Estate of Graves v. Circleville, 06CA2900.

• Citation: 902 N.E.2d 535,179 Ohio App.3d 479,2008 Ohio 6052
• Decision Date: 21 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06CA2900.,06CA2900.
• Parties: ESTATE OF GRAVES, Appellee, v. CITY OF CIRCLEVILLE et al., Appellants.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

902 N.E.2d 535

179 Ohio App.3d 479

2008-Ohio-6052

ESTATE OF GRAVES, Appellee, v. CITY OF CIRCLEVILLE et al., Appellants.

No. 06CA2900.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Ross County.

Decided November 21, 2008.

Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., Rex H. Elliott, Charles H. Cooper Jr., Columbus, and Aaron D. Epstein; and J. Jeffrey Benson, Chillicothe, for appellee.

Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, James A. Climer, and Frank H. Scialdone, Cleveland; and Gary D. Kenworthy, Circleville, for appellants Peter Shaw, William J. Eversole, Benjamin E. Carpenter, and John and Jane Doe Officers of the Circleville Police Department.

HARSHA, Judge.

{¶ 1} The estate of Jillian Marie Graves (the "estate") sued Officers Peter Shaw, William Eversole, and Benjamin Carpenter (collectively, the "officers") of the Circleville Police Department for the death of Graves. The estate claims that the officers wantonly or recklessly released the vehicle of Cornelius Copley from impound without a court order. While intoxicated, Copley drove the vehicle and collided with Graves's vehicle, killing her. The trial court denied the officers' joint motion for summary judgment in which they argued that they were not liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) because they owed no duty to Graves, did not act in a wanton or reckless manner, and were not the proximate cause of Graves's death.

{¶ 2} The officers argue that under the public-duty doctrine, which provides that a statutory duty owed only to the general public does not create a similar duty to an individual, the estate cannot demonstrate that they owed a duty to Graves. We disagree. While we agree that Ohio's common-law public-duty doctrine remains viable, we conclude that it does not apply to situations involving wanton or reckless conduct. The officers also contend that as a matter of law, their conduct was not reckless or wanton. Because the estate presented evidence that the officers knew or should have known that Copley had a history of driving while drunk and that his vehicle could not be released without a court order, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the officers acted in a wanton or reckless manner. Finally, the officers contend that as a matter of law, their conduct was not the proximate cause of Graves's death. Because the estate presented evidence that the officers knew or should have known that Copley habitually drove while drunk and on a suspended license, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Graves's death was the natural and probable consequence of the officers' conduct. Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of the officers' motion for summary judgment.

I. Facts

{¶ 3} On July 4, 2003, Officer Shaw arrested Copley for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and driving under suspension ("DUS"). In his deposition, Shaw admitted that he knew that proper procedure required a court order to release a vehicle to a person with (1) a charge of DUI and a prior DUI conviction¹ or (2) a charge of driving under a suspended license. In his deposition, Shaw stated that at the scene of the arrest, Copley told him that he drove without a license because the court suspended it due to a prior DUI violation. Despite receiving this information, Shaw failed to remove Copley's license plates and send them to the BMV, failed to make sure the paperwork clearly stated that no one could release Copley's car from the impound lot until a court ordered the release, failed to properly complete the BMV immobilization form by not indicating that the car's license plates were to be removed, and failed to inform the dispatcher that no one could release Copley's vehicle from the impound lot without a court order. Prior to the vehicle's release, Shaw checked Copley's LEADS report showing Copley's license suspension and lengthy DUI history. Shaw took no steps to ensure that Copley's vehicle was not released. After Shaw learned that someone had released the vehicle to Copley without a court order, he failed to do anything to secure the vehicle's return.

{¶ 4} Officer Eversole released Copley from jail. In his deposition, Eversole admits that at the time of release, he knew that an officer had arrested Copley for DUI and DUS. He further admitted that he knew that proper procedure required a court order to release a vehicle to a person with (1) a charge of DUI and a prior DUI conviction within the last six years, or (2) a charge of driving under a suspended license. Regardless, without a court order, Eversole gave Copley his keys to the vehicle. Though Eversole claims that he had no further involvement with Copley after his release, Copley's sister, Carolyn Brewer, states otherwise. Following his release, Copley went home for a short period of time. Then Brewer and Totie Rhodes, Copley's niece by marriage, accompanied him to the Circleville police station so he could obtain a release form to retrieve his car from the impound lot. After Copley received the form and they prepared to pull out from the station, an officer approached Copley's window. Rhodes recalls the officer stating, "Now, don't be going out and getting in that car and drinking and kill someone." Brewer similarly recalls the officer telling Copley, "[D]on't take that car out and kill somebody tonight." Brewer identified the officer as Eversole.

{¶ 5} Dispatcher Carpenter wrote "no hold" on Copley's vehicle release form and authorized the release of Copley's car by signing his name on the form. Carpenter testified at his deposition that after reading the police department's standard operating procedures, he signed his name to indicate he had read them. He understood that there were certain circumstances under which vehicles would be impounded and could not be released until the suspect had appeared in court. However, he further testified, "[U]ntil this situation [arose], I didn't understand how vehicles are held for suspensions and DUI's." He stated, "I'd usually just wait for the officers to tell me what they needed as far as putting a hold on it or not." Carpenter printed out Copley's "lengthy" LEADS report, involving the history of Copley's criminal record, and was "sure he glanced at it" to find out what Copley's history was. Carpenter knew that an officer had arrested Copley for DUI, but failed to contact the officer before signing off to release the vehicle; he knew Copley did not have a valid driver's license; and he knew Copley had not yet appeared in court.

{¶ 6} After Copley retrieved his vehicle on the afternoon of July 5, 2003, and while intoxicated, Copley drove the wrong way on U.S. Route 23 in the early morning hours of July 6, 2003. He collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Jillian Marie Graves, killing her.

{¶ 7} The estate brought an action against the city of Circleville ("city"), John and Jane Doe Officers of the Circleville Police Department, and others. In the original complaint, the estate alleged causes of action for negligence, wrongful death, Graves's pain and suffering before her death, and respondeat superior. The estate amended its complaint to include allegations that the defendants acted wantonly, recklessly, and with complete disregard for the foreseeable consequences of their actions. After the city moved the trial court for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court found that the city and its officers were engaged in a governmental function and were, thus, immune from liability for their actions under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). Accordingly, the court granted the city and John and Jane Doe Officers judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the estate's amended complaint.² We affirmed the court's dismissal of the city, but reversed the dismissal of the John and Jane Doe Officers and remanded this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Estate of Graves v. Circleville, Ross App. No. 04CA2774, 2005-Ohio-929, 2005 WL 503372.

{¶ 8} On remand, the estate amended its complaint a second time and added three defendants: Officer Peter Shaw, Officer William Eversole, and Officer Ben Carpenter. After several depositions, the officers sought summary judgment, claiming immunity from any liability. When the court denied the officers' motion, they filed this appeal. Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, provides that such a judgment constitutes a final, appealable order.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 9} Appellants present one assignment of error:

The lower court erred in denying the appellants/individual officers' joint motion for summary judgment because they are immune and appellee failed to establish a relevant exception to their immunity.

III. Standard of Review

{¶ 10} When reviewing a trial court's decision on a summary-judgment motion, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate and does not defer to the trial court's decision. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153.

{¶ 11} Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant has established: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, with the evidence against that party being construed most strongly in its favor. Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146, 524 N.E.2d 881.

{¶ 12} The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls upon the party who moves for summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, 662 N.E.2d 264. However, once the movant supports the motion with appropriate evidentiary materials, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's...