Estate of Lalli

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JONES; COOKE
• Citation: Estate of Lalli, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1977)
• Decision Date: 17 November 1977
• Parties: , 371 N.E.2d 481 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Mario LALLI, Deceased. Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, Deceased, Respondent.

Page 761

400 N.Y.S.2d 761

43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Mario LALLI, Deceased Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, Deceased, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 17, 1977.

Morris R. Henkin and Leonard M. Henkin, Mount Vernon, for appellant.

Leonard A. Weiss, Mount Vernon, for respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Irwin M. Strum, Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Suzanne M. McGrattan, New York City, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

This case is now before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States for further consideration in the light of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31. We adhere to our previous decision (38 N.Y.2d 77, 378 N.Y.S.2d 357, 340 N.E.2d 721).

At the outset we observe that the standard to be applied in our review, while "less than strictest scrutiny", is nonetheless "not a toothless one" (perhaps in the sense that it would be a "toothless" standard if it could be satisfied by a mere finding of some remote rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate State purpose) (430 U.S. 762, 767, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31).

We find the Illinois statute which was before the court in Trimble significantly and determinatively different from the New York statute. Under the former the right of an illegitimate child to inherit from his father depended not only on proof, by way of the father's acknowledgment, of the fact of paternity, but on proof as well that the parents had intermarried (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 3, § 12 (1961); cf. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 3, § 2-2 (1976-1977 Supp.)). By contrast, under our New York statute the right to inherit depends only on proof that a court of competent jurisdiction has made an order of filiation declaring paternity during the lifetime of the father. (EPTL 4-1.2, subd. (a), par. (2)). ¹

In our analysis the Illinois statute focuses on a requirement that the family relationship be "legitimatized" by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Thus, there was a manifested and impermissible hostility to illegitimacy as such, unrelieved even if there were no doubt whatsoever as to paternity. ² The Supreme Court held unacceptable such a statutory provision which penalized children born of an "illegitimate relationship" between their parents concluding that the sins of the parents are not to be visited upon their children. There is nothing similar in our statute; it is concerned only with proof of paternity and the establishment of a blood relationship between the father and the child.

In another aspect we note that even with respect to the issue of paternity there is a different emphasis in the two statutes. Illinois requires in a conclusory form only that the child be "acknowledged by the father as the father's child". New York, on the other hand, is evidently concerned not only with the fact of paternity but with the form and manner, and thus the availability, of its proof, i. e., by order of filiation.

The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the inherently more difficult problems of proof of paternity than of maternity and acknowledged that the States have a legitimate interest in making provision for the orderly settlement of estates and the dependabili of titles to property passing under intestacy laws (430 U.S., at p. 771, 97 S.Ct., at p. 1465). "The orderly disposition of property at death requires an appropriate legal framework, the structuring of which is a matter particularly within the competence of the individual States. In exercising this responsibility, a State necessarily must enact laws governing both the procedure and substance of intestate succession. Absent infringement of a constitutional right, the federal courts have no role here, and, even when constitutional violations are alleged, those courts should accord substantial deference to a State's statutory scheme of inheritance."

The issue here appears to turn, then, on whether a State may constitutionally require as proof of paternity a judicial determination made during the lifetime of the father. We find nothing in Trimble which forecloses this possibility; specifically we do not, as appellant would have us, read footnote 14 at page 772, 97 S.Ct. 1459 as forbidding such a requirement. The preference for judicial determinations with respect to title to real property has a long and respected history and provides an available record. In effect our statute requires that the determination of paternity be made in the formality of a judicial proceeding in consequence of which there will follow an order of filiation and a permanent, accessible record. If a father is prepared to execute a formal acknowledgment of paternity (a prerequisite which appears clearly to be acceptable to the Supreme Court), obtaining an order of filiation will not be burdensome. Nor do we perceive the seeds of constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the judicial determination be made within the lifetime of the father. As we noted before, the father "may be expected to have greater personal knowledge than anyone else, save possibly the mother, of the fact or likelihood that he was indeed the natural father. His availability should he a substantial factor contributing to the reliability of the fact-finding process." (38 N.Y.2d, at p. 82, 378 N.Y.S.2d at p. 355, 340 N.E.2d at p. 724.) Indeed a formal acknowledgement of paternity, apparently found in Trimble to be an acceptable requirement, obviously entails personal participation by the father during his lifetime.

Finally, we would merely note, if Trimble is to be read as inviting exploration of the intent of the Legislature in adopting the particular statute, that research of counsel as well as our own has disclosed no relevant materials with respect to the enactment of EPTL 4-1.2 (subd. (a), par. (2)). We could speculate as to the details of legislative intentions, and so could others. To us it is clear, even in the absence of specific legislative materials, that this statute serves a legitimate State purpose in the language of Trimble, to make provision for "the orderly settlement of estates and the dependabili of titles to property passing under intestacy laws" (430 U.S. 762, 771, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1465, 52 L.Ed.2d 31, supra ). We know of nothing, and there is nothing in the record, to suggest that our statute was intended as a moral, ethical or social disparagement of illegitimacy or was the product of proponents whose objective, even in small part, was to discourage illegitimacy, to mold human conduct or to set societal norms.

For the reasons stated we conclude that our statute meets the constitutional guidelines articulated in Trimble. Accordingly, the decree of Surrogate's Court, Westchester County, should be affirmed, with costs.

COOKE, Judge (dissenting).

Admittedly, the Illinois statute recently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States is significantly different from the New York statute (EPTL 4-1.2, subd. (a), par. (2)). Nevertheless, it is respectfully submitted that our statute is likewise unconstitutional in light of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31.

In Trimble, the Supreme Court was careful to delineate the boundaries of its inquiry, thus explaining that (p. 771, 97 S.Ct. p. 1465) "The orderly disposition of property at death requires an appropriate legal framework, the structuring of which is a matter particularly within the competence of the individual States. In exercising this responsibility, a State necessarily must enact laws governing both the procedure and substance of intestate succession. Absent infringement of a constitutional right, the federal courts have no role here, and, even when constitutional violations are alleged, those courts should accord substantial deference to a State's statutory scheme of inheritance." The court also recognized that (p. 770, 97 S.Ct. p. 1465) "(t)he more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally". Nevertheless, considering the Illinois statute, the court reasoned (pp. 770-771, 97 S.Ct. p. 1465): "We think, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the relation between § 12 and the State's proper objective of assuring accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property at death. The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion...