Estate of Holderbaum v. Gibson, 3-776A169
Decision Date | 14 June 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 3-776A169,3-776A169 |
Citation | 176 Ind.App. 623,376 N.E.2d 1189 |
Parties | The ESTATE of Paul E. HOLDERBAUM, and Florence Holderbaum, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Patricia GIBSON, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William J. Reinke, Lawrence G. DiNardo, Thornburg, McGill, Deahl, Harman, Carey & Murray, South Bend, for appellants.
Robert F. Gonderman, South Bend, for appellee.
Patricia Gibson filed a complaint against Florence Holderbaum and the estate of Paul E. Holderbaum (hereafter collectively referred to as "the estate"), alleging that she was injured while riding in a car driven by Paul Holderbaum. Prior to the trial, the trial judge ruled that the Indiana Guest Statute 1 was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case was tried on the theory of negligence, as opposed to the theory of wilful and wanton misconduct. Following the submission of the evidence, the estate moved for a judgment on the evidence on the basis that wilful and wanton misconduct had not been shown. The motion was denied. Later, the jury returned a verdict for Gibson, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
The estate then filed a motion to correct errors. Before the trial judge ruled on that motion, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Sidle v. Majors (1976), Ind., 341 N.E.2d 763, upheld the constitutionality of the guest statute. Later, on February 23, 1976, the trial court entered the following order:
Gibson then filed an additional motion to correct errors on April 8, 1976. On April 27, 1976, the trial judge granted Gibson's motion to correct errors and made the following findings:
The estate argues these issues on appeal that: 1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Gibson's April 8, 1976 motion to correct errors; and 2) the trial court erred in ordering a new trial. We affirm.
In order to resolve the first issue raised by the estate, we must consider the following events and the order in which they occurred:
(1) The jury returned a verdict for Gibson in the amount of $12,000 and judgment was entered thereon.
(2) Both Gibson 2 and the estate filed motions to correct errors.
(3) The trial court granted the estate's motion, vacated the judgment which had been previously entered for Gibson, and entered a judgment for the estate.
(4) Gibson filed a motion to correct errors addressed to the entry of the judgment for the estate.
(5) The trial court granted Gibson's motion and ordered a new trial.
The estate contends that if Gibson was aggrieved by the trial court's order granting the estate's motion to correct errors, her only recourse was to initiate a direct appeal of that order pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 2. 3 Therefore, the argument continues, the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule upon the subsequent motion to correct errors filed by Gibson. Gibson, on the other hand, maintains that, in order to preserve her right to appeal, she was required to file an additional motion to correct errors addressed to the entry of the judgment for the estate.
The issue before us, therefore, can be reduced to the following question: What procedural avenues are open to a party who is aggrieved by the trial court's granting of an opponent's motion to correct errors?
Until recently, the appellate court decisions concerning this matter were, for the most part, hopelessly confused and often totally irreconcilable. Compare, for example, Easley v. Williams (1974), 161 Ind.App. 24, 314 N.E.2d 105, with Miller v. Mansfield (1975), Ind.App., 330 N.E.2d 113. Recognizing the "procedural quagmire" which the courts had created, the Supreme Court, in P-M Gas and Wash Company, Inc. v. Smith, Ind., 375 N.E. 592 (Handed down April 27, 1978), overruled State v. Deprez (1973), 260 Ind. 413, 296 N.E.2d 120, and its progeny and established new guidelines concerning the filing of motions to correct errors. The Supreme Court also held that Smith was to be given a limited retroactive effect by applying the new guidelines to cases on appeal on the date Smith was handed down, unless such an application would deprive a party of a review on the merits. 4
Smith addresses the particular issue with which we are confronted:
"If a party wants to complain about the relief granted to another party, when that other party made a motion to correct error which was granted in whole or in part, then that party can appeal that order, and commence the process under Ind.R.Ap.P. 2(A)."
Thus, when the trial court granted the estate's motion to correct errors, Gibson should have, pursuant to the new guidelines, initiated an appeal by filing a praecipe within thirty days of the entry of the order...
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