Estate of Mooney
Decision Date | 22 December 2008 |
Docket Number | No. A121935.,A121935. |
Citation | 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115,169 Cal.App.4th 654 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Estate of JEAN MARIE MOONEY, Deceased. ANNE SCULLY, as Co-administrator, etc., et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. THOMAS MURPHY et al., Claimants and Respondents. |
Evans, Latham & Campisi, James A. Barringer and Claudia J. Lowder for Petitioners and Appellants.
Thomas Murphy, in pro. per.; Nancy Danish, in pro. per.; Daniel Murphy, in pro. per.; and Edward Murphy, in pro. per., for Claimants and Respondents.
Under a will executed in 1961, Jean Marie Mooney left the bulk of her estate to her father or, if he predeceased her, to her two sisters, Doris and Lucile, in equal shares. By the time Mooney passed away in 2007, her father and both sisters had predeceased her. Both sisters were survived by adult children. This brought California's antilapse statute, Probate Code1 section 21110, into play. The probate court construed section 21110 to require that each of the surviving adult children of Doris and Lucile receive an equal, one-seventh share of Mooney's estate. Lucile's children appeal, contending that they were each entitled to receive a one-sixth share of the estate and Doris's four children were each entitled to a one-eighth share. We agree, and reverse the probate court's order.
Mooney died on January 17, 2007. Her will, which was executed in 1961, devised certain specific items of real and personal property to her nieces and nephews, and devised the residue of her estate as follows: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, of whatever kind or nature and wheresoever situate, to my father, EDWARD J. MOONEY, provided, however, if he should predecease me, or die as a result of the same sickness, accident or calamity that may befall me, then and in that event, I hereby give, devise and bequeath such rest, residue and remainder of my property in equal shares to my two sisters, LUCILE MAY SCULLY and DORIS MURPHY." Decedent's father and both of her sisters predeceased her.
Under the will, the provision for Mooney's sisters was not conditioned on their surviving her, and no alternate disposition was provided for in the event they did not survive her. Under section 21110, the antilapse statute, if a bequest is made to kindred, and is not conditioned on survivorship and is not subject to an alternate disposition, and the beneficiary predeceases the transferor, the bequest passes to the predeceased beneficiary's issue. The only issue before us is how to divide Mooney's residual estate among the children of her two sisters.
Decedent's sister, Doris Murphy, is survived by four adult children: Thomas Murphy, Daniel Murphy, Edward Murphy, and Nancy Danish. Decedent's sister, Lucile May Scully, is survived by three adult children: Anne Scully, Charles Scully II, and Jean Bordon. Neither Doris Murphy nor Lucile May Scully left any issue of deceased children. Jean Bordon has disclaimed her interest in the estate in favor of her adult son, Bryan.2 Jean Bordon has no other children or issue of deceased children.
On November 20, 2007, Anne Scully and Nancy Danish, as administrators with will annexed, filed their petition for final distribution. The petition proposed that one-half of the residue of the estate be distributed equally among Doris's four children (one-eighth each) and one-half of the estate be divided equally among Lucile's three children (one-sixth each). In an accompanying points and authorities, counsel for the administrators argued that the proper application of sections 240 and 21110 required this distribution.
Based on its independent reading of the antilapse statute, the court directed the administrators to file an amended proposed distribution providing that the residue be distributed equally among Doris's and Lucile's children (one-seventh each). An unopposed motion by Anne Scully, Charles Scully II, and Bryan Bordon to set aside the court's order was denied.
This timely appeal followed.
(1) Section 21110, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part as follows: "[I]f a transferee . . . fails or is treated as failing to survive the transferor . . . the issue of the deceased transferee take in the transferee's place in the manner provided in Section 240." For purposes of section 21110, "transferee" is limited to "a person who is kindred of the transferor or kindred of a surviving, deceased, or former spouse of the transferor." (§ 21110, subd. (c).) Subdivision (a) does not apply if the instrument expresses a contrary intention or makes a substitute disposition. (§ 21110, subd. (b).)3
All of the conditions for the application of section 21110 are present here: (1) the testator attempted to devise the residue of her estate to her kin, (2) the intended devisees predeceased the testator, and (3) the will fails to evidence the testator's intent in that event. In those circumstances, section 21110 replaces the decedent's attempted devise to her sisters with a substitute disposition to her sisters' descendants. The section applies to residuary beneficiaries, as well as other types of beneficiaries. (Estate of Walker (1925) 196 Cal. 323, 331-332 [statute] predecessor .) Section 21110 is known as an "antilapse" statute because the attempted devises protected by it would otherwise lapse and the property would pass instead by intestacy: (Halbach & Waggoner, The Upc's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions (1992) 55 Albany L.Rev. 1091, 1099.)
This case focuses on the meaning of the statutory directive that "the issue of the deceased transferee take in the transferee's place in the manner provided in Section 240." (§ 21110, subd. (a).) Section 240 provides as follows: "If a statute calls for property to be distributed or taken in the manner provided in this section, the property shall be divided into as many equal shares as there are living members of the nearest generation of issue then living and deceased members of that generation who leave issue then living, each living member of the nearest generation of issue then living receiving one share and the share of each deceased member of that generation who leaves issue then living being divided in the same manner among his or her then living issue."
The trial court construed sections 21110 and 240 as requiring that each of the children of Doris and Lucile receive an equal one-seventh share of the residual estate, whereas counsel for the administrators had argued for a distribution "by representation" in which the four children of Doris would divide Doris's one-half share and the three children of Lucile would divide Lucile's one-half interest. In support of its holding, the court cited a portion of Estate of Begley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 791 (Begley), in which the appellate court determined that the probate court had erred in distributing the one-fourth interest devised to the "heirs of Viola Davis" by "right of representation" when, in fact, each of Viola's living grandchildren— two by one child of Viola's, who predeceased Begley, and one each by Viola's two other children, both of whom also predeceased Begley—was entitled to an equal share since the grandchildren were the "nearest generation of living issue" to Begley. (Id. at p. 797.)
In our view, the probate court misconstrued this portion of the Begley opinion. The testator in Begley had three living siblings when the will was executed in 1960—Lena, Lulu, and John. (Begley, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 794.) A fourth sibling, Viola, was deceased when the will was executed. (Ibid.) The will specified that Begley's estate was to be divided in four equal shares between the three siblings who were alive in 1960 and "the Heirs" of Viola. (Ibid.) By the time of the testator's death in 1985, Lena, Lulu, and John had all died. Lena had nine living children at that time, as well as four living issue of one deceased child and two living issue of a second deceased child. (Ibid.) Lulu and John had no issue. (Ibid.) All three of Viola's children had predeceased Begley, but four issue of these children survived, including two from one child, and one each from the other two deceased children. (Ibid.)
The probate court in Begley had divided the property as follows: The two children born to one of Viola's three children were to split one-third of Viola's one-fourth interest in the estate, while each of her other two grandchildren were to receive one-third of her one-fourth interest. (Begley, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 794.) The one-fourth interest devised to Lena was to be divided among Lena's children and grandchildren in accordance with former section 6147 (now § 21110). (Begley, at p. 795.) Consistent with section 240, the distribution of Lena's one-fourth interest among her children and grandchildren, as the issue of a predeceased devisee, was to be per stirpes, "in eleven equal shares, with the share of one deceased child being divided among four living issue and the share of the other deceased child being divided among two living issue." (Begley, at pp. 796, 797-798.) Finally, the combined one-half interest devised to Lulu and John would also be distributed "under section 6147 in the manner prescribed by section 240," with "Lena's and Viola's living and deceased children, with the deceased children's shares being divided among their living issue." (Id. at p. 795.)
The Court of Appeal held initially that the probate court erred in applying section 6147...
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