Estate of Henry v. Schwab
| Decision Date | 03 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:18-CV-2090,6:18-CV-2090 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF DUSTYN HENRY, through Administrator Laura Barrett, BRENDA HENRY, RANDY HENRY, and B.H., through Next Friend Laura Barrett, Plaintiffs, v. MIKE SCHWAB, individually and in his official capacity, and STAE OF IOWA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter is before the Court on defendants Mike Schwab and the State of Iowa's ("defendants") Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 27). On July 12, 2019, the Estate of Dustyn Henry, along with Brenda Henry, Randy Henry, and B.H. ("plaintiffs") filed their Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ("complaint") against defendants. (Doc. 25). Defendants timely moved to dismiss Counts II-IV of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(1), or in the alternative, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 27). Plaintiffs timely resisted the motion (Doc. 28), and defendants timely filed a reply (Doc. 29). For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted.
The Court, under Rule 12(b), accepts plaintiffs' factual allegations in the complaint as true for purposes of this motion. The plaintiffs in this case are the Estate of Dustyn Henry ("decedent"), decedent's mother and father, Brenda Henry and Randy Henry, and B.H., decedent's minor child. (Doc. 25, at 1-2). Defendant Mike Schwab was decedent's supervising probation or parole officer while plaintiff resided at the Waterloo Residential Facility ("facility") by order of the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County. (Id., at 2, 6). The State of Iowa ("State") runs the facility through the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. (Id., at 2).
Decedent had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues in the years leading up to his death. (Id., at 2-3). Defendants knew about, or had access to information regarding, decedent's history of substance abuse and mental health issues while he resided at the facility. (Id., at 6). While at the facility decedent was terminated from his job, which caused decedent to lose his health insurance. (Id., at 6-7). As a result of decedent's loss of insurance, decedent's prescriptions for anti-anxiety and anti-depression medication stopped being filled. (Id.). Defendants took no action to ensure that decedent got his medications after decedent lost his insurance. (Id., at 7). Defendants knew decedent was using controlled substances while residing at the treatment facility, and defendants failed to follow their normal policy of taking residents who were intoxicated to the nearby jail to detox. (Id.).
On December 15, 2016, Mr. Schwab filed a Report of Violation of the terms of decedent's probation due to decedent's loss of employment and use of controlled substances. (Id., at 8). The Report of Violation sought to revoke decedent's probation and have decedent sent to prison. (Id.). Decedent was "despondent" when he learned of the Report of Violation. (Id.). Despite knowledge of decedent's mental health issues and lack of prescribed medication, defendants took "no steps to keep [decedent] from committing self-harm after informing him of the Report of Violation." (Id.). On December 16, 2016, decedent committed suicide by hanging himself from the clothes hanger rack in his room. (Id., at 8-9). Defendants knew that the clothes hanger racks in the facility were capable of supporting a person's weight without collapsing due to prior suicides by hanging in the facility. (Id., at 9). Defendants failed to utilize widelyavailable clothes hanging equipment designed to prevent suicide by hanging. (Id.). Plaintiffs assert various claims for money damages resulting from decedent's death. (Id., at 9-15).
Plaintiffs brought a four-count complaint alleging: 1) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) wrongful death - negligence; 3) parental loss of child consortium; and 4) child loss of parental consortium. (Id., at 9-14). In response, defendants moved to dismiss Counts II-IV based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 27, at 1).
"Questions of sovereign immunity fall squarely within the province of a 12(b)(1) motion because, if immunity is present for a claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim." Mills v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (citing Mumford v. Godfried, 52 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 1995); Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Iowa 1986)). Thus, the Court will analyze defendants' motion as one to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), not as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a party may assert the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by motion and that motion "must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that:
A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must distinguish between a "facial attack" and a "factual attack." In the first instance, the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings . . . and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6). The general rule is that a complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can proveno set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In a factual attack, the court considers matters outside the pleadings . . . and the non-moving party does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards.
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "[A] facial attack [is] one 'based on the complaint alone, or on the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record.'" Younie v. City of Hartley, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730). Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss presents a facial attack on Counts II-IV.
When evaluating a facial attack on jurisdiction, the court must "consider[] only the materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint.'" Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cox v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. 685 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2012). The 12(b)(6) protections applicable to facial attacks under Rule 12(b)(1) include "accepting all the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to [the non-movant]." Gross v. Weber, 186 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1999).
United States District Courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, the court also has "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To be considered part of the same case or controversy, "[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). "A plaintiff's claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact if the 'claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.'"OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 350 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.)
A. Partial Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue that the Court should grant their partial motion to dismiss three of the four counts in the complaint "for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction [because] [d]efendants' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to claims under the Iowa Tort Claims Act." (Doc 27-1 at 2). The complaint asserts four counts: 1) civil rights violations under Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 against Mr. Schwab individually; 2) wrongful death negligence against Mr. Schwab individually and in his official capacity and against the State under Iowa common law; 3) parental loss of child consortium against both defendants under Iowa Code Section 613.15A; and 4) child loss of parental consortium against both defendants under Iowa Code Section 613.15. In the present motion, defendants seek to dismiss Counts II-IV. Subject matter jurisdiction over Count I, plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim, is not at issue because it "arises under . . . the law[ ]. . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. At issue is the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over Counts II-IV, which plaintiffs assert under Iowa law.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "Although by its terms the [Eleventh] Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended [its] applicability to suits by citizens against their own States." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citations omitted). Indeed, "[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Id. (citations omitted).
Although the Eleventh Amendment only explicitly discusses states' immunity from suit in federal court, states are also "immun[e] from private...
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