Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Decision Date | 03 June 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 19535.,19535. |
Citation | 427 F.2d 80 |
Parties | ESTATE of Harry R. FRUEHAUF, Deceased, National Bank of Detroit, Harry R. Fruehauf, Jr., and Thomas L. Munson, Co-Executors, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
E. James Gamble, Detroit, Mich., for appellants; Dykema, Wheat, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit, Mich., of counsel.
Janet R. Spragens, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Crombie J. D. Garrett, Benjamin M. Parker, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellees.
Before PECK, McCREE and COMBS, Circuit Judges.
Harry R. Fruehauf (hereinafter "the decedent") died on April 29, 1962, in Detroit, Michigan. An estate tax return filed with the district director of internal revenue for Detroit, Michigan, was subsequently determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (hereinafter "the Commissioner") to disclose a deficiency in the tax upon the estate. The basis of the Commissioner's deficiency determination was the failure by the executors to include in decedent's gross estate the value of the proceeds of six insurance policies on decedent's life in which the Commissioner determined that decedent possessed "incidents of ownership" at the time of his death. This appeal is from the Tax Court's affirmance1 of the Commissioner's deficiency determination.
All six of the policies on decedent's life were applied for, paid for, and owned by decedent's wife, Vera Berns Fruehauf, who was also the primary beneficiary of each policy. She died testate approximately fourteen months prior to the date of decedent's death. Among other things, her will bequeathed her residuary estate to a trust, the net income of which was to be paid to her husband, the decedent, for life with a remainder over to her issue per stirpes. The will also assigned to the trust created from the residuary estate the life insurance policies owned by the wife at the date of her death and gave to the executors and trustees certain powers over those insurance policies. Finally, the will named decedent as a co-executor of his wife's estate and as a co-trustee of the trust created by her will. The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows:
At the date of decedent's death the administration of his wife's estate had not been completed. There had been no distribution to the trust established under paragraph Eighth of his wife's will, and neither decedent nor the other trustees named in the will had been appointed by the probate court. All of the assets of the wife's estate which would have been distributed to the testamentary trust were distributed directly to the Fruehauf's son, Harry R. Fruehauf, Jr.
The Commissioner determined that the proceeds of the six insurance policies on decedent's life were includible in his gross estate under § 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter "the Code"), which provides in part as follows:
The immediate question raised by the above quoted language is whether the decedent possessed "any of the incidents of ownership" in the policies on his life at the time of his death, and this raises the additional question of the meaning of the term "incidents of ownership." Fortunately, the treasury regulations promulgated under the statute provide a definition of the term sufficient for the purposes of this case. The regulations provide in pertinent part as follows:
Treas.Regs. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2).
Comparison of the above-quoted regulation with the pertinent provisions of the wife's will, supra, readily discloses that decedent did possess a number of powers over the policies in the nature of "incidents of ownership" in his fiduciary capacity as executor of his wife's will and trustee-designate of the testamentary trust. The issue was thus narrowed, both in this Court and in the Court below, to the question of whether the powers over the policies which decedent here held constitute "incidents of ownership" in view of the fact that he held these powers in a fiduciary capacity only. The Tax Court answered this in the affirmative and held that therefore the proceeds of the policies were includible in his gross estate.
While the opinion of the Tax Court clearly related the holding to the facts of this case, certain language in that opinion is susceptible to interpretation as a broad per se rule that possession by a decedent of powers constituting incidents of ownership in insurance policies on his life, regardless of the capacity in which they are held, always requires inclusion of the proceeds of the policies in the decedent's gross estate. In reasoning to this conclusion the Tax Court placed heavy reliance on a number of cases2 which arose under § 2038 ( ) of the Code. Section 2038 charges a decedent's gross estate with any property of which he made an inter vivos transfer if, at the date of his death, he possessed the power to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate" the transfer. The statute also provides that the existence of the power is to be determined "without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired the power." Thus, the Tax Court reasoned:
and held that:
"The fact the powers over the policies were held by decedent in a fiduciary capacity is no bar to their constituting incidents of ownership under section 2042." 50 T.C. at 926.
We must disagree with the Tax Court's broad per se rule. We believe that there is a distinction between the issues arising under § 2038 where the decedent, as transferor of certain property, possesses at his death the power, even though in a fiduciary capacity, to revoke or change the transfer, and the issues in a case arising under § 2042 where the decedent is the transferee, in a fiduciary capacity, of powers constituting incidents of ownership in the insurance policies on his life. Where a decedent holds the requisite powers over policies on his life solely because he is a transferee, in a fiduciary capacity, of those powers, with no beneficial interest therein, such arrangement can hardly be construed as a substitute for testamentary disposition on decedent's part. Cf. Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 288 U.S. 436, 444, 53 S.Ct. 451, 77 L.Ed. 880 (1933); Commissioner of...
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