Estate of Fritz v. Hennigar
| Decision Date | 20 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. C19-2046-LTS,C19-2046-LTS |
| Parties | THE ESTATE OF WILLYS H. FRITZ, DANIEL W. FRITZ, ADMINISTRATOR (on behalf of Leanne G. Fritz, decedent's surviving widow; Daniel W. Fritz, decedent's surviving adult son, and Susan G. Lueder, decedent's surviving adult daughter), Plaintiffs, v. BRYSON HENNIGAR and WEST UNION, IOWA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This case, which arose from a tragic collision between a law enforcement vehicle and a vehicle operated by a civilian driver, is before me on defendants' motion (Doc. 42) for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have filed a resistance (Doc. 49) and defendants have filed a reply (Doc. 59). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).
Plaintiffs filed this case in the Iowa District Court for Fayette County on June 20, 2019, seeking to recover damages resulting from the death of Willys Fritz (Willys). Doc. 6. Plaintiffs are Willys' son and estate administrator, Daniel Fritz, along with Willys' surviving wife and daughter. Id. The state court petition named two defendants: (1) the City of West Union and (2) Bryson Hennigar, a former police officer for West Union. Id. Plaintiffs raised state law claims of negligence and recklessness, along with an unconstitutional deprivation of life claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
On July 12, 2019, the City filed a notice of removal to this court and a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' negligence claim.1 Doc. 1. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand on July 29, 2019, which was denied on November 26, 2019. Doc. 10, 26. On December 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which no longer includes a negligence claim. Doc. 29. Defendants then withdrew their motion to dismiss and filed an answer. Doc. 30-31. On July 31, 2020, defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. Doc. 42.
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. Facts that are "critical" under the substantive law are material, while facts that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are not. Id.
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when "'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChryslerCorp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only provides "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute" so as to "require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Id. at 248-49. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, "because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, "the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine." Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996).
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
On July 17, 2017, just before 2:40 p.m., defendant Hennigar received a call from the apartment manager at Westwood Apartments in West Union, Iowa, who reported an argument between tenants and asked for assistance.2 Doc. 42-1 at 1-2. The Westwood Apartments were considered a "problem area" in West Union to which police were frequently called. Id. at 4. Hennigar had responded to an incident a month earlier, involving the same tenants, that resulted in an arrest. Id. Hennigar informed dispatch that he was en route to a fight in progress and began driving to the Westwood Apartments. Id. at 2.
After turning northbound on Iowa Highway 150, a two-lane highway, Hennigar accelerated quickly with his lights and siren activated. Id. Three vehicles were between him and the upcoming intersection of Highway 150 and Highway 18. One northbound driver saw Hennigar approaching rapidly from behind and quickly pulled off to the side of the road out of fear of getting hit. Doc. 54 at 4. As Hennigar passed that northbound vehicle, part of his police SUV crossed over the middle line and into the southbound lane, causing a southbound vehicle on Highway 150 to also quickly pull off the road. Id. The third vehicle was a pickup truck with a large box over its cargo bed, but it turned right (east) at the intersection before Hennigar reached it. Doc. 56-1 at 3. Hennigar does not dispute that vehicles moved off the road as he approached, but he claims they did so to yield the right-of-way to him as required by Iowa law. Doc. 56-1 at 3. Hennigar's speed while approaching the intersection is not clear from the record, though estimates for two stretches of highway near where he passed the vehicles came to 44 mph and 51 mph. Doc. 55-1 at 12; Doc. 55-2 at 157.
The intersection of Highways 150 and 18 includes a four-way stop and is one of the busiest intersections in West Union. Doc. 54 at 4. Hennigar claims he slowed slightly as he approached the intersection, which was clear, and made eye contact with a driver who was stopped on the east side of the intersection before continuing through it. Doc. 42-1 at 2; Doc. 56-1 at 3. Plaintiffs assert he slowed down little, if at all, before the intersection. Doc. 54 at 3. In any event, Hennigar accelerated through the intersection, reaching speeds as high as 60 mph, and collided with Willys approximately 272 feet north of it. Doc. 42-1 at 3.
Leading up to the accident, Willys was waiting at the stop sign of a business turnoff on the west side of Highway 150. Id. He waited for over 15 seconds to let three vehicles pass, one northbound and two southbound. Doc. 54 at 4; BP Video 1, 02:39:34 - 02:39:51 p.m..3 As the second southbound vehicle was passing, Willys began driving straight across Highway 150 toward a gas station on the opposite side. Doc. 42-1 at 3; BP Video 1, 02:39:51 p.m. A little more than four seconds later, Willys' truck was broadsided by Hennigar's police SUV while crossing the northbound lane of Highway 150. Doc. 42-1 at 3; BP Video 1, 02:39:55 p.m.; Doc. 55-1 at 14. Willys died of injuries sustained from the crash, but the exact timing of his death, and particularly his level of consciousness leading up to it, are disputed.
Crash data retrieval (CDR) software from Hennigar's SUV recorded data up to five seconds before the collision. From five to two seconds before the collision Hennigar's SUV accelerated from 47 mph to 60 mph with the accelerator pedal fully pressed down and the engine throttle at 99%. Doc. 42-1 at 3; Doc. 55-2 at 76. Hennigar removed his foot from the accelerator approximately two seconds before the collision and applied the brakes within half a second later. Doc. 42-1 at 3; Doc. 55-2 at 76. Hennigar'sSUV decelerated over the final two seconds before the collision and was travelling approximately 34 mph at the time of the collision. Doc. 42-1 at 3; Doc. 55-2 at 76, 153, 160. The speed limit on Highway 150 at the site of the collision is 35 mph. Doc. 42-1 at 3.
There is some disagreement as to whether, or when, Hennigar and Willys were able to see each other before the collision. Hennigar claims that he saw Willys at the stop sign as he passed through the intersection and thought Willys would yield to him since he was operating in emergency mode. Doc. 42-1 at 5. Plaintiffs note, however, that Hennigar has provided inconsistent accounts as to when he first saw Willys, as he has stated on at least one other occasion that there was a semi-truck in the southbound lane, on the north side of the intersection, that blocked his view such that he first saw Willys'...
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