Estate of Gentry v. Diamond Rock Hill Realty, LLC, 2020 EDA 2014
Decision Date | 20 February 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2020 EDA 2014,2020 EDA 2014 |
Citation | 111 A.3d 194,2015 PA Super 40 |
Parties | The ESTATE OF Patricia Amelie Logan GENTRY, Deceased, Appellant v. DIAMOND ROCK HILL REALTY, LLC, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Harris R. Rosen, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Richard D. Magee, Jr., Doylestown, for appellee.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
John Devlin (“Devlin”), executor of the Estate of Patricia Amelie Logan Gentry, appeals a June 19, 2014 order entered by the orphans' court. In that order, the learned orphans' court sustained the preliminary objections of Diamond Rock Hill Realty, LLC (“Diamond”), to Devlin's petition for citation to show cause why Diamond should not return real property to the Estate or why a judgment should not be entered against Diamond. We reverse.
Patricia Amelie Logan Gentry (“Decedent”), a resident of Robeson County, North Carolina, died testate on July 17, 2011. At the time of her death, Decedent owned real property located at 523 Parkway Drive in Bucks County, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). Pursuant to Decedent's Will, which she executed on May 14, 2011, Decedent nominated Devlin as executor of her Estate and directed Devlin “in his unbridled discretion” to “cause [the Property] to be sold by private or public sale.” Orphans' Court Opinion (“O.C.O.”), 8/11/2014, at 1–2. Under the terms of the Will, Decedent's granddaughter, Cynthia Gentry, was to receive $20,000.00 from the Property's net sale proceeds.
On August 17, 2011, the Decedent allegedly executed a deed conveying the Property to Diamond. The deed was prepared by Alpert Abstract, LLC (“Alpert”), a title insurance company. On the final page of the instrument, a Robeson County, North Carolina notary public certified that Decedent personally appeared before her and executed the deed on August 17, 2011. And yet, the Decedent unquestionably could not have conveyed the Property to Diamond on August 17, 2011. How do we know this? Decedent had died thirty-one days earlier.
On October 19, 2011, a North Carolina court probated Decedent's Will and appointed Devlin as executor of the Estate. On July 17, 2013, Devlin filed a petition for citation in the orphans' court division of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.1 Therein, Devlin requested that a citation be issued compelling Diamond and Alpert to show cause why they should not return the Property to Decedent's Estate, or, in the alternative, why judgment should not be entered against them for $85,000.00. Specifically, Devlin averred that the August 17, 2011 conveyance was “patently void on its face and fraudulent,” and sought to have title to the property (or monetary damages) returned to the Estate. Devlin's Petition for Citation, 7/17/2013, at 2. The petition further alleged that neither the Estate, nor Devlin on its behalf, received any proceeds from the sale of the Property, and that Devlin made no distribution arising from the sale of the Property, as was required under the terms of Decedent's Will.
On September 24, 2013, the orphans' court directed Diamond and Alpert to respond to the petition's averments by October 21, 2013. On October 21, 2013, both Alpert and Diamond filed preliminary objections to Devlin's petition. On January 23, 2014, the orphans' court sustained Alpert's preliminary objections upon the basis that the orphans' court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Devlin's claims, and dismissed the petition as to Alpert. On June 19, 2014, following a hearing on Diamond's preliminary objections, the orphans' court similarly dismissed Devlin's petition as to Diamond for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
On July 17, 2014, Devlin timely filed a notice of appeal. The orphans' court ordered Devlin to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 21, 2014, Devlin timely complied. On August 11, 2014, the orphans' court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Devlin presents five issues for our review:
Brief for Devlin at 4 (numbering modified).
We address Devlin's first three issues collectively, as each of them challenges the orphans' court's determination that it lacked the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over Devlin's claims against Diamond.2 Devlin principally argues that the orphans' court had mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over the administration and distribution of the real property of the Decedent's Estate. Id. at 8. We agree.
Our analysis begins with a recitation of the applicable legal standards:
Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling [or granting] preliminary objections is to determine whether the trial court committed an error of law. When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.
De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Urban P'ship, LLC, 903 A.2d 586, 589 (Pa.Super.2006). “On an appeal from an [o]rder sustaining preliminary objections, we accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the appellant's complaint and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts.” Filipovich v. J.T. Imports, Inc., 431 Pa.Super. 552, 637 A.2d 314, 316 (1994). “Where, as here, upholding sustained preliminary objections would result in the dismissal of an action, we may do so only in cases that are clear and free from doubt.”Ellenbogen v. PNC Bank, N.A., 731 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa.Super.1999). “Any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the objections.” Id.
“[I]t is well-settled that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party, or by the court sua sponte. ” B.J.D. v. D.L.C., 19 A.3d 1081, 1082 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Grom v. Burgoon, 448 Pa.Super. 616, 672 A.2d 823, 824–25 (1996) ). Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. “Generally, subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the court's power to hear cases of the class to which the case at issue belongs.” Verholek v. Verholek, 741 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa.Super.1999).
Jurisdiction is the capacity to pronounce a judgment of the law on an issue brought before the court through due process of law. It is the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case.... Without such jurisdiction, there is no authority to give judgment and one so entered is without force or effect. The trial court has jurisdiction if it is competent to hear or determine controversies of the general nature of the matter involved sub judice. Jurisdiction lies if the court had power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it could not give relief in the particular case.
Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 767 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa.Super.2001) (quoting Bernhard v. Bernhard, 447 Pa.Super. 118, 668 A.2d 546, 548 (1995) ).
Jurisdiction over decedents' estates and their fiduciaries is vested, by statute, solely in the orphans' court division of the various courts of common pleas. 20 Pa.C.S. § 711. Instantly, the orphans' court held that it lacked mandatory subject matter jurisdiction over Devlin's claims pursuant to Section 711 of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (“PEF Code”). The court similarly held that it lacked permissive jurisdiction over Devlin's claims pursuant to Section 712 of the PEF Code.
Our analysis begins and ends with Section 711, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Commentary to the PEF Code provides that a personal representative3 has “the duty as well as the right to control real estate until it is sold or distributed by decree or until control is relinquished to the heir or devisee because it is not needed for administration.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 3311, cmt.
As explained supra, Subsection 711(1) grants the orphans' court mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over “[t]he administration and distribution of the real and personal property of...
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