Estate of I.C.D. v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-137 |
| Parties | THE ESTATE OF I.C.D., deceased, and NATHAN and TRACY DELAMETER, individually and on behalf of the heirs of I.C.D., Plaintiffs, v. BEAUMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant; and THE ESTATE OF M.L., deceased, and SHAKENDRA COOK, individually and on behalf of the heirs of M.L., Plaintiffs, v. SPRING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant; and THE ESTATE OF T.J., deceased, and SHEVONNE KENNEDY, individually and on behalf of the heirs of T.J., Plaintiffs, v. ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant; and C.C. b/n/f ART and PATRICIA CHUPK, Plaintiffs, v. PFLUGERVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant Beaumont Independent School District's ("BISD") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs the Estate of I.C.D., deceased, and Nathan and Tracy Delameter, individually and on behalf of the heirs of I.C.D.'s (collectively, "the Delameters") Second Amended Complaint (#26). Before the court issued its ruling on the instant motion, the Delameters amended their complaint to add three new sets of claims and parties.1 Because the Delameters' claims remain substantially the same, the court will construe the instant motion as a partial motion to dismiss claims—as stated in the Third Amended Complaint—asserted by the Delameters against BISD only. Having considered the motion, the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED.
I.C.D. was born with cranial stenosis and had severe cognitive impairments. I.C.D. was eligible to receive Special Education services, including transportation by a school bus that couldhold a wheelchair in place and staffed by a person with specialized training to serve the students-passengers' needs. On the morning of December 8, 2014, I.C.D., strapped into his wheelchair, traveled on a school bus operated by Clint Finnell ("Finnell"), a bus driver with BISD, and staffed by Tisha Washington ("Washington"). According to the Delameters, the regular aide on the bus was not available that day and Washington was the substitute aide. They allege that it was Washington's first day on the job and that she was not trained to care for a child with I.C.D.'s needs. The Delameters contend that Washington should have noticed that I.C.D.'s wheelchair restraints needed adjustment. When she checked on I.C.D. about twenty minutes after he was placed on the bus, she discovered that he was non-responsive. Washington informed Finnell, who stopped the bus and contacted the transportation base after he was unable to feel a pulse on I.C.D. Pursuant to BISD policy, the transportation base contacted Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") and instructed Finnell to wait for EMS to arrive even though the school bus was only 0.7 miles from a local hospital. The Delameters allege that neither Finnell nor Washington performed CPR on I.C.D. while they waited for EMS. When EMS arrived, they determined that I.C.D. did not have a pulse and transported him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.
On September 23, 2015, the Delameters filed wrongful death and survival claims based on various theories of negligence under state law against BISD in the 172nd Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. BISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that it was immune from the Delameters' suit and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The state district court granted BISD's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the Delameters' state court action on January 19, 2017.
The Delameters appealed the state district court's ruling, which the Texas Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont, Texas, affirmed on February 1, 2018. See Delameter v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 09-17-00045-CV, 2018 WL 651268 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied).2 In their state court lawsuit, the Delameters asserted that BISD's negligence caused I.C.D.'s death. Id. at *1. Texas law waives school districts' governmental immunity from tort liability only as to injuries arising from the operation or use of a motor vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, 101.051; Delameter, 2018 WL 651268, at *3. Thus, in order to survive BISD's plea to the jurisdiction, the Delameters were required to show that BISD operated the bus negligently and that such negligence proximately caused I.C.D.'s injury or death. Delameter, 2018 WL 651268, at *4. The state court reviewed the evidence submitted by the Delameters and found no evidence to support the assertion that Finnell operated the bus negligently or that the bumpiness of the bus ride caused I.C.D. to be injured or his death. Id. The state court rejected the Delameters' other theories of liability that were not based on operation of the bus and held that the Delameters failed to establish a valid waiver of BISD's immunity from suit. Id. at *5. The Delameters filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas on March 16, 2018.
On April 2, 2018, the Delameters filed the instant lawsuit in federal court. The Delameters' Original Complaint (#1) and First Amended Complaint (#3)3 asserted: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a claim under § 504 of theRehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (3) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131; (4) a discrimination claim under § 121.003 of the Texas Human Resources Code; (5) a wrongful death claim under §§ 71.001-71.012 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and (6) a survival claim under § 71.021 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This court stayed the federal lawsuit pending disposition of the Delameters' petition for review, which the Supreme Court of Texas ultimately denied on June 21, 2019.
After the stay was lifted in this action, the Delameters filed their Second Amended Complaint (#24) on August 16, 2019, reasserting: (1) a § 1983 claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a Rehabilitation Act claim; (3) an ADA claim; and (4) a claim for damages for wrongful death.4 BISD filed the pending Motion to Dismiss the Delameters' Second Amended Complaint (#26) on August 20, 2019. BISD argues that the statutes of limitations expired before the Delameters filed the instant lawsuit and that the Delameters plead insufficient facts to establish a school district's liability under § 1983 for violation of a Fourteenth Amendment right. On September 17, 2019, the Delameters filed their Response (#30), maintaining that their claims were tolled by § 16.064 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and that their various theories of § 1983 liability are adequate, and, on September 24, 2019, BISD filed its Reply (#33).
On January 24, 2020, the Delameters and the newly joined plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (#36). With respect to the Delameters, the new complaint repeats allegationsfrom the Second Amended Complaint, includes a survivorship claim that was omitted from the Second Amended Complaint, and asserts for the first time a civil conspiracy claim against BISD and the newly added defendants. In response, BISD filed a Motion to Sever or Dismiss New Plaintiffs and Defendants (#37) and its First Supplemental Reply to the Delameters' Response to its Motion to Dismiss the Delameters' Second Amended Complaint (#38).5 Plaintiffs did not file a timely response or seek an extension to file a response to either filing. The newly added defendants have not appeared, and the record does not indicate whether they have been served.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests only the formal sufficiency of the statement of a claim for relief and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (); Humana, Inc. v. Shrader & Assocs., 584 B.R. 658, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Faas v. Cascos, 225 F. Supp. 3d 604, 609 (S.D. Tex. 2016). It is not a procedure for resolving contests about the facts or the merits of a case. See Stanfield v. Boston Sci. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 3d 873, 877 (S.D. Tex. 2015); 5B CHARLES A.WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (3d ed. 2019). In ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Hernandez v. Mesa, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017); Warren v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 759 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2014); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (); Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 936 (2012).
Nevertheless, "the plaintiff's complaint [must] be stated with enough clarity to enable a court or an opposing party to determine whether a claim is sufficiently alleged." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989)). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Davis v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n, 761 F. App'x 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2019); Lee v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 837 F.3d 523, 533 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1374 (2017). "Where the well-pleaded facts of a complaint do not permit a court...
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