Estate of Goyne, Matter of, No. 64645

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Writing for the Court: LAVENDER; SIMMS
• Citation: 1986 OK 69,733 P.2d 391
• Decision Date: 28 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 64645
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Loy Richard GOYNE, Deceased. Lorene GOYNE, Appellant, v. Billie Sue ALMANZA, Loy Doggett and Iva Marmie, Appellees.

Page 391

733 P.2d 391 1986 OK 69 In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Loy Richard GOYNE, Deceased.
Lorene GOYNE, Appellant,
v.
Billie Sue ALMANZA, Loy Doggett and Iva Marmie, Appellees. No. 64645. Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Oct. 28, 1986.
Rehearing Denied March 3, 1987.

Page 392

Jack L. Rorschach, Vinita, for appellant.

Michael C. Taylor, Tulsa, for appellees.

LAVENDER, Justice:

The deceased in this case, Loy Goyne, died intestate on December 1, 1980. Appellant, the deceased's second wife, petitioned the trial court for letters of administration. Appellant was subsequently duly appointed administratrix of the deceased's estate. Appellees, daughters of the deceased by a previous marriage, were given notice of the various proceedings regarding the administration of the estate.

A final decree settling the estate was filed on March 22, 1982. The court, in this decree, found that all of the property of the deceased had been held in joint tenancy with appellant and ordered all interests of the deceased transferred to appellant. From the statements of the parties on appeal it appears that appellees were present at the hearing which gave rise to the final decree. The record, however, does not reflect whether appellees entered an appearance or took an active part in that hearing. Appellees deny that they played any role.

On April 19, 1982, appellees filed a motion to vacate the final decree with affidavits from two of appellees setting forth grounds for challenging the final account of the administratrix on which the final decree was based. An order setting the motion to vacate for hearing on agreement of the parties and the trial court was entered on June 29, 1982.

No further action was taken in this case until April 4, 1984, when appellees filed an application for declaratory judgment seeking a determination as to the status of the various pieces of property which comprised the deceased's estate.

On May 31, 1985, the trial court entered an order vacating the final decree. The trial court also entered declaratory judgment, finding: "that all property for which documents do not contain language reflecting joint tenancy with right of survivorship was held by the decedent at the time of his death as a tenant in common with [appellant]."

From this order appellant brought a timely appeal alleging three grounds of error: 1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the final decree; 2) that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 9, Rules for District Courts; ¹ and 3) that there was no evidentiary support for the trial court's finding that all of the estate property had not been held in joint tenancy.

The Court of Appeals, Division I, to which this appeal was initially assigned, found that the trial court did have jurisdiction to vacate the final decree under the court's term time rule. ² The court further affirmed the trial court's ruling on the Rule 9 issue, but remanded the case on the question of which pieces of property were held in joint tenancy as not having been addressed by the trial court. Appellant sought certiorari from this Court for review of the Court of Appeal's decision. We have previously granted the requested writ.

I.

In her argument presented on certiorari, appellant now maintains that the legislative substitute for the court's term time rule, 12

Page 394

O.S.1981 § 1031.1, does not authorize the trial court's action in this case because a more specific statute, 58 O.S.1981 § 723, is controlling. ³ It is contended that section 723, as a statute specifically applicable to the administration of estates, should control over the provisions of section 1031.1.

We do not agree with appellant's contention. We have previously held that the Chapter on Vacation and Modification of Judgments By Trial Courts, 12 O.S.1981 §§ 1031 through 1038, applies to trial courts sitting in probate jurisdiction. ⁴ It further appears that section 1031.1 provides specifically that action to vacate the judgment of the court may be taken by the court on its own motion or on motion of a party. ⁵ Section 723, on the other hand, provides that a person interested in the proceeding, who was not a party, may move to reopen the judgment. ⁶

Both the provisions of section 1031.1 and section 723 would be available in proceedings regarding the administration of estates. However, the remedies provided by the two sections are available to different entities. Because of the specific circumstances of this case, discussed infra, we find section 723 to be specifically applicable to the present case and to support the trial court's vacation of the final decree. ⁷

In her brief on appeal, appellant argued that appellees were not entitled to proceed under section 723 as they were parties to the proceeding which resulted in the final decree. In the case of Anderson v. Miller, 324 P.2d 856 (Okl.1958), ⁸ this Court dealt with the distinction between who would be considered a party under the language of section 723 and who...