Estate of Jackson v. Hardaway (In re Hardaway)

• Decision Date: 05 October 2016
• Docket Number: Adversary Proceeding No. 15-4360-PJS,Case No. 15-40281
• Citation: Estate of Jackson v. Hardaway (In re Hardaway), 558 B.R. 831 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2016)
• Parties: In re: Terrill Hardaway, Debtor. Estate of Tony Leridge Jackson, Latonya Jackson, Personal Representative, Plaintiff, v. Terrill Hardaway, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Michigan

558 B.R. 831

In re: Terrill Hardaway, Debtor.

Estate of Tony Leridge Jackson, Latonya Jackson, Personal Representative, Plaintiff,

v.Terrill Hardaway, Defendant.

Case No. 15-40281

Adversary Proceeding No. 15-4360-PJS

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed October 5, 2016

Jordan Fields, Joshua Wheelock, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Sharpe, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (3) ABSTAINING FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Phillip J. Shefferly, United States Bankruptcy Judge

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment with respect to a complaint to determine the nondischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiff is the personal representative of an individual who was fatally shot by the defendant, the debtor in this Chapter 7 case. The plaintiff and the defendant have both moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court will grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and abstain from further proceedings regarding the plaintiff's claim against the defendant.

JURISDICTION

The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and E.D. Mich. LR 83.50(a), the District Court has referred this adversary proceeding to the Bankruptcy Court. Although the complaint in this adversary proceeding alleges a claim for a personal injury tort and wrongful death, which can only be tried by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), the determination of whether the claim is nondischargeable is a core proceeding which this Court may hear and determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).

The parties do not request in their cross motions for summary judgment that this Court adjudicate whether the defendant is liable on the plaintiff's claim for personal injury tort and wrongful death, but only whether such claim is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The parties expressly consent to the Court making a final judgment regarding nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

The Court finds that it has the statutory and constitutional authority to make such determination in this core proceeding, leaving the adjudication of the defendant's liability on the plaintiff's claim for personal injury tort and wrongful death and the liquidation of the amount of such claim to another court of competent jurisdiction.

FACTS

Based on its review of the cross motions for summary judgment and the papers filed in support of the cross motions, the Court finds that the following facts are not in dispute.

Early in the morning on December 29, 2012, Tony Leridge Jackson (“Jackson”) was fatally shot by Terrill Hardaway (“Hardaway”) outside of the Four Winds Lounge in Detroit, Michigan. Hardaway was charged with second degree murder for the shooting. On November 11, 2014, the criminal trial against Hardaway commenced in the Wayne County Circuit Court, case no. 14-3105 (“Criminal Case”). Following a jury trial, Hardaway was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced under Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.321. On December 23, 2014, Latonya Jackson, as the personal representative of Jackson's estate (“Personal Representative”) filed a civil complaint in the Wayne County Circuit Court, case no. 14-016275-NO (“Civil Case”), against Hardaway and other defendants, alleging multiple counts, including wrongful death and assault and battery.

On January 12, 2015, Hardaway filed this Chapter 7 case. On April 20, 2015, the Personal Representative filed a one count complaint in this adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the Personal Representative's claim in the Civil Case is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code because it is for a willful and malicious injury by Hardaway. On May 7, 2015, Hardaway filed an answer to the complaint admitting that he was convicted in the Criminal Case of voluntary manslaughter for the shooting of Jackson, but denying that the Personal Representative's claim is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

On July 20, 2015, the Court held an initial scheduling conference. The Court conferred with the Personal Representative and Hardaway about some of the jurisdictional issues implicated in this adversary proceeding. The Court observed that the Personal Representative's claim against Hardaway is a personal injury tort and wrongful death claim, and that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) states that the District Court, and not the Bankruptcy Court, shall try any personal injury tort and wrongful claim in a bankruptcy case. The Court explained that because of this provision, it cannot adjudicate the issue of whether Hardaway is liable on the Personal Representative's claim, but must either refer the adjudication of that claim to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), or permit the parties to litigate that claim in the Civil Case. The Court noted, however, that this Court does have the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) to determine whether that claim is nondischargeable. Therefore, at the initial conference, the Court allowed the parties to conduct discovery and other pretrial proceedings in this adversary proceeding and scheduled another conference at the end of discovery to discuss any further proceedings, whether in this Court, the District Court, or the Civil Case.

On June 6, 2016, following the close of discovery, the Court held the conference. The parties informed the Court that they now agree that the Wayne County Circuit Court should decide in the Civil Case whether there is any liability owing by Hardaway on the Personal Representative's claim and, if so, the amount of such liability. The parties further informed the Court that they agree that this Court should adjudicate only the issue of whether such claim is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

After conferring with the parties, the Court permitted them a period of time to file cross motions for summary judgment. The Court entered an order setting a deadline to file the cross motions by July 21, 2016. The order expressly stated that “any motion for summary judgment should not address the question of whether there is any liability by [Hardaway] to the [Personal Representative], nor the amount of any such debt, but should only address whether, if there is a debt owing by [Hardaway] to the [Personal Representative], such debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).”

On July 17, 2016, Hardaway filed a motion for summary judgment. On July 21, 2016, the Personal Representative filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court construes both motions, together with the parties' agreement placed on the record at the June 6, 2016 conference, as a stipulation by the parties, for the sole purpose of binding them in this adversary proceeding, that there is a debt owing by Hardaway to the Personal Representative, but without prejudice to their respective rights to argue otherwise in the Civil Case.

On September 23, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment. Because Hardaway's motion for summary judgment made reference to portions of the transcripts from the Criminal Case that were not attached to Hardaway's motion for summary judgment, the Court set a further deadline for Hardaway to provide the Court with copies of those excerpts. In addition, at the hearing both parties requested the Court to view, as part of the record for the cross motions for summary judgment, a videotape of the shooting that was received into evidence in the Criminal Case. The Court then took the cross motions for summary judgment under advisement.

Following the hearing, Hardaway provided the Court with the excerpts of the transcripts of the Criminal Case referred to in his motion for summary judgment, as well as a copy of the videotape. The Court has now had an opportunity to review those materials, as well as the materials submitted by the Personal Representative in support of her motion for summary judgment, which consist of extensive portions of the transcripts from the Criminal Case. The cross motions for summary judgment are now ripe for decision.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment is incorporated into Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “genuine” issue is present “ ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

“The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that an essential element of the non-moving party's case is lacking.” Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International Corp., 171 F.3d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). “The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with specific facts, supported by evidence in the record, upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id.(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). “The non-moving party, however, must provide more than mere allegations or denials ... without giving any significant probative evidence to support” its position. Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d...