Estate of Hirshfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Action No. 15-1082 (CKK)

• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge
• Citation: 330 F.Supp.3d 107
• Decision Date: 30 August 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-1082 (CKK)
• Parties: ESTATE OF Yonadav HIRSHFELD, Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

330 F.Supp.3d 107

ESTATE OF Yonadav HIRSHFELD, Plaintiffs,
v.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-1082 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed August 30, 2018

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Asher Perlin, Hollywood, FL, Paul G. Gaston, Law Offices of Paul G. Gaston, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge

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This case arises from the March 6, 2008 death of 18-year old Yonadav Hirshfeld, while he was at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, Israel where he went to school. See Transcript of April 24, 2018 Bench Trial held before the Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ("Tr."), ECF No. 38, at 4-5. Plaintiffs—the estate, heirs, and immediate family members of the deceased—allege that Yonadav Hirshfeld ("Yonadav") was killed by a shooter affiliated with Hamas, a terrorist organization.¹ Proceeding under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran") provided material support and resources to Hamas and accordingly should be held liable for Yonadav's death. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' assessment.

Defendant has not answered or otherwise participated in this litigation, and therefore, the case proceeded in a default setting, with Plaintiffs filing a [30] Motion for Default Judgment. The Court held a bench trial on April 24, 2018. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the record as a whole, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs have established their claims by evidence satisfactory to the Court and accordingly will GRANT default judgment against Defendant. The Court will also consider the issue of appropriate damages for each Plaintiff.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 10, 2015. Compl., ECF No. 1. An Amended Complaint was filed on December 8, 2015. Am. Compl., ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs then grappled for years to fulfill the requirements for service on Defendant Iran, due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. On October 10, 2017, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order deeming service effective pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1608(a)(4). Memo. Op. and Order, ECF No. 27. Approximately one month later, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Default Judgment; a supporting Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and sworn declarations by the Plaintiffs, two witnesses to the incident, and two experts. Mot. for Default Judg., ECF No. 30; Memo. in support of Mot. for Default Judg., ECF No. 30-2. Plaintiffs urged this Court to bypass holding a hearing and to find the sworn declarations and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1608(e), that a claimant must "establish[ ] [his] claim or right [to] relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court." Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 845 F.Supp.2d 204, 211 (D.D.C. 2012). In its discretion, however, this Court decided to hold a bench trial with live witnesses instead of relying solely on sworn declarations.

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The Court held a bench trial on April 24, 2018, at which time Plaintiffs offered documentary, photographic and video evidence, and they presented: (1) live testimony by Yonadav's parents, one sibling, and two expert witnesses; (2) deposition testimony of two eye witnesses and one additional expert witness; and (3) deposition testimony and/or affidavits by Yonadav's other eleven siblings. This hearing addressed both the Plaintiffs' claims on liability and the resulting damages. After the trial, Plaintiffs submitted Post-Hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ECF No. 39.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The entry of default judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. "The determination of whether a default judgment is appropriate is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Hanley-Wood LLC v. Hanley Wood LLC , 783 F.Supp.2d 147, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ). Before granting default judgment, the Court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction, and "[t]he party seeking default judgment has the burden of establishing both subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over the defendants." Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic , 167 F.Supp.3d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2016).

Under the FSIA specifically, this Court cannot enter default judgment against a foreign state "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) ; see Fraenkel v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 892 F.3d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (To obtain a default judgment in a Section 1605A action, plaintiffs have to establish a right to relief by providing "evidence satisfactory to the court."); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The court ... has an obligation to satisfy itself that plaintiffs have established a right to relief."). "[T]he FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide," Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea , 774 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and "[u]ncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true," Thuneibat , 167 F.Supp.3d at 33. Section 1608(e)"does not require the court to demand more or different evidence than it would normally receive; ... indeed, the quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less than that normally required." Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), petition for cert. filed , 864 F.3d 751 (Mar. 6, 2018) (No. 17-1406).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT²

The following Findings of Fact recount a tragic event. They detail the murder of Yonadav Hirshfeld, a young man attending a school in Jerusalem, Israel, where a shooter purposefully targeted Jewish students. As discussed further below, in addition to expert testimony received by the Court, three members of Yonadav's family testified at the Court's bench trial regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of their loved one. The Court appreciates that providing such testimony was extremely difficult for each witness, as it required them to revisit publicly what was likely the most tragic event in their lives. The Court also acknowledges that the current legal proceedings cannot make these

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family members whole again or even ease their pain.

The Court's Findings of Fact are based on testimony presented at the bench trial held in this matter on April 24, 2018, as well as evidence submitted prior to and during that trial.³ The Court's findings fall into three overarching categories: (1) Hamas and Iran's material support for it; (2) how that support resulted in the death of Yonadav Hirshfeld in this case; (3) facts relevant to the determination of the damages which are warranted with regard to Yonadav's parents, siblings, and his Estate.

A. Iran's Material Support for Hamas

The facts contained in this section are largely derived from the testimony of two experts with extensive experience studying, writing, and testifying about Iran: Dr. Patrick Clawson, the Director of Research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Dr. Matthew Levitt, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Clawson Tr. 71; Levitt Tr. 81.⁴ As a preliminary matter, Hamas may be characterized as a Palestinian political organization that was founded in 1987 with a purpose of carrying out militant attacks against Israel, and which has effectively controlled the Gaza Strip since 2007.⁵ Clawson Tr. 74-75; Levitt Tr. 89-90 ("Hamas is a U.S., European, and other-designated terrorist organization, ... [b]ut it is a movement and it has other components too [political and social welfare] ... [and] these components are used to leverage its ability to wage, in its terms, jihad, or a holy war[.]"); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14 ("Hamas is listed by the United States Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization ("FTO") and has been listed as [such] since 1997."); Am. Comp. ¶¶ 15-16 ("Hamas is listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist ("SDGT") pursuant to Executive Order 13224" and has been listed like that "since October 31, 2001.") The relationship between Hamas and Iran became close after 1993 — after the Palestine Liberation Organization reached an agreement with Israel, the Iranians turned to Hamas, a more militant organization, to sponsor terrorist attacks against Israel, and this is when Iran started providing Hamas with material support. Clawson Tr. 74-75.

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The Court finds that Iran provided substantial material support to Hamas leading up to and immediately before and including the date of the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva incident, which occurred on March 6,...