Estate of LaJeuenesse v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M.

• Decision Date: 06 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 30,969.,30,969.
• Citation: 292 P.3d 485
• Parties: The ESTATE OF Reuben LAJEUENESSE, by and through Personal Representative Frances BOSWELL, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, a body corporate of the State of New Mexico, for itself and its public operations including University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center and its components the University of New Mexico Hospital and University of New Mexico School of Medicine, Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

292 P.3d 485

The ESTATE OF Reuben LAJEUENESSE, by and through Personal Representative Frances BOSWELL, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee,

v.BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, a body corporate of the State of New Mexico, for itself and its public operations including University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center and its components the University of New Mexico Hospital and University of New Mexico School of Medicine, Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

No. 30,969.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 27, 2012.

Certiorari Granted, Dec. 6, 2012, No. 33,878.

Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Steven L. Tucker, Santa Fe, NM, Curtis & Lucero, Lisa K. Curtis, Amalia S. Lucero, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

Simone, Roberts & Weiss, P.A., David W. Frizzell, Meena H. Allen, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} We address in this appeal tension between the Tort Claims Act (TCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41–4–1 to –30 (1976, as amended through 2010), and the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41–2–1 to –4 (1882, as amended through 2001), as to the maximum liability of a government entity in a wrongful death action when there is one decedent and multiple statutory beneficiaries. We hold that the TCA prevails and that the maximum liability of $400,000 “to any person” under NMSA 1978, Section 41–4–19(A)(3) (2004) (amended 2007), applies. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

{2} In the cross appeal, we consider whether the district court erred in allowing Plaintiff to present a video concerning the decedent's life to the jury, in granting Plaintiff double costs against Defendants under Rule 1–068(A) NMRA, contrary to the TCA, and by accumulating costs from the filing of an offer of settlement under Rule 1–068(A) rather than from the expiration of the period for Defendants to respond to the offer of settlement. We also affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to the issues on cross appeal.

BACKGROUND

{3} Plaintiff, the Estate of Rueben Lajeuenesse, brought this action by and through a personal representative for the wrongful death of Reuben Lajeuenesse (the decedent) based on the negligent medical care provided by Defendants. Before trial, Defendants made an offer of settlement under Rule 1–068(A) of $350,000. At trial, over Defendants' objections, Plaintiff played for the jury a video concerning the decedent's life. The district court ruled that the danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the video's probative value and that Defendants could have the opportunity to cross-examine the persons speaking on the video.

{4} The jury awarded Plaintiff damages of $750,000. The district court granted Defendants' motion for remittitur and reduced the verdict to $400,000 plus medical charges of $13,032, stating in part that “regardless of the language contained in the Wrongful Death Act,” the “ ‘per person’ monetary limitation of $400,000 under the Tort Claims Act applies.” With respect to Defendants' offer of settlement under Rule 1–068(A), the district court granted Plaintiff double costs accumulating from the date Defendants filed the offer of settlement.

APPEAL—THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT

{5} The WDA permits the personal representative of a deceased person to bring an action for damages caused by the wrongful act or neglect resulting in the death of the deceased. Sections 41–2–1, –3. In a wrongful death case, the jury “may give such damages, compensatory and exemplary, as they deem fair and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the surviving party entitled to the judgment, or any interest in the judgment[.]” Section 41–2–3. When there is no surviving spouse and the deceased is survived by all of the deceased's children as in this case, the proceeds of a judgment obtained for wrongful death “shall be distributed” to the children. Section 41–2–3(C).

{6} The TCA sets forth the immunity of governmental entities and public employees and the exceptions for which the state has waived immunity for purposes of tort liability. Section 41–4–4(A). The TCA waives immunity for liability for damages for wrongful death caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties. Id. However, it limits the damages that can be awarded against a governmental entity or public employee acting within the scope of the employee's duties. Section 41–4–19(A). As pertinent to this case, the TCA provides that the liability of a governmental agency shall not exceed:

(3) the sum of four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000) to any person for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence for all damages other than property damage and medical and medically related expenses as permitted under the [TCA]; or

(4) the sum of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) for all claims other than medical or medically related expenses arising out of a single occurrence.

Section 41–4–19(A) (2004).

{7} To ascertain the proper amount of the verdict, we must examine the interplay of the WDA with the TCA and determine whether a wrongful death action brought by a personal representative on behalf of multiple statutory beneficiaries is considered a single claim under Section 41–4–19(A)(3) (2004) or multiple claims under Section 41–4–19(A)(4) (2004). We review the meaning of statutory language under a de novo review. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2002–NMSC–020, ¶ 16, 132 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61. We attribute to statutory language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the legislative context indicates otherwise. Id.; seeNMSA 1978, § 12–2A–2 (1997) (“Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar and common usage.”). We seek to construe statutes covering the same subject matters together and harmoniously whenever possible. Att'y Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2011–NMSC–034, ¶ 10, 150 N.M. 174, 258 P.3d 453. We note Plaintiff's argument that, as remedial statutes, the WDA and the TCA should be construed broadly to advance the legislative intent. On the other hand, the WDA and the TCA are both statutes in derogation of the common law, which generally require strict construction. Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 427, 872 P.2d 840, 845 (1994); Methola v. Cnty. of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 333, 622 P.2d 234, 238 (1980). Regardless,we endeavor to construe the statutes in this case to fulfill the intent of the Legislature. Methola, 95 N.M. at 333, 622 P.2d at 238 (interpreting the TCA for legislative intent).

{8} Plaintiff contends that Section 41–4–19(A)(4) (2004) applies because each statutory beneficiary is a “person” within the meaning of the TCA and, within the WDA, the statutory beneficiaries own the rights represented by a wrongful death action. We do not agree that the WDA or the TCA contemplates this structure under the facts of this case.

{9} We begin with the TCA and its relationship with the WDA. The TCA governs the manner in which tort actions can be brought against governmental entities and public employees. See § 41–4–2(A) (stating, as a matter of public policy, “that governmental entities and public employees shall only be liable within the limitations of the [TCA] ... and in accordance with the principles established in that act”). It is the “exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or public employee for any tort for which immunity has been waived.” Section 41–4–17(A). The TCA provides the specific types of tort liability that are excepted from the immunity granted to governmental entities and public employees. Section 41–4–4(A). A wrongful death action based on the negligence of public employees acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of a hospital is one of the exceptions. Section 41–4–9. We must look to the TCA to determine the availability and extent of a wrongful death action. See § 41–4–4(A).

{10} With this structural backdrop, we turn to the WDA. At common law, a cause of action for personal injuries that resulted in death did not survive the death of the injured person. Ickes v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 415, 79 P.2d 942, 943 (1938). The WDA provides the statutory authority for a wrongful death action, permitting the cause of action to be brought by the personal representative of the injured, deceased person, “notwithstanding the death of the person injured.” Sections 41–2–1, –3; Chavez v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 103 N.M. 606, 608, 711 P.2d 883, 885 (1985). The WDA ensures that persons whose negligence causes injury that would entitle an injured person to damages if the injured person had not died do not escape liability because the injury results in death. Section 41–2–1. If the injured person did not die, the injured person would possess the cause of action. The WDA permits the cause of action to survive. Id.

{11} As originally enacted in 1882, the WDA permitted the surviving beneficiaries of the deceased to bring the action and be awarded damages “not exceeding five thousand dollars ... with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death[.]” Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 69, 73, 463 P.2d 45, 49 (Ct.App.1969) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd,81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970). The WDA was amended in 1891 to give the personal representative of the deceased person the sole right to pursue the action. Stang, 81 N.M. at 73, 463 P.2d at 49;see§ 41–2–3.

{12} Of course, the Legislature did not intend for the personal representative to personally receive the damages in the capacity of personal representative. The WDA states, as added in 1891, that the jury may award damages, “taking into consideration the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the surviving party.” Section 41–2–3; Stang, 81 N.M. at 73, 463 P.2d at 49. Additionally, the WDA provides that the proceeds of any judgment be distributed to the injured, deceased person's...