Estate of Finlay, Matter of, Docket No. 79783

Citation424 N.W.2d 272,430 Mich. 590
Decision Date07 June 1988
Docket NumberDocket No. 79783
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE OF Linda L. FINLAY, Deceased. Patricia THOMAS and Jacquelynne Russell, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Michael J. FINLAY, Marianne L. Finlay Baker, Maureen D. Finlay Ball, and Gregory T. Finlay, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Touma, Watson, Nicholson, Whaling, Fletcher & DeGrow, P.C. by Douglas S. Touma, Port Huron, for petitioners-appellants.

Campbell, Keenan & Harry by C. Daniel Harry, Clarkston, for respondents-appellees.

ARCHER, Justice.

We granted leave to consider two issues: (1) whether the former Probate Code must be applied because the parties so stipulated in the probate court; and (2) whether the law applicable to this case is the former Probate Code or the Revised Probate Code, M.C.L. Sec. 700.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5001 et seq.

We hold that the RPC is the applicable law. The RPC became effective July 1, 1979. 1 M.C.L. Sec. 700.992(a); M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992(a) states that the RPC applies to proceedings begun after that date. The original proceedings began in the probate court after July 1, 1979; therefore, the RPC clearly applies.

We also hold that the parties' stipulation to apply the former Probate Code was a stipulation of law that does not bind a court.

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts

The facts of this case are undisputed. On June 22, 1967, the decedent, Linda L. Finlay, married John R. Finlay. John R. Finlay had four children from a prior marriage. Linda L. Finlay had not been married before and had no children. During the course of her marriage to John R. Finlay, Linda L. Finlay bore no children, nor did she adopt John R. Finlay's children.

On May 13, 1978, Linda L. Finlay executed a will. In the will, she devised a parcel of property in Bear Lake, Michigan to her sister's children 2 and gave all of the rest to her husband, John R. Finlay. The will further provided that "[i]n the event my said husband, John R. Finlay, predeceases me, then I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate to my husband's children, namely Michael J. Finlay, Marianne L. Finlay, Maureen D. Finlay and Gregory T. Finlay, in equal shares."

On February 20, 1979, Linda L. Finlay and John R. Finlay were divorced. The judgment of divorce was executed by both parties and contained a property settlement between the parties. After the divorce, Linda L. Finlay did not execute a new will, nor did she expressly revoke her old one.

On December 23, 1984, Linda L. Finlay was killed in an automobile accident. Her only remaining heirs-at-law are her two sisters, Jacquelynne A. Russell and Patricia Thomas. Russell and Thomas are the appellants in this case. On February 12, 1985, appellants filed a petition to commence these proceedings in the Probate Court for the Thirty-First Judicial Circuit. Appellants sought to admit the Last Will and Testament of Linda L. Finlay as to the property in Bear Lake but contended that the residue passed by intestacy. On April 25, 1985, appellants moved to withdraw this petition. Instead, they sought to have the entire estate distributed through intestacy. In opposition, appellees contended that the residue of the estate should pass to them under the terms of the will.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The Court conducted oral argument on June 17, 1985. At oral argument, the parties stipulated and the probate court found that the applicable law was the former Probate Code, not the RPC.

Appellees appealed the probate court's decision ordering intestate distribution of the estate. A unanimous Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the RPC should have been applied. 3 The Court relied on M.C.L. Sec. 700.124; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5124. The relevant subsection is M.C.L. Sec. 700.124(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27.5124(2). This subsection provides:

"If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage annulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment of property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as a personal representative, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property prevented from passing to a former spouse because of revocation by divorce passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent and other provisions conferring some power or office on the former spouse are interpreted as if the spouse failed to survive the decedent. Provisions not revoked by any means except the operation of this subsection are revived by testator's remarriage to the former spouse. A decree of separation which does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section. Any other change of circumstances does not revoke a will." (Emphasis added.)

This statute requires that a former spouse's share by treated as if he failed to survive the decedent. In this case, the appellees were entitled to receive the former husband's share, as expressed in the will.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was not bound to accept the parties' stipulation that the former Probate Code applied. 4

Appellants moved for a rehearing before the Court of Appeals. The motion was denied. Appellants applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave to appeal limited to the two issues determined by the Court of Appeals. 5

I

The threshold issue is whether we are bound to accept the parties' stipulation that the former Probate Code applies. We hold that we are not bound.

The stipulation in the lower court was a stipulation of law. It is well established that a court is not bound by the parties' stipulations of law. See, e.g., Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125, 138 (1862), and Bradway v. Miller, 200 Mich. 648, 655; 167 N.W. 15 (1918). 6 It is within the inherent power of a court, as the judicial body, to determine the applicable law in each case. To hold otherwise could lead to absurd results; for example, parties could force a court to apply laws that were in direct contravention to the laws of this state. It would also allow the parties to stipulate to laws that were obsolete, overruled, or unconstitutional. On the appellate level, this would result in a tremendous waste of judicial resources, since such case law would have no precedential value.

II

The final issue is whether the applicable law is the former Probate Code or the RPC. We hold that the controlling law is the RPC.

The decedent and John Finlay were divorced February 20, 1979. On that date, the former Probate Code was in effect.

The RPC became effective July 1, 1979. This date was after the divorce, but before the parties originally commenced these proceedings in probate court. The RPC controls this case because M.C.L. Sec. 700.992; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992 provides that it is to apply to proceedings begun after the effective date of the statute. Paragraph (a) of M.C.L. Sec. 700.992; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992 provides:

"Except as provided elsewhere in this act, on the effective date of this act:

"(a) This act applies to any proceedings in court then pending or thereafter commenced regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent that in the opinion of the court the former procedure should be made applicable in a particular case in the interest of justice or because of infeasibility of application...."

According to paragraph (a), the RPC applies to a proceeding commenced after the effective date of the act unless: (1) the court opines that the former Probate Code should be applied for the interest of justice, or (2) it is infeasible to apply the RPC. There is no evidence that the former Probate Code should be applied to further the interest of justice. Similarly, there is no evidence that it is infeasible to apply the RPC. Accordingly, we hold that the RPC is the applicable law. In addition to paragraph (a), there are three other paragraphs in M.C.L. Sec. 700.992; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992. Each paragraph is preceded by the letters (b), (c) or (d). The phrase "any proceeding" appears twice in M.C.L. Sec. 700.992; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992; it appears in paragraph (a) and paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) provides:

"An act done before the effective date in any proceeding and any accrued right is not impaired by this act. If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period of time which has commenced to run by the provisions of any statute before the effective date, the provisions shall remain in force with respect to that right."

Appellants argue that paragraph (c) precludes the application of the RPC to this case. Appellants present a two-fold argument for the application of this section. First, they argue that the divorce revoked the will and extinguished appellees' rights in the estate. Second, the divorce and simultaneous revocation created accrued rights in appellants, enabling them to inherit by intestate succession. These arguments were adopted by the probate court.

We disagree with the probate court's opinion and present a two-fold rejection of appellants' arguments.

First, M.C.L. Sec. 700.992(c); M.S.A. Sec. 27.5992(c) is not applicable because no "act" of the circuit court is impaired when the RPC is applied to these facts.

Appellants argue that the divorce decree simultaneously revoked the will under the former Probate Code, thereby causing appellees' rights to be extinguished and appellants' rights to accrue. This contention misapplies the cases interpreting the former Probate Code.

The relevant portion of the former Probate Code is M.C.L. Sec. 702.9; M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(79). It provided:

"No will nor any part thereof shall be revoked, unless by burning, tearing, canceling or obliterating the same, with the intention of revoking it, by the testator, or by some person in his...

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