Estate of McFarlin v. City of Lake

• Decision Date: 06 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. C 10-4092-MWB,C 10-4092-MWB
• Parties: ESTATE OF DAVID PAUL MCFARLIN, by its Personal Representative, JAMIE LAASS; JAMIE LAASS, individually; and JAMIE LAASS, as parent and next friend of S.L., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF STORM LAKE, an Iowa municipal corporation; BUENA VISTA COUNTY, an Iowa municipal corporation; LAKE IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION, an Iowa code chapter 28E organization; BRUNSWICK CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, d/b/a MERCURY MARINE and LUND BOAT COMPANY; HARRY FOOTE, RANDY REDIG, RUSSELL HARRINGTON, and DAVID BOTINE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

ESTATE OF DAVID PAUL MCFARLIN, by its Personal Representative,JAMIE LAASS; JAMIE LAASS, individually;and JAMIE LAASS, as parent and next friend of S.L., Plaintiffs,

v. CITY OF STORM LAKE, an Iowa municipal corporation; BUENA VISTA COUNTY,an Iowa municipal corporation; LAKE IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION,an Iowa code chapter 28E organization; BRUNSWICK CORPORATION,a Delaware corporation, d/b/a MERCURY MARINE and LUND BOAT COMPANY;HARRY FOOTE, RANDY REDIG, RUSSELL HARRINGTON, and DAVID BOTINE, Defendants.

No. C 10-4092-MWB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA WESTERN DIVISION

DATED: September 6, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER REGARDING DAVID

MCFARLIN'S MOTION TO JOIN

AS A NECESSARY PARTY OR TO

DISMISS AND THE DREDGING

DEFENDANTS' JOINDER IN THE

MOTION TO DISMISS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION......................................... 3

A. Factual Background ................................... 3

B. Procedural Background ................................ 3

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS....................................... 5

A. McFarlin's Rule 19 Motion To Join ........................ 5

B. The Dredging Defendants' Rule 19 Motion To Dismiss............ 7

1. Arguments of the parties ......................... 8

2. Analysis ....................................9

a. Rule 19 standards ......................... 9

b. The feasibility analysis ..................... 11

c. The necessary party analysis ................. 11

i. Necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(A)...... 11

ii. Necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) .... 13

iii. Necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) .... 18

d. The equity analyses ....................... 20

III. CONCLUSION ........................................ 21

Must an estranged father be allowed to join in or force the dismissal of this diversity action arising from the death of a minor child brought by the child's mother on behalf of the child's estate and on behalf of herself and her surviving child for bystander emotional distress and loss of consortium? The mother opposes joinder or dismissal, because the estranged father would destroy diversity jurisdiction, but one group of defendants agrees that this action must be dismissed, because the estranged father is a necessary party, but cannot feasibly be joined. I must determine not only the merits of the estranged father's demand to join the action or dismiss it, but the proper procedural vehicle for him to assert that demand.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

The facts giving rise to the present lawsuit are few, but tragic. Plaintiff Jamie Laass (Laass) alleges that, on May 31, 2010, she was riding with her two children, David Paul McFarlin (David) and S.L., in a boat operating on Storm Lake in Buena Vista County when the boat struck a submerged dredge pipe causing the boat's motor to flip up into the boat with the propeller still running. The motor, including the spinning prop, struck David, causing his death. David was ten years old when he died.

B. Procedural Background

On October 1, 2010, Laass filed her Complaint (docket no. 1) initiating this lawsuit on behalf of David's estate, herself, and her surviving minor child, S.L., to recover damages related to the boating accident that resulted in David's death. Laass named as defendants the owner and operator of the boat, Harry Foote; the manufacturer of the boat's motor, Brunswick Corporation, d/b/a Mercury Marine and Lund Boat Company (Mercury Marine/Lund); and the parties allegedly responsible for the dredge pipe and dredging operation on Storm Lake, the City of Storm Lake, Buena Vista County, the Lake Improvement Commission, Randy Redig, Fussell Harrington, and David Botine (collectively, the Dredging Defendants). Laass asserts a claim on behalf of David's estate for damages related to David's injury and death allegedly resulting from the defendants' negligence. She also asserts claims on behalf of herself and her surviving minor child, S.L., for damages for emotional distress related to their presence as bystanders during theaccident and for loss of consortium.¹ The Lake Improvement Commission filed an Answer (docket no. 4) on October 20, 2010, and an Amended Answer (docket no. 5) on October 25, 2010; Mercury Marine/Lund filed an Answer (docket no. 8) on October 29, 2010; the remaining Dredging Defendants (Buena Vista County, City of Storm Lake, Redig, Harrington, and Botine) filed an Answer (docket no. 11) on November 9, 2010; and Foote filed an Answer (docket no. 12) on November 18, 2010.

Laass brought this action in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, on the basis of diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. The Complaint and Answers reveal that Laass is a citizen of Nebraska; Harry Foote and the Dredging Defendants are all citizens of Iowa; and Mercury Marine/Lund is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Iowa. Thus, there is, at present, complete diversity between the plaintiff and the defendants.

On June 15, 2011, David McFarlin (McFarlin), an Iowa citizen and David's father, filed a Motion To A. Join As A Party Per FRCP 19; Or, In The Alternative, ToB. Dismiss The Within Action (docket no. 23), which is now before me. On July 1, 2011, the Dredging Defendants (including the Lake Improvement Commission) filed a Partial Resistance To Motion To Intervene/Dismiss (docket no. 24), resisting intervention or joinder of McFarlin on the ground that allowing intervention or joinder would deprive the court of diversity jurisdiction, but joining in McFarlin's motion to dismiss so that a new action including McFarlin could be filed in state court. On July 5, 2011, Laass filed her Resistance (docket no. 25), asserting that McFarlin's motion to "join" as a required party, pursuant to Rule 19, is properly a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24, but that neither his intervention nor dismissal of this action is appropriate.

I regret that the press of other matters, including a two-week stint as a visiting judge in the District of the Northern Mariana Islands, prevented me from reaching this matter sooner.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. McFarlin's Rule 19 Motion To Join

McFarlin, a non-party to the suit, moves to be joined in this action as a necessary or "required" party pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, if joinder is not feasible, to dismiss the action so that the parties can join their claims in a state forum. However, McFarlin's motion pursuant to Rule 19 is procedurally inappropriate: Only parties to a suit may move to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19. Arrow v. Gambler's Supply, Inc., 55 F.3d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1995). Alternatively, the court may order the joinder of a necessary party sua sponte. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2). Where an interested person has improperly filed a Rule 19 motion, the court must treat it as a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409. Therefore, I will construe McFarlin's Rule 19 motion to join as a Rule 24 motion to intervene.

As pertinent here, Rule 24 provides as follows:

(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:

* * *

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject matter of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). However, federal courts may not join persons to an action if the courts do not have jurisdiction to hear their claims. See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552-54 (2005) (discussing the nature of the federal courts' authority to hear diversity claims). Section 1367(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code, which applies only to diversity cases, withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs proposed to be joined under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 24. Exxon Mobile, 545 U.S. at 560; see also Griffin v. Lee, 621 F.3d 380, 390 (5th Cir. 2010) (interpreting the jurisdictional exclusions in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) to mean that persons who fall within the exclusions may not be joined to a federal action). Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue of whether a court must deny intervener motions of non-diverse persons in actions based solely on diversity, other courts of appeals have. E.g., Griffin, 621 F.3d at 390. In Griffin, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a non-diverse intervenor's motion to join because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) withholds supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse persons seeking to intervene under Rule 24 when the court's only basis for original jurisdiction over theaction is diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id.; see also TIG Insurance Co. v. Reliable Research Co. , 334 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2003) (dismissing the plaintiff intervenor's claim for lack of jurisdiction because its citizenship was not diverse from the party against whom it was asserting the claim). Moreover, nothing in the language of Rule 24 suggests any other outcome but denial of a motion to intervene where there would be no jurisdiction to hear the intervenor's claims once he was joined.

Because McFarlin is not a party to this litigation, his motion to join was improperly brought under Rule 19 and should be treated as a motion to intervene under Rule 24. Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409. Even if McFarlin otherwise satisfies the conditions for intervention as of right under Rule 24, I must deny his motion because this court does not have jurisdiction to hear his claim. Griffin, 621 F.3d at 390. The sole basis for original jurisdiction over the action at hand is diversity of citizenship. Because McFarlin is seeking to intervene as a plaintiff,² and is a citizen of Iowa, he may not bring a claim against the defendants, all citizens of Iowa or Delaware, in federal court unde...