of the parties shall be owned in accordance with the title of joint ownership" and "shall be presumed to be held equally."
Prior to the marriage, Ralph owned two savings certificates in his own name. In 2010, during their marriage, Ralph renewed the savings certificates-a process of cashing out the certificates and repurchasing them. He renewed the certificates in the names "Ralph N. Eagle or Barbara A. Eagle WROS." Ralph testified he set it up that way because he "figured if [he] ever needed to get some money to do something with, [he] didn't have to go ask her if [he] could do it [he] would've just done it [himself]." He also added her name to the certificates
During the marriage, Ralph contributed rental income generated from the lease of certain real estate, draws from his business' partnership account, and his social security payment to a joint banking account from which marital expenses were paid. Conversely, Barbara set up an account in her sole name into which she deposited all of her separate funds, and later added her adult son's name. Disagreements over spending habits and Barbara's refusal to contribute to the couple's joint account, over time, led to marital discord.
As the marriage deteriorated, Ralph cashed out the two $50,000 savings certificates, renewed them in his own name, and deposited the earned interest money, about $25,000, into a newly opened bank account in his sole name. This occurred in June 2019. Ralph stopped contributing funds to the couple's joint account in July 2019. Barbara found out that the savings certificates were cashed out at the bank after their separation-Ralph did not discuss it with her. The parties separated in November 2019.
Both parties acknowledged that the Agreement controlled the property distribution during the circuit court hearing regarding division of property. Barbara asked for one of the two savings certificates to be awarded to her, along with half the value of the interest derived from the saving certificates (her half being $12,882.99).[1] Barbara argued that the savings certificates were joint because they were retitled to include her name during the marriage, thus transforming them, and the interest earned on them, from Ralph's separate property into their joint property.
Ralph argued that the savings certificates were not joint because he had titled them with an "or" between their names. He further argued that the certificates reverted to his separate property when he renewed them in his name alone, and the classification of property should be calculated based on its status at the time of the couple's separation, as the Agreement did not specify when the determination of property would be made.
The circuit court noted that the "Joint Property" clause of the Agreement was the crux of the dispute and analyzed the plain meaning of the contractual language. It found that the certificates, once jointly titled, were owned jointly in accordance with the Agreement. The Court's final decree ordered Ralph to transfer one of the certificates to Barbara. It also ordered Ralph to pay Barbara half of the accrued interest on the certificates.
This appeal followed.[2] The circuit court's holding that the savings certificates were jointly owned and that the proceeds from cashing them in were jointly owned are the only issues disputed on appeal.
We review the trial court's interpretation of a contract de novo. Dowling v. Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 516 (2005). Premarital agreements are contracts subject to the rules of construction of contracts generally. Smith v. Smith, 43 Va.App. 279, 286 (2004). Thus, we follow the rule of applying the "plain meaning of unambiguous contract terms." Id. at 286-87. We "consider the words of the contract within the four corners of the instrument itself." Dowling, 270 Va. at 516. In interpreting and enforcing a contract "it is the duty of the court to construe a contract as written." Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187 (1984). The court "cannot read into contracts language which will add to or take away from the meaning of the words already contained therein." Id. (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. Avis, 124 Va. 711, 719 (1919)). "The guiding light in the construction of a contract is the intention of the parties as expressed by them in the words they have used, and courts are bound to say that the parties intended what the written instrument plainly declares." Id. (quoting Meade v. Wallen, 226 Va. 465, 467 (1984)). "Moreover, what the parties claim they might have said, or should have said, cannot alter what they actually said." Id. at 188.
In the first assignment of error, appellant argues that the savings certificates, and their proceeds, were always Ralph's separate property, even when Barbara's name was added to the renewed certificates in 2010. Appellant points to inclusion of the word "or" between Ralph and Barbara's names on the savings certificates, suggesting that this disjunctive modifier kept the certificates from becoming "joint property."
Appellant relies heavily...
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