Estate of Eason v. Lanier
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18 C 5362 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF TERRELL EASON, deceased, by DEBORAH EASON, his aunt and independent administrator, Plaintiff, v. P.O. LARRY LANIER #16195, P.O. DAVID TAYLOR #18525, and the CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Terrell Eason was shot and killed by Chicago Police Officers Larry Lanier and David Taylor. Eason's estate, by Eason's aunt, Deborah Eason, brought this action against Lanier and Taylor, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983, and state law claims for wrongful death, funeral and burial expenses, and indemnification by the City of Chicago for any judgment against Lanier and Taylor. (Dkt 52.)[1] Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, summary judgment is entered for Lanier and Taylor on qualified immunity grounds and the court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
After defendants filed their motion for summary judgment (dkt. 107) and statement of facts (dkt. 108) under Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1, Eason filed a response to the motion (dkt 115) and a response and statement of additional facts (dkt 114). In reply, defendants raised certain deficiencies in Eason's response and statement of additional facts. (Dkt 125.) Eason was granted leave to refile an amended response to correct those deficiencies and to file a sur-reply. (Dkt. 126, 127.) Eason filed an amended response, amended Local Rule 56.1 responsive statement with additional facts, and sur-reply. (Dkts. 128, 129, 130.) Eason's amended Local Rule 56.1 responsive statement was stricken for including, for the first time, additional facts beyond those included in his original Local Rule 56.1 responsive statement (dkts. 134, 135), but he was granted leave to assert those additional facts (dkt. 138). Eason filed a second amended Local Rule 56.1 responsive statement with those additional facts (dkt. 139), to which defendants replied (dkt. 142).
Thus, the following factual assertions come from defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts (dkt. 108, “DSOF”) and Eason's second amended response to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts and additional facts (dkt. 139, “PSOF”).[2]
At the outset, there are several discrepancies and disputes in the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements that require clarification or resolution before determining the undisputed facts on summary judgment. When considering whether a party is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the court relies on the undisputed material facts as set forth by the parties. Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1 govern how parties must present factual matters in supporting or opposing summary judgment. Under Rule 56(c)(1), parties must support both factual assertions and disputes of factual assertions with citation to admissible record evidence. Local Rules 56.1(a)(2) and (d) further require the movant to submit a statement of material facts with supporting citations in a specific numbered-paragraph form. Local Rules 56.1(b)(2) and (e) require the nonmovant to file a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement; where it disputes a fact, it must include references to the record evidence on which it relies. Under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), the non-moving party may set forth additional material facts in its response. The court is “entitled to . . . strict compliance with” Local Rule 56.1 and has discretion to strike or consider improperly asserted facts. Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011).
The following analysis of the parties' factual assertions requires some familiarity with their respective views on what the undisputed evidence establishes. For their part, defendants argue that both Lanier and Taylor fired their weapons after Eason had first stumbled to the ground, on his own, and then stood back up with gun in hand and continued to run, all while in the backyard of 4730 W. Fulton Ave. In opposition, Eason attempts to establish that either the evidence does not conclusively show or it is disputed whether he was shot while on the ground on his hands and knees, following his stumble, before he had stood up with the gun.
In response to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, Eason admitted to most of them but with qualifications. He disputes paragraphs 30, 36, and 54.
As a preliminary matter, Eason's response to defendants' numbered paragraphs is off by one. Compare dkt. 108 at 1-8 (60 paragraphs) with dkt. 139 at 1-9 (59 paragraphs).[3] The error occurred at paragraphs 55 and 56 where Eason combined them into one paragraph (PRDSOF ¶55): “Officer Lanier did not continue to discharge his weapon” (DSOF ¶55) and “Defendant Officers went over the radio immediately to request an ambulance when Eason was shot” (DSOF ¶56). Eason admitted the combined paragraph, so it is thus construed as such.
Moving on, Eason admits to many of defendants' asserted facts with the qualification that Lanier and Taylor “testified to such after [they were] sued” (PRDSOF ¶¶17, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51) and notes in another place that “there is no audio to verify” certain testimony (PRDSOF ¶41). Those qualifications do not create a disputed issue of fact, because they do not “cite specific evidentiary material” - e.g., declarations, deposition testimony, video - “that controverts the asserted fact.” LR 56.1(e)(3). Rather, they merely suggest metaphysical doubt about it. See infra Legal Standard. The failure to cite admissible evidence to support a disputed fact renders that fact undisputed. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015).
For admissions that also “deny that the video reflects this” (PRDSOF ¶¶25, 39, 44, 46, 48, 49, 54), Eason did not provide a counter-explanation of what he believes the video shows, if not what defendants assert. Despite the failure to do so, video evidence will be relied on only to the extent that it establishes the events “with confidence” and “beyond reasonable question, ” while testimonial explanations of the video will be relied on to the extent they are consistent with the video. See infra Legal Standard.
Next, defendants' paragraph 52, although admitted by Eason, is not supported by the cited video time stamp at the 5-second mark from Taylor's body-worn camera, causing a discrepancy between what exactly is undisputed and disputed in that paragraph. Paragraph 52 states that Lanier “was positioned in the rear yard of 4732 W. Fulton to the right of the tree and west of Eason when he discharged his weapon, ” citing in support the 5-second mark of the video and paragraphs 11 and 14 of Lanier's declaration. (DSOF ¶52.) Eason admits to Lanier's stated positioning “and that Lanier discharged his weapon at 00:00:05.” (PRDSOF ¶52.)
Paragraph 52 does not purport to assert that Lanier fired his weapon at the 5-second mark, and neither the video nor declaration establishes that fact. Although the camera's audio had not started, [4] at the 5-second mark Eason is seen picking himself up off the ground. According to other evidence not disputed by Eason (see DSOF ¶¶25, 32, 33, 39, 44, 50), Taylor, who fired his weapon first, had not yet fired until Eason was back on his feet, holding a gun, and running, which occurred after the 5-second mark. Rather, the 5-second mark of the video shows Taylor landing in the backyard of 4730 W. Fulton Ave., after jumping over a chain-link fence and Eason can be seen on his hands and knees starting to pick himself up off the ground. (Video at 0:00:05; DSOF ¶22.) According to undisputed statements from Taylor, he fired his weapon eight consecutive times after he saw Eason back on his feet and running again, which is around the 7-second mark. (DSOF ¶¶32 (citing Video at 0:00:08-09), 33, 35 (citing Video 0:00:07-10).)
Lanier's declaration also does not establish that he fired the first shot or did so at the 5-second mark of the video. Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that “[a]t the time of the shooting, [he] was located to the west of Eason in the rear yard of 4732 W. Fulton Ave.” (dkt. 108-5 at 3, ¶11), which was the backyard adjacent to one in which Eason was shot. And paragraph 14, which cites the 5-second mark of the video, stated that he “was still positioned to the right of the tree captured on the body worn camera when I discharged my weapon.” (Id. at ¶14). To the extent that there is ambiguity in paragraph 14 as to whether Lanier is stating that either he fired his weapon at the 5-second mark or the citation to the 5-second mark is to show the tree that he was standing next to, paragraph 13 resolves any ambiguity by stating that he “did not discharge [his] weapon when [he] saw Eason on all fours in the process of standing up with a gun in his right hand” (id. at 3, ¶13), which, again, is around the 5-second mark. Consistent with that, Lanier's deposition confirms the order of events:
Thus, defendants' paragraph 52 asserts where Lanier was when he fired his weapon, not when he did so, and that fact is undisputed.
Eason also objects to defendants' asserted fact in paragraph 36 that “[o]nce Eason fell to the ground...
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