Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 99-15662
| Decision Date | 26 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-15662,99-15662 |
| Citation | 219 F.3d 1018 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2000) ESTATE OF MARIA TERESA MACIAS, by and through its successors in interest; CLAUDIA MACIAS; JUAN MACIAS; AVELINO MACIAS, JR., minors, by and through their Guardian, Sara Hernandez; SARA HERNANDEZ, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARK IHDE, Sheriff; PAUL DAY, Sergeant; CRAIG WISEMAN, Sergeant; DEFFENBAUGH, Deputy Sheriff, Defendants, and MARK LOPEZ, Deputy Sheriff; COUNTY OF SONOMA, Defendants-Appellees. Office of the Circuit Executive |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard Seltzer, Seltzer & Cody, Oakland, California; Milo M. Benningfield, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael D. Senneff, Senneff Kelly, A Professional Corporation, Santa Rosa, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, D. Lowell Jensen, District Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CV-96-03658-DLJ/MJ
Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Arthur L. Alarcon, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.
Claudia Macias, Juan Macias, Avelino Macias, Jr., Sara Hernandez and the estate of Maria Teresa Macias, (collectively, the "Appellants") appeal from the dismissal of this civil-rights action following the entry of an order granting summary judgment in favor of the County of Sonoma ("Sonoma County") and Deputy Mark Lopez of the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department (collectively, the "Appellees"). The Appellants filed this action in the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that the Appellees denied Maria Teresa Macias's right to equal protection by providing her with inferior police protection on account of her status as a woman, a Latina, and a victim of domestic violence. In granting summary judgment, the district court assumed, for the purpose of considering the question whether the Appellees' conduct caused Mrs. Macias's death, that the Appellants had demonstrated in their opposition to the Appellees' motion that they, as state actors, had deprived Mrs. Macias of her constitutional rights. The Appellants have timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.
The Appellants contend that reversal is compelled because the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the murder of Mrs. Macias was the "alleged constitutional deprivation." We reverse the order granting summary judgment and dismissing this action because we hold that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the denial of equal protection. We remand so that the district court can determine, in the first instance, following completion of discovery, whether the Appellees deprived Mrs. Macias of her right to equal protection.
The Appellants filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, on October 18, 1996.1 They alleged that Deputy Lopez and Sonoma County, as well as several other individuals, had violated their rights to equal protection and substantive due process. The complaint alleged that Mrs. Macias's death and Ms. Hernandez's injuries were the result of a Sonoma County policy to discriminate against women, victims of domestic violence, and Latinos. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not state a due process claim based on the criminal acts of a private citizen, and that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the heightened pleading requirements with respect to their equal protection claims. The district court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their equal protection claims in order to establish a non-conclusory basis for the allegations that the individual defendants intended to discriminate against women, victims of domestic violence, and Latinos.
On April 20, 1997, the Appellants filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged that Deputy Lopez and Sonoma County violated Mrs. Macias's right to equal protection by providing inadequate police protection based on her status as a woman, a victim of domestic violence, and a Latina. The district court dismissed the Appellants' allegations of discrimination against Latinas, but allowed the Appellants to pursue their claims that the Appellees had discriminated against Mrs. Macias in its provisions of police protection on account of her status as a woman and a victim of domestic violence.
The district court then ordered discovery to begin in phases. The first phase was to be directed solely to the question whether the conduct of the Appellees caused the death of Mrs. Macias. The district court also instructed the parties that it would entertain "a motion for summary judgment limited to the issue of causation following the completion of discovery on the issue."
After the completion of discovery on the issue of causation, the Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, limited solely to the issue of causation. The Appellees' motion focused on the question whether their conduct caused the death of Mrs. Macias. The district court stated that the only issue before it was whether the Appellants could establish "a direct causal link between the personal conduct of Deputy Lopez or the municipal conduct of Sonoma County and the alleged constitutional deprivation, in this case the murder of Maria Teresa Macias." In ruling on the question of causation, the district court assumed the existence of the other elements needed to establish a S 1983 claim, including whether Mrs. Macias had suffered a constitutional deprivation.
The following facts in evidence were considered by the district court in deciding the narrow question whether the Appellants caused Mrs. Macias's death. Mrs. Macias met Avelino Macias in Mexico in 1980. The couple married one or two years later. They subsequently settled in Sonoma County, where Mrs. Macias gained employment providing house cleaning services to local homeowners. Prior to their separation, Mr. Macias physically and sexually abused Mrs. Macias and their children. The abuse was not reported until 1995, when Mrs. Macias fled with their children to a women's shelter in Ukiah, California.
While at the shelter, Mrs. Macias filed a police report in which she alleged "aggravated physical, emotional and sexual abuse of herself and her children by her husband. " The report was prepared by the Ukiah Police Department and forwarded to the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department. Within days, Mrs. Macias filed a declaration in the Sonoma County Superior Court requesting an order to protect her and her children from any further abuse. The court issued a temporary restraining order on April 25, 1995. The court also warned Mrs. Macias that her children would be removed from her custody and placed in a foster home if she could not keep Mr. Macias away from her residence.
After obtaining the restraining order, Mrs. Macias left the shelter and returned to the family home. Sometime in the next two months, Mrs. Macias verbally recanted the allegations of abuse in her declaration in support of the temporary restraining order during a follow-up interview with the police. Mr. Macias returned to the family home, notwithstanding the warning of the Sonoma County Superior Court that the children would be placed in a foster home. On June 10, 1995, the Department of Child Protective Services of Sonoma County removed the children from Mrs. Macias's custody and placed them in the Valley of the Moon Children's Home. Soon thereafter, Mrs. Macias, with the help of her mother, Ms. Hernandez, evicted Mr. Macias from the family residence.
On January 21, 1996, the Department of Child Protective Services took Mrs. Macias's three children to her apartment for a visit. While the children were present, Mr. Macias forced his way into the home. Mrs. Macias called the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department to report the intrusion. Deputy Brad O'Bryan was dispatched to the scene. Deputy O'Bryan alleged in his declaration that the family "did not appear to be in distress or emotionally upset" when he arrived, and though Mr. Macias had forced his way into the home, he "simply walked into the room, hugged and kissed his children and then left without incident." Using the eldest child as an interpreter, Deputy O'Bryan instructed Mrs. Macias that she would have to file a complaint for criminal trespass in order to have Mr. Macias arrested. He also advised her that she could obtain another restraining order from the Sonoma County Superior Court. Mrs. Macias declined to file a complaint. Deputy O'Bryan did not file the type of report that is required by state law2 and departmental orders when a law enforcement agency has received a domestic violence-related call for assistance.3
One day later, on January 22, 1996, Mrs. Macias appeared in propria persona in the Sonoma County Superior Court. She obtained a second temporary restraining order pursuant to the California Domestic Violence Prevention Act.4 The temporary restraining order provided that Mr. Macias "must not contact, molest, attack, strike, threaten, sexually assault, batter, telephone, or otherwise disturb" Mrs. Macias, her three children, or her mother, Ms. Hernandez. The order further provided that Mr. Macias could not come within 100 yards of Mrs. Macias, her apartment, her places of employment, or her vehicle, and that the order "shall be enforced by all law enforcement officers in the State of California."
The next day, Mr. Macias followed Mrs. Macias to a home in Glen Ellen, California, where she provided house cleaning services. He entered the garage. Mrs. Macias sought assistance from her employer. The employer instructed Mr. Macias to leave the premises, whereupon Mr. Macias became "menacing" and threatened to report her and Mrs. Macias to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. While Mr. Macias was...
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