Estate of Marjorie v. Faskowitz

• Decision Date: 26 June 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1-18-1691,1-18-1691
• Citation: 131 N.E.3d 1181,433 Ill.Dec. 336,2019 IL App (1st) 181691
• Parties: IN RE ESTATE OF Marjorie IVY, Deceased (Christopher Ivy, Independent Administrator, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Mordechai Faskowitz, Respondent-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (1st) 181691

131 N.E.3d 1181

433 Ill.Dec. 336

IN RE ESTATE OF Marjorie IVY, Deceased(Christopher Ivy, Independent Administrator, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.Mordechai Faskowitz, Respondent-Appellant).

No. 1-18-1691

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, THIRD DIVISION.

June 26, 2019

Miriam F. Solo, of Chicago, for appellant.

James R. Carey, Robin D. Maher, and Daniel T. Paluga, of Levin Schreder & Carey, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The issue presented in this case is whether a person charged with first degree murder of a decedent and found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is barred by collateral estoppel from contesting that he "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused decedent's death under section 2-6 of the Probate Act of 1975, commonly known as the Slayer Statute ( 755 ILCS 5/2-6 (West 2012) ). The Cook County probate court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the criminal court's NGRI finding on two counts of first degree murder acts, by way of collateral estoppel, to establish that respondent "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused Marjorie Ivy's (Decedent) death, thereby prohibiting him from receiving from Decedent's estate under the Slayer Statute.

¶ 2 For the following reasons we reverse.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Relevant History Antecedent the Probate Proceeding at Issue

¶ 5 On June 7, 2016, respondent Mordechai Faskowitz was found NGRI for the death of his girlfriend of 32 years. The events leading up to Decedent's death are as follows.

¶ 6 Throughout respondent and Decedent's relationship, respondent suffered from schizophrenia, which had been controlled by medication until June 2013 when respondent stopped receiving his psychiatric medication. The pharmacy was unable to read the handwriting on his prescription, and despite efforts by respondent and others to obtain a new prescription, respondent was without medication until August 2013. Without his medication, respondent's mental health substantially deteriorated. Respondent believed he was in danger of being murdered by skinheads, Nazis, and the Mafia because God had chosen him to help and protect the helpless and homeless. He believed that Decedent wanted to kill him because she was the leader of the skinheads and Satan. At one time, respondent began eating raw rats believing it would spread a plague among evil doers. On September 12, 2013, respondent was arrested by the Chicago Police Department after he attacked a man walking a pit bull, believing the man was a skinhead stalking him. Respondent was placed in the psychiatric ward at MacNeal Hospital, where he attacked two people and was considered a danger to others. Despite the danger documented at MacNeal, on September 27, 2013, respondent was released without medication because he told a doctor that he would not attack anyone if no one attacked him.

¶ 7 On October 9, 2013, respondent went to Decedent's home with a knife that he had brought from his residence. He entered Decedent's home, called her a monster, threw her on the floor, and killed her by stabbing her more than 40 times with the knife. Respondent was arrested in connection with Decedent's death and charged with (1) one count of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)), (2) one count of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(2) of the Code (id. § 9-1(a)(2) ), and (3) one count of concealment of a homicidal death (id. § 9-3.4(a)).

¶ 8 Criminal Trial

¶ 9 At his criminal trial, respondent asserted an insanity defense. During the trial, defense's expert, Dr. Roni Seltzberg, opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, respondent was suffering from acute psychotic mental illness, specifically, schizophrenia, at the time he killed Decedent, which impaired his judgment to the extent that he was not able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Dr. Seltzberg testified that respondent felt he had to kill Decedent because she was evil and trying to kill him, Orthodox Jews, homeless people, and others and God was directing him to do this because it was the right thing to do.

¶ 10 Dr. Christina Floreani's testimony was offered by stipulation. Dr. Floreani opined that respondent was legally insane at the time he killed Decedent and was suffering from a mental disease and/or defect that resulted in a substantial lack of capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. She reported that when respondent was at MacNeal in September 2013 he was very psychotic, aggressive, delusional, and not adherent to his medication and was discharged without any psychotropic medication. She reported that respondent told her that at the point when he killed Decedent he "was already thinking that there were these people running around like demons, posing as people, and [he] thought Decedent might be one of these demons."

¶ 11 Dr. Kristin Schoenback's testimony was also admitted by stipulation. Dr. Schoenback opined that to a reasonable degree of psychological and scientific certainty respondent was legally insane at the time of the offense and as a result lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.

¶ 12 At the conclusion of the criminal trial, respondent was found not guilty on all counts by reason of insanity. During its ruling, the criminal trial judge made the following statements:

"This case certainly is a tragedy. There's no question about it. As an aside, I guess it is not really relevant to my finding, but I sure hope someone is suing the c*** out of MacNeal Hospital. It seems like this could have been prevented. It is a horrible tragedy * * * three experts telling us that Mr. Faskowitz was insane at the time, the system failed him, specifically, MacNeal Hospital failed him by sending him out without any medication and thinking that, that was just fine. I do find him not guilty by reason of insanity NGRI. * * * I am finding him the same on all three counts not guilty by reason of insanity."

¶ 13 Procedural Posture in Probate Proceedings

¶ 14 Decedent died intestate leaving certain assets of which respondent was named beneficiary including an individual retirement account, an annuity, two investment accounts, and the "Mordechai Faskowitz Supplemental Care Trust." On August 1, 2016, petitioner Christopher Ivy, Decedent's nephew and independent administrator of Decedent's estate, filed a "Petition to Disqualify Mordechai Faskowitz From Receiving Benefits Under the Slayer Statute and Distribute Assets to Successor Beneficiaries to the Estate of Marjorie G. Ivy," which was subsequently amended on August 25, 2016 (Amended Petition). The Amended Petition and related filings seek to disqualify respondent from receiving benefits from Decedent's estate for reasons to include the Slayer Statute ( 755 ILCS 5/2-6 (West 2012) ) because respondent "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused Decedent's death. The Slayer Statute prevents a person who intentionally and unjustifiably kills a decedent from receiving property from the decedent through inheritance laws or otherwise and states in relevant part as follows:

"A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any other capacity and whether the property, benefit, or other interest passes pursuant to any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance. The property, benefit, or other interest shall pass as if the person causing the death died before the decedent, provided that with respect to joint tenancy property the interest possessed prior to the death by the person causing the death shall not be diminished by the application of this Section. A determination under this Section may be made by any court of competent jurisdiction separate and apart from any criminal proceeding arising from the death, provided that no such civil proceeding shall proceed to trial nor shall the person be required to submit to discovery in such civil proceeding until such time as any criminal proceeding has been finally determined by the trial court or, in the event no criminal charge has been brought, prior to one year after the date of death. A person convicted of first degree murder or second degree murder of the decedent is conclusively presumed to have caused the death intentionally and unjustifiably for purposes of this Section ." (Emphases added.) Id.

¶ 15 Respondent, through his agent pursuant to power of attorney, filed an answer to the Amended Petition on September 8, 2016.

¶ 16 On September 14, 2016, petitioner filed a reply to respondent's answer and motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ) arguing that as a matter of law respondent should be deemed to have predeceased Decedent under the Slayer Statute. Following a hearing on petitioner's section 2-615 motion, the trial court denied the motion, finding:

"only where a person is convicted of murdering the decedent in the first or second degree is it necessarily the case that he or she has also ‘intentionally and justifiably’ [sic ] caused the death of the decedent for purposes of the Slayer Statute. [Citation.] In all other circumstances, including the instant one, a court must make the determination on the particular facts of the case—‘separate and apart from [the] criminal proceeding arising from the death * * *.’ "

The trial court further found that "whether Faskowitz ‘intentionally and unjustifiably’ caused the death of Decedent remains a question of material fact that may not be resolved on the pleadings; as such, Respondent is entitled to a hearing on the same."

¶ 17 Thereafter,...