Estate of Homan v. Osman
| Decision Date | 05 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:21-cv-00053-TES |
| Parties | ESTATE OF WILLIAM ELDER HOMAN, deceased,[1] Plaintiff, v. GEOFFRY OSMAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
On February 6, 2019, officers arrested William Homan based on an outstanding warrant for shoplifting and transported him to the Macon-Bibb County Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”). [Doc. 50-1, ¶ 2].[2] Once Homan arrived at the LEC, he was screened by medical personnel. [Id. at ¶ 3]. That intake screening concluded that Homan did not pose a suicide risk. [Id. at ¶ 4]. On February 9, after being placed in a cell, Homan broke a sprinkler head in his cell, which caused flooding in the J-block dormitory. [Id. at ¶ 6]. At the disciplinary hearing for the incident that same day, Homan told officers he broke the sprinkler while trying to dry his clothes. [Id. at ¶¶ 78]. Following the hearing, officers informed Homan that he would be placed in disciplinary isolation for 20 days. [Id. at ¶ 9].
Before being placed in isolation, Defendant Crystal Wilson-Perez conducted an “isolation assessment” ensuring there were no “contraindications” precluding Homan from being placed in isolation. [Id. at ¶ 10-12]. During that evaluation, Homan did not indicate he intended to harm himself. [Id.]. On February 11 Homan complained to Deputy Walter Williams that he experienced a seizure and needed to be taken to the infirmary. [Id. at ¶ 13]. At the infirmary medical staff concluded that Homan did not have a seizure but instead experienced symptoms of withdrawal. [Id. at ¶ 14]. In response, Dr. Charles Clopton prescribed medications to help with his withdrawal symptoms, but Homan refused to take it. [Id. at ¶¶ 15-16].
Later, on February 15, Homan complained of a headache to Deputy Kaleb White and Defendant Deputy Geoffrey Osman. [Id. at ¶ 18]. The officers told Homan he should put in a sick call. [Id. at ¶ 19]. Deputy White then performed a block check around 11:30 p.m. and saw Homan sitting on his bed in his cell. [Id. at ¶ 20]. No one observed Homan again until Deputy White began handing out food to inmates around 5:30 a.m. [Id. at ¶ 21]. After a few minutes, Deputy White realized that Homan failed to slide his food tray back outside of his door, so Depute White proceeded to look into Homan's cell. [Id. at ¶ 23]. Once Deputy White looked in the window, he realized that Homan had not changed positions from the night before. Deputy White then asked Osman to open Homan's cell, where officers discovered Homan hanged himself with a bed sheet. [Id. at ¶¶ 24-25].
Following the incident, Bibb County initiated an internal investigation. See generally [Doc. 61-4]. Over the course of that investigation, new facts came to light- including that Deputy White and Osman lied about performing the required hourly block checks and that Defendant Wilson-Perez “did not follow [Defendant CorrectHealth-Bibb's] policy on doing check-ups on inmates while they are in isolation.” [Doc. 61-4, p. 19].[3] Also during that investigation, Osman told investigators that he's “been here long enough to know that nobody, no inmate just hangs a towel on a sprinkler head . . . and tries to pull it down . . . so in my opinion that is just an attempted suicide in the beginning.” [Doc. 61-4, p. 72].
First, Defendant Geoffrey Osman filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 50]. Then, Defendants Crystal Wilson-Perez and CorrectHealth-Bibb, LLC filed a Motion to Exclude Causation Testimony [Doc. 51] and also a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 52].[4] The Court addresses each in turn.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony-like all evidentiary rulings- necessarily involve the exercise of the Court's discretion. See Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011). Trial courts are to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure that speculative and unreliable opinions do not reach the jury. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, n.7 (1993). “This gatekeeping role, however, is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury: vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” United States v. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013). Expert testimony is admissible if “(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable . . .; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact . . . to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems. Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). The “‘burden of establishing qualification, reliability and helpfulness'” lies with the party offering the expert opinion. McClain v. Metabolite lnt'l. Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260).
In assessing whether an expert's methodology is reliable, the Court generally should consider the following factors: “(1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential error rate of the technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.” Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). These factors, of course, represent a nonexhaustive list and “‘do not constitute a definitive checklist or test.'” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). “While those factors may help in assessing the reliability of scientific or experience-based expert testimony, the district court's ‘gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case.'” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150).
In its gatekeeping role, the Court's focus must be on the reliability of the testimony, not simply whether it fits within the narrow confines of lawyer-urged litmus tests. While “‘each stage of the expert's testimony [must] be reliable, . . . each stage must [also] be evaluated practically and flexibly without bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.'” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999)). The Court's goal is to ensure that an expert “‘employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.'” Id. at 1260 (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). “Sometimes the specific [traditional] Daubert factors will aid in determining reliability; sometimes other questions may be more useful.” Id. at 1262. Testimony that the parties plan to present to a jury must be “‘properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.'” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory comm. note (2000 amend.)).
Finally, the Court must assess whether the expert testimony helps the trier of fact. This factor turns on whether the expert testimony “concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. “Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.” Id. at 1262-63. “Nor does expert testimony help the trier of fact if it fails to ‘fit' with the facts of the case.” Stoner v. Fye, No. 5:15-cv-102 (CAR), 2017 WL 2434461, at *4 (M.D. Ga. June 5, 2017) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004)). “Expert testimony lacks ‘fit' when ‘a large analytical leap must be made between the facts and the opinion.'” Id. (quoting McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1299); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. “Thus, the court may exclude otherwise reliable testimony if it does not have ‘sufficient bearing on the issue at hand to warrant a determination that it [is helpful to the trier of fact].' ”Fye, 2017 WL 2434461, at *4 (quoting Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2005)). “At all times when scrutinizing the reliability and relevance of expert testimony, a court must remain mindful of the delicate balance between its role as a gatekeeper and the jury's role as the ultimate fact-finder.” Id.
Defendants Wilson-Perez and CorrectHealth-Bibb argue that the Court should exclude Dr. Mark McMunn's expert testimony regarding causation. [Doc. 51, p. 2 ()]. First, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff must establish both actual and proximate cause as elements of their deliberate indifference claims, and because this case “presents a technical and scientific issue,” Plaintiff must present a “qualified expert witness.” [Doc. 51, p. 2 (citing Stanfill v Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1379 (...
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