Estate of Nelson v. Nelson (In re Perkins)

Decision Date26 July 2018
Docket NumberNO. 2016-CA-01789-COA,2016-CA-01789-COA
Citation266 So.3d 1008
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals
Parties In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Delvyn NELSON, Deceased: Robert Perkins, natural father of Delvyn Nelson, Deceased; L.P., a Minor, by and through her next friend and natural mother, Juanita Croom; K.P., a Minor, by and through her next friend and natural mother, Atlay Nelson; and A.G., a Minor, by and through his next friend and natural mother, Nykeshia Green, Appellants v. Roshida NELSON, Appellee

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: GINNY Y. KENNEDY, CECIL MAISON HEIDELBERG, RIDGELAND

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CARLOS EUGENE MOORE, GRENADA, ASHLEIGH LAUREN QUINN, JACKSON

EN BANC.

CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. The Hinds County Chancery Court entered an order naming Roshida Nelson and her minor daughter Tina1 as the sole heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries of Delvyn Nelson. The appellants now appeal, arguing the following assignments of error: (1) the chancellor erred in determining that Robert Perkins and his natural children were not wrongful death beneficiaries, (2) the chancellor erred by adjudicating Tina as a wrongful death beneficiary, (3) the wrongful death statute is unconstitutional, and (4) the chancellor erred by failing to apply the doctrine of unclean hands sua sponte.

¶ 2. Upon our review, we find that the chancellor erred in part in her determination of the wrongful death beneficiaries. Accordingly, we affirm in part, and reverse and render in part.

FACTS

¶ 3. Delvyn Nelson was born to Roshida Nelson on January 26, 2012. Delvyn was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) in Jackson and died on June 2, 2012, while a patient at UMMC. The death certificate, dated July 3, 2012, stated that Delvyn's cause of death was "sepsis, fungal" due to or as a consequence of "multiple organ system failure, cardiopulmonary disease, and congenital heart disease."

¶ 4. After Delvyn was born, Roshida filed an action to determine paternity against Robert Perkins in the District Court of Sumter County, Alabama. Roshida and Perkins were never married, and Perkins was not listed on Delvyn's birth certificate. After Roshida filed the paternity action, Perkins denied that he was Delvyn's natural father and requested genetic testing. Perkins further denied paternity when Roshida sought financial support from Perkins through the Social Security Administration.

¶ 5. Although Delvyn tragically died before the parties received the test results, the results revealed that Perkins was Delvyn's father. The results were filed with the Alabama court on June 18, 2012. On that same day, Roshida filed a motion to dismiss her action regarding paternity due to Delvyn's death, and the motion was granted without objection from Perkins. The Alabama court dismissed the action without an admission or adjudication of paternity.

¶ 6. In December 2013, Roshida, individually and on behalf of Delvyn's wrongful death beneficiaries, filed a medical malpractice suit against UMMC. The record reflects that Roshida did not name Perkins as a plaintiff and she did not notify him of the commencement of the action. The malpractice suit was settled, and the settlement proceeds were deposited in the registry of the circuit court pending the determination of Delvyn's wrong death beneficiaries.

¶ 7. On February 26, 2014, Roshida filed a petition to adjudicate Delvyn's heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries in the Hinds County Chancery Court, and she published notice of the petition in The Clarion Ledger on April 14, 21, and 28, 2014. Perkins acknowledged notice of the petition.

¶ 8. On February 10, 2015, nearly a year after Roshida filed her petition to adjudicate Delvyn's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries, Perkins filed a motion asking the Alabama district court to amend its order dismissing the action regarding paternity and declare him Delvyn's father. The Alabama court granted Perkins's motion.

¶ 9. Roshida subsequently filed a motion to set aside the adjudication of paternity, which the Alabama court granted on August 12, 2015. In setting aside the adjudication of paternity, the Alabama court ultimately held that Perkins was not the legal father of Delvyn. The Alabama court explained that after the original action regarding paternity was dismissed in 2012, no subsequent hearing appeared on the docket, "nor was evidence of [Perkins's] admission of paternity presented to the [c]ourt, and [Perkins] did not admit paternity of [Delvyn] by statement in open [c]ourt nor by filing any document acknowledging paternity of [Delvyn]." Perkins appealed to the Alabama Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's findings.

¶ 10. Perkins then filed an answer to Roshida's February 26, 2014 petition to adjudicate Delvyn's heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries. In his answer, Perkins alleged that as Delvyn's natural father, he and his other minor children, Lisa, Kim, and Alan, qualified as wrongful death beneficiaries.2

¶ 11. The chancellor in the instant case entered an order on December 16, 2016, finding that Roshida and Tina were Delvyn's sole heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries. The chancellor held that neither Perkins nor his other minor children met the statutory requirements to be determined Delvyn's wrongful death beneficiaries and therefore they could not recover wrongful death benefits. It is from this order that Perkins, Lisa, Kim, and Alan appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. Determination of Wrongful Death Beneficiaries

¶ 12. In this appeal, Perkins, Lisa, Kim, and Alan argue that the chancellor's determination of wrongful death beneficiaries was clearly erroneous. "We apply a limited standard of review to appeals from chancery court." In re Estate of Ivy , 121 So.3d 226, 232 (¶ 29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Upon review, "[w]e will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor unless such findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous." Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law. Id.

¶ 13. Mississippi's wrongful death statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004), provides:

Whenever the death of any person ... shall be caused by any real, wrongful or negligent act or omission ... as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof ... and such deceased person shall have left a ... father or mother, or sister, or brother, the person or corporation, or both that would have been liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable for damages, notwithstanding the death, and the fact that death was instantaneous shall in no case affect the right of recovery. The action for such damages may be brought in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person ... for the benefit of all persons entitled under the law to recover, ... or by the parent for the death of a child ... or by a sister for the death of a brother ... or a brother for the death of a brother, or all parties interested may join in the suit, and there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned, but the determination of such suit shall not bar another action unless it be decided on its merits. Except as otherwise provided in Section 11-1-69, in such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages allowable by law as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.
....
In an action brought pursuant to the provisions of this section by the ... father, mother, sister or brother of the deceased ... such party or parties may recover as damages property damages and funeral, medical or other related expenses incurred by or for the deceased as a result of such wrongful or negligent act or omission ..., whether an estate has been opened or not. Any amount, but only such an amount, as may be recovered for property damage, funeral, medical or other related expenses shall be subject only to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the deceased for property damages, funeral, medical or other related expenses. All other damages recovered under the provisions of this section shall not be subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the deceased, except as hereinafter provided, and such damages shall be distributed as follows: ...
if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death.... There shall not be, in any case, a distinction between the kindred of the whole and half blood of equal degree. The provisions of this section shall apply ... to the mother on account of the death of an illegitimate child ..., and they shall have all the benefits, rights and remedies conferred by this section on legitimates. The provisions of this section shall apply ... to the natural father on account of the death of the illegitimate child ..., and they shall have all the benefits, rights and remedies conferred by this section on legitimates, if the survivor has or establishes the right to inherit from the deceased under Section 91-1-15.

¶ 14. We now turn to review each wrongful-death beneficiary's claim.3

A. Roshida (Delvyn's Mother)

¶ 15. In her order determining Delvyn's heirs at law and wrongful death beneficiaries, the chancellor interpreted section 11-7-13 and ruled that Roshida and her daughter, Tina, were the sole wrongful death beneficiaries and heirs at law of Delvyn.

¶ 16. The record reflects that Roshida was not married to Delvyn's natural father at the time of his birth. Accordingly, Delvyn would be considered an illegitimate child. Section 11-7-13 provides that, as to the mother of an illegitimate child,...

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    ...relief in court when he is guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue ." (Emphasis added). In Estate of Nelson v. Nelson , 266 So. 3d 1008 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), we reiterated that "the supreme court has further expounded upon the meaning of unclean hands, stating: the meaning......
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