Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Office
| Citation | 769 F.3d 850 |
| Decision Date | 15 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–3232.,13–3232. |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Frank P. LAGANO, Appellant v. BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; Michael Mordaga; Various John Doe and Jane Doe Defendants, whose individual identities or wrongful acts are not now known to Plaintiff. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
William H. Buckman, Esq., William H. Buckman Law Firm, Moorestown, NJ, Edward M. Koch, Esq., White & Williams, Philadelphia, PA, David M. Ragonese, Esq. [Argued], White & Williams, Cherry Hill, NJ, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
John J. Hoffman, Esq., Lisa A. Puglisi, Esq., Brian G. Flanagan, Esq. [Argued], Eric S. Pasternack, Esq., Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Trenton, NJ, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKI E, Circuit Judges.
Frank P. Lagano was fatally shot on April 12, 2007, in front of a diner in East Brunswick, New Jersey. More than five years later, in August 2012, the Estate of Frank P. Lagano (“the Estate”) filed suit against, inter alia, the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (the “BCPO”) and former BCPO Chief of Detectives Michael Mordaga, alleging that BCPO personnel improperly revealed to members of organized crime that Lagano was an informant and this disclosure led to Lagano's murder. Specifically, the Estate contends the alleged disclosure of Lagano's status as a confidential informant established a state-created danger in violation of his due process rights. The Estate also challenges a December 2004 search of Lagano's home and seizure of his property. The BCPO and Mordaga (collectively, “Appellees”) each filed motions to dismiss the Estate's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The District Court granted both motions and dismissed the Estate's claims in their entirety. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
According to the Estate, Lagano and Michael Mordaga shared a long-term business and personal relationship.1 Lagano was also the subject of an organized crime investigation by the BCPO, where Mordaga served as Chief of Detectives. On December 1, 2004, BCPO detectives executed a search warrant at Lagano's home in New Jersey, during which they seized more than $50,000 in cash along with other items. Detectives from the BCPO also executed search warrants on Lagano's safe deposit boxes, which resulted in the seizure of additional funds. Lagano was charged with several crimes, including racketeering, promoting gambling, criminal usury, and conspiracy.
After Lagano was charged, Mordaga allegedly brought Lagano to his office and instructed him to retain a specific attorney with the assurance that the attorney could “make his legal problems go away.” (Estate's Br. 12.) Lagano did not follow Mordaga's instructions. Instead, according to the Estate's allegations, Lagano agreed to serve as a confidential informant for James Sweeney, who was employed at the time as an investigator with the Criminal Justice Division of the New Jersey Attorney General's Office (“the DCJ”).
Mordaga subsequently attended a dinner meeting with Lagano, where he once again urged Lagano to hire the attorney he recommended, assuring him that, if he did so, “half his money would be returned and ... [he] would serve no prison time.” (App. 31a ¶ 28.) Lagano rejected Mordaga's offer, and their relationship “soured.” ( Id. 30a ¶ 21.)
The Estate avers that sometime thereafter, “[BCPO] personnel ... disclosed to alleged members of traditional Organized Crime families ... that [Lagano] had been an informant.” ( Id. 32a ¶ 32.) On April 12, 2007, more than two years after his arrest, Lagano was shot and killed. The Estate argues that Lagano's death resulted from the actions of Mordaga and other BCPO employees, who allegedly “conspired to illegally arrest and steal funds from Lagano in 2004 and, then, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for Lagano's safety, conspired to disclose Lagano's status as a confidential informant to known members of Organized Crime.” (Estate's Br. 9.)
On August 29, 2012, the Estate filed a three-count complaint against the State of New Jersey, the BCPO, Mordaga, and various John and Jane Doe Defendants. The bulk of the Estate's factual averments were based on allegations made by James Sweeney, who is now deceased, in a complaint he filed in 2010 (“the Sweeney Complaint”).2 The Estate contends that it discovered the facts relevant to this appeal through the Sweeney Complaint.
The Estate filed a first amended complaint (hereinafter, “the amended complaint”) on December 12, 2012, which asserts the same claims as averred in the original complaint but omits the State of New Jersey as a defendant. Count 1 presents a due process claim under the state-created danger theory, asserting that Appellees violated Lagano's rights by disclosing his identity as a confidential informant, thus proximately causing his death. Count 2 asserts the same claim, but under the New Jersey Constitution, made actionable via the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6–1 to –2 (“NJCRA”). Count 3 asserts violations of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
The BCPO filed a motion to dismiss, and the District Court granted the motion on March 22, 2013. Mordaga then filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted on June 19, 2013. The Estate filed this timely appeal.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), see Common Cause of Pa. v. Pa., 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir.2009), as well as Rule 12(b)(6), see Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir.2013).
The District Court's dismissal rested on several alternative theories: the District Court dismissed all counts on the basis that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO is a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, or the NJCRA; it dismissed all counts against the BCPO on the basis that the BCPO is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; it dismissed Counts 1 and 2 against Mordaga on the basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity; and it dismissed Count 3 on the alternative basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations. We will discuss each in turn.
We begin with the question of whether Appellees are “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, or the NJCRA. In its March 22, 2013 opinion, the District Court held that the BCPO is not a “person” subject to liability under these provisions. In its June 19, 2013 opinion, the District Court concluded that Mordaga is not a “person” subject to suit under the federal civil rights laws. Because the District Court erred in reaching these conclusions, we will vacate the dismissal on this ground.
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Section 1985 imposes liability “if two or more persons ” conspire to interfere with civil rights in a manner enumerated therein. Id. § 1985 (emphasis added).3
The District Court found that the BCPO was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and that Mordaga, as BCPO Chief of Detectives, was a state official. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Court held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.” 4 Local governmental bodies and their officials, by contrast, are regarded as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Because local governmental bodies and their officials are “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985, and state agencies and their officials acting in their official capacity are not, we must decide initially whether the BCPO is an arm of the State of New Jersey or of Bergen County. If the BCPO is an arm of the State of New Jersey, we must then decide whether Mordaga has been sued exclusively in his official capacity as BCPO Chief of Detectives.5
Our resolution of the first question—whether the BCPO is an arm of the State—is guided by Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir.1996). In Coleman, we held that “when [New Jersey] county prosecutors engage in classic law enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State.” Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir.1996). When county prosecutors perform administrative functions “unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution,” however, they act as county officials. Id. at 1505–06.
Here, the District Court found that “the BCPO was acting within its classical function of investigating criminal activities and conducting criminal prosecutions with respect to Mr. Lagano.” (App.13a.) Similarly, the District Court found that Mordaga “was acting as the Chief of Detectives in the BCPO, a state agency,” and that Mordaga was acting “in his official capacity in connection with the allegations made by Lagano's Estate.” (App.8a.) Based upon these findings, the District Court concluded that neither the BCPO nor Mordaga were amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985, and dismissed those claims accordingly.
It is, of course, true that in some respects the amended complaint avers activity within the BCPO and actions taken by Mordaga that fall within the ambit of “classic law enforcement and...
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