Estate of Girard v. Laird

• Decision Date: 15 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-133,92-133
• Citation: 621 A.2d 1265,159 Vt. 508
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: ESTATE OF Sydney GIRARD v. Justina LAIRD, et al.

Page 1265

621 A.2d 1265

159 Vt. 508

ESTATE OF Sydney GIRARD v. Justina LAIRD, et al.

No. 92-133.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Jan. 15, 1993.

Donna Russo-Savage and Ralph W. Howe III of Paterson & Walke, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant.

David A. Otterman of Otterman and Allen, P.C., Barre, for defendants-appellees.

Before ALLEN, C.J., GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

DOOLEY, Justice.

This is a dispute over the ownership of a house and surrounding land located at 3-5 Hillside Avenue in the City of Barre. The contending parties are plaintiff, estate of Sydney Girard, and certain relatives of Sydney Girard (defendants) who claim title under a deed from Sydney Girard to his parents, Francis and Patricia Shepard. The Washington Superior Court awarded title to defendants. We affirm.

The parties stipulated to the facts in this one-issue case. Girard purchased the property from his grandparents in 1975. Shortly thereafter, he married Sharon Houle, and they took up residence on the property. A son, Jonathan, was born in 1979. The couple separated in 1979, however, and neither Sharon nor Jonathan ever again lived in the Barre premises. A year later, Girard conveyed the property to his parents by his sole deed, but he continued to live on the property until May of 1986. Through later transfers, record title to the property ended up in Girard's aunt, Justina Laird.

In 1982, Girard and Sharon Houle divorced. The final order, which was based on a stipulation between the parties, provided that "[t]he real property at 5 Hillside Avenue, Barre, Vermont, belonging to [Girard] is awarded to [Girard], subject to debts presently on this property."

Girard died in 1990, and his former wife and son opened an estate. They made a formal demand that Justina Laird convey the Barre property to Jonathan. When Justina Laird refused, this suit ensued. ¹ Plaintiff's claim is that the Girard deed to his parents was void because Sharon Houle did not join in it to convey her homestead interest. Because it was void, they argue that the property remains in Girard's estate and passes to his heirs. ²

The trial court found that conveyance from Girard to his parents was made without the required participation of his wife Sharon but that the defect made the conveyance only voidable by Sharon. Because Sharon failed to void the conveyance before the divorce, and she lost all interest in the property in the divorce, the court held that the conveyance was no longer voidable. Accordingly, it awarded summary judgment to defendants.

The parties agree that there are no disputed issues of fact, and the case was properly decided by summary judgment. Plaintiff renews here its argument that Girard's deed was void, and the property remains in the estate. Defendants rely on the trial court analysis, adding that Girard was estopped to contest the validity of his deed. Both agree that the controlling statute is 27 V.S.A. § 141(a), which provides:

§ 141. Execution and acknowledgement of conveyance

(a) A homestead or an interest therein shall not be conveyed by the owner thereof, if married, except by way of mortgage for the purchase money thereof given at the time of such purchase, unless the wife or husband joins in the execution and acknowledgment of such conveyance. A conveyance thereof, or of an interest therein, not so made and acknowledged, shall be inoperative so far only as relates to the homestead provided for in this chapter.

The statute is part of the remedial scheme to protect home ownership from loss to creditors, to conserve family homes and to " 'save [families] from disintegration and secure their permanency.' " Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 524, 546 A.2d 787, 788 (1988) (quoting R. Waples, Homestead and Exemption ch. 1, § 2, at 3 (1893)). The main provision of the homestead law exempts from attachment or execution the "dwelling house, outbuildings and the land used in connection therewith, not exceeding $30,000.00 in value, and owned and used or kept by [a natural] person as a homestead." 27 V.S.A. § 101.

As plaintiff emphasizes, we have generally held that under § 141(a) a deed to a homestead property, executed by only one spouse, is void ab initio for noncompliance with the statute. This rule was clearly stated in Martin v. Harrington, 73 Vt. 193, 50 A. 1074 (1901), in part to resolve conflict in earlier precedents. In Martin, a husband mortgaged homestead property by his sole deed. His wife subsequently died, and he remained on the property, eventually remarrying. When he died, litigation arose between the mortgagee and the second wife over the validity of the mortgage. Rejecting the mortgagee's position that the mortgage deed was voidable on the initiative of the first wife, the Court held that "the sole deed of the [husband] was void so far as the homestead was concerned and was not rendered in any way effective by the subsequent death of the [first] wife." Id. at 201, 50 A. at 1076. The Martin rule has been followed in other cases where the issue arose directly. See Ellingwood v. Ellingwood, 91 Vt. 134, 138, 99 A. 781, 782 (1917); Johnson v. Churchill's Adm'r, 88 Vt. 137, 140, 92 A. 26, 27 (1914); Laird v. Perry, 75 Vt. 454, 462, 52 A. 1040, 1042 (1902). As stated in Johnson, the rule is that "the mortgage [conveyed in violation of the statute], being absolutely void ab initio for want of power in him, a married homesteader, alone to execute it, no subsequent change of circumstances can operate to validate it." 88 Vt. at 140, 92 A. at 28. Applying the rule in Ellingwood, the Court found the husband's sole deed void where he attempted to convey the property to his wife through a third person. 91 Vt. at 138, 99 A. at 782.

The cases indicate two rationales behind the Martin rule. The first is that it is commanded by the words of the statute. That is the primary rationale expressed in Abell v. Lothrop, 47 Vt. 375, 380 (1875), on which Martin relies: "Surely, no more explicit language could be used to negative the right of the husband to convey either his own or his family's interest in the homestead. His deed is absolutely void...." Martin echoed that the words of the statute were the "equivalent to saying that the deed is null and void and has no force." 73 Vt. at 199, 50 A. at 1076.

The second is that the statute is intended to protect not only the spouse who did not join in the conveyance but also the spouse who made the conveyance. Martin reasoned:

The statute protects the [owner of the] homestead against any attachment by a creditor, although he has no wife nor children. Considering the object of the statute that it is to preserve a home for the family it is not unreasonable to hold that it is as much for the benefit of an aged housekeeper, a demented octogenarian, with no means of support, as it is for the benefit of a young widow, just out of her teens, who may have a competence in her own right.

The homestead act was to protect the husband as well as the wife and this construction is not a strained one for we can have in mind that "Courts often do accommodate the provisions of a statute to cases which they were obviously intended to cover although not well suited to accomplish."

73 Vt. at 199-200, 50 A. at 1076 (citation omitted); see also Ellingwood, 91 Vt. at 138, 99 A. at 782 ("homestead act protects the husband as well as the wife").

Although we concur with plaintiff that the Martin line of cases, never overruled, supports its argument that the Girard deed was void ab initio, we note that our precedents are not in a straight line. More recently, the issue arose in Cole v. Cole, 117 Vt. 354, 91 A.2d 819 (1952), where the wife in a divorce proceeding sought an order declaring void the conveyance of the marital homestead made in violation of § 141(a). Although the Martin rule would have entitled the wife to relief, the Court emphasized that the purchasers gave value without notice that the husband was married and were entitled to some protection. It held that the trial judge had discretion to determine whether to grant the relief requested pending the outcome of the divorce. Id. at 365, 91 A.2d at 825. The opinion is not entirely clear on this point, but we read it as holding that the final divorce order could cure any defect in the conveyance to the bona fide purchasers. In part, this is an application of the rule that "the final judgment in a divorce proceeding terminates a homestead right." Condosta v. Condosta, 142 Vt. 117, 122, 453 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1982).

Cole is not the first deviation in the line of cases. Martin itself had to overrule Whiteman v. Field, 53 Vt. 554 (1881), which held that the object of the then-existing version of § 141(a) was to protect the wife and minor children and that object was "fully attained by holding that the sole deed of the husband and father is voidable for the benefit of the wife and children." Id. at 559.

Defendants urge us to rely on Cole to hold that the Martin line of cases is inapplicable in these circumstances where the wife's homestead interest has been terminated by divorce. We conclude that such a rationale would leave the law in a state of confusion, relying on distinctions without differences. We choose to reach the same result by overruling Martin and its progeny and reinstating the rule announced in Whiteman. ³

We adopt this approach because we find that the Martin rule leads to unnecessary injustice and that neither of the rationales supporting its adoption are valid. The main rationale is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, see Venman v. Patrissi, 156 Vt. 257, 258, 590 A.2d 897, 898 (1991), based on the conclusion that "inoperative" in § 141(a) plainly means "void." Of course, the rule does not apply where the wording is ambiguous and there is no "plain meaning." See Williston Citizens for Responsible Growth v. Maple Tree Place Assocs., 156 Vt. 560, 563, 593 A.2d 469, 470 (1991) (statute has no plain meaning that controls)...