Estate of Jahn v. Farnsworth, 052317 MICA, 329613
| Judge | Before: Servitto, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ. |
| Parties | ESTATE OF STEVEN JACOB JAHN, by STEVEN C. JAHN, Personal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM T. FARNSWORTH, THOMAS L. VALKO, PATRICIA L. SPEILBURG and MARYSVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Docket Number | 329613 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
| Date | 23 May 2017 |
UNPUBLISHED
St. Clair Circuit Court LC No. 15-000637-NO
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants on the ground that plaintiff's negligence and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress claims were barred by governmental immunity. We affirm.
On March 19, 2012, Steven Jacob Jahn (Jake) was 17 years old and a senior at Marysville High School when he was suspected of stealing a teacher's laptop computer which held confidential student records as well as the teacher's course work. Instead of contacting the police and pursuing criminal charges as advised by the school district's attorney, the matter was handled as a school discipline issue. In accordance with the due process policy and guidelines set forth in the student handbook and on the school's website, Jake had the right to be informed of the allegations and evidence, to offer a defense to the allegations and, if necessary, to appeal the discipline.
On that day, Jake was brought to the front office at about 11:00 a.m. and was informed by the school principal, defendant William Farnsworth, and the assistant principal, defendant Thomas Valko, that he was a suspect in the theft of the laptop computer.1 Jake was told that the punishment for theft included a ten-day suspension, removal from all extracurricular activities, and a recommendation to the superintendent for a long-term suspension, i.e., suspension for the remainder of the school year. Jake was also told that surveillance videotape showed him leaving the teacher's classroom with a bag about 20 to 30 seconds after the laptop computer was disconnected from the school's network. Jake asked to see the videotape, but was told it was not available at that time. Although Jake initially denied taking the computer, he eventually admitted that he took it and that it was at his house.
After Jake's admission, a conference call was placed to Jake's father Steven, the personal representative in this case. Jake told his father where the laptop computer was located in his bedroom and Steven brought the laptop to the school at about 12:00 p.m. The laptop was examined and it was determined that Jake had "reimaged" it with different software, and the user name and password had been reset. Steven was advised of Jake's punishment, including suspension, but was also told that Jake could continue his education and complete his coursework at home. There was also a discussion about the possibility that Jake may have been involved in other thefts at the school involving computer equipment and cell phones, which Jake denied. Steven testified that Farnsworth and Valko told Jake that, if he did not confess, they were going to contact the police with regard to the other thefts, as well as notify the colleges that Jake was interested in attending about the events that had occurred. Farnsworth and Valko both denied that they made these statements to Jake. In any case, Valko escorted Jake to his car at about 12:45 p.m., at which time Jake became upset. Jake eventually shook Valko's hand and thanked him for not involving the police. Valko then returned to his office and told Jake's father that Jake was upset and to keep an eye on him. Jake drove home and, within a short time, his father arrived home as well.
Jake was home with his family until about 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. when he left his house without anyone's knowledge. At about 5:20 p.m. Steven realized that Jake was not home, but Jake's cell phone was home. However, at about 5:00 p.m., the police were dispatched to the scene of a fatal accident on I-69. Jake had driven his vehicle into a concrete pillar, causing the car to catch fire. Jake died of traumatic injuries and his death was ruled a suicide.
Three years later, this lawsuit was filed. In Count I, a negligence claim, plaintiff's allegations included that defendants breached their duties to Jake by: (a) interrogating him in a closed room without his parents or counsel; (b) misrepresenting facts to him during their interrogation; (c) intimidating him; (d) lying to him about the videotape showing him in possession of the laptop; (e) threatening him about a felony conviction and his future college plans; (f) suspending him for the remainder of the school year; and (g) failing to follow their suicide prevention policies although Jake was suicidal. In Count II, an intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress claim, plaintiff alleged that because of defendants' actions set forth above, Jake was subjected to severe emotional distress that caused him to commit suicide.
Subsequently, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). Defendants noted that this was the second lawsuit filed by plaintiff arising out of Jake's suspension from school for stealing a teacher's laptop computer. The first case was filed in the federal district court and alleged procedural and substantive due process violations under 42 USC § 1983. Jahn v Farnsworth, 33 F.Supp.3d 866 (ED Mich, 2014). That case was dismissed on defendants' motion for summary judgment after the district court held that Jake received all the procedural due process to which he was entitled and that his substantive due process rights were not violated. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision "in all respects." Jahn v Farnsworth, 617 Fed.Appx 453, 464 (CA 6, 2015).
In their motion for summary disposition of the claims brought in this case, defendants argued that plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel considering the dismissal of the federal case. Defendants further argued that plaintiff's claims were barred by governmental immunity. In particular, the claims against the school district were barred because the gross negligence exception only applies to individuals not governmental agencies and governmental entities are absolutely immune from intentional tort claims. The negligence claim against the individual defendants was also barred because: (1) defendants owed no duty to Jake at the time of his death since he was not on school property and had been released to the custody of his parents several hours earlier; (2) if defendants did owe Jake a duty, their actions related to Jake's suspension were not grossly negligent, i.e., did not constitute "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results;" and (3) defendants were not "the proximate cause" of Jake's death because the one most immediate, direct cause of Jake's death was his own act of committing suicide. Further, defendants argued, plaintiff's intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress claim must be dismissed because none of their actions could be considered "extreme and outrageous." In summary, defendants argued that plaintiff's case must be dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiff responded to defendants' motion for summary disposition, arguing first that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel barred his claims because these state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice by the federal court and the ultimate issues to be decided in this action were not the same as those in the federal action. Second, the individual defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress because the issue whether they acted in good faith in their treatment of Jake was a question for the jury. That is, reasonable minds could differ on the issue whether...
To continue reading
Request your trial