Estate of Parini v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, No. 96-064

• Docket Nº: No. 96-064
• Citation: 926 P.2d 741, 279 Mont. 85, 53 St.Rep. 1062
• Case Date: November 07, 1996
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

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926 P.2d 741 279 Mont. 85 In The Matter of the ESTATE OF Emilio Tony PARINI, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent and Appellant. No. 96-064. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted on Briefs July 11, 1996.
Decided Nov. 7, 1996.

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[279 Mont. 87] Deborah Harten, Tax Counsel, Department of Revenue, Office of Legal Affairs, Helena, for Respondent and Appellant.

Leonard J. Haxby; Haxby & Somers, Butte, Carl M. Davis, Attorney at Law, Dillon, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

LEAPHART, Justice.

The Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the Fifth

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Judicial District Court, Jefferson County, concluding that tax liability calculations made by the Estate of Emelio Tony Parini (the Estate) were correct. We reverse.

The following issue is raised on appeal:

Did the District Court err in characterizing various joint tenancies as "gifts" made by the decedent to his relatives?

BACKGROUND

The material facts of this case are undisputed. Emelio T. Parini (Emelio), died on December 21, 1991. Emelio never married and died without children. During his lifetime, Emelio placed title in certain personal property in himself and his various brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews as joint tenants with right of survivorship. All but one of the nineteen joint tenancies were created more than three years before the death of Emelio. As a joint tenant, Emelio retained all rights to possession of the property associated with joint tenancy.

Upon Emelio's death, all property was transferred to the joint tenants. The DOR requested proof of contribution to the joint tenancies by the surviving joint tenants. The DOR maintained that inheritance taxes owed by the surviving joint tenants' estate should be based upon the full value of each of the joint tenants. The Estate challenged the DOR's calculations, arguing that the tax on the joint tenancies should be limited to 50% of each joint tenancy. The Estate paid over $30,000 of taxes on the full value of the joint tenancies, which had a combined value of $427,736. The District Court agreed with the Estate and concluded that inheritance taxes only apply to 50% of the value of each joint tenancy. The District Court came to this [279 Mont. 88] conclusion without fully considering the amount of contribution by each surviving joint tenant. The DOR appeals from the District Court's conclusion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a district court's findings of fact is whether they are clearly erroneous. Daines v. Knight (1995), 269 Mont. 320, 324, 888 P.2d 904, 906. Here, the District Court found that four of the joint tenants may have contributed to their respective joint tenancies. The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law was correct. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (1996), 276 Mont. 67, ----, 915 P.2d 175, 182, 53 St.Rep. 245, 250. In its conclusion, the District Court found that the DOR's position on taxing joint tenancies at their full value was contrary to the intent and purpose of §§ 72-16-301(2) et seq., MCA, and also found that a surviving joint tenant should only be taxed upon 50% of the value of the joint tenancy. The District Court based its decision on this Court's holding in Department of Revenue v. Dwyer (1989), 236 Mont. 405, 771 P.2d 93.

DISCUSSION

The statute applied by this Court in Dwyer ( § 72-16-303, MCA (1987)) allowed the state of Montana to tax in an amount equal to Emelio's interest in the joint tenancy. Prior to the changes enacted by the 1989 Legislature, the statute read as follows:

(1) Whenever any property, however acquired, real or personal, tangible or intangible, including government bonds of the United States, is inscribed in co-ownership form, held by two or more persons in joint tenancy or as tenants by the entirety, or is deposited in any bank or other depositary in the joint names of two or more persons and payable to the survivor or survivors of them upon the death of one of them, the right of the survivor or survivors to the immediate possession or ownership is a taxable transfer.

(2) The tax is upon the transfer of decedent's interest, one-half or other proper fraction, as evidenced by the written instrument creating the same, as though the property to which the transfer relates belonged to the joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, joint depositors, holders in co-ownership form, or persons, as tenants in common and had been, for inheritance tax purposes, bequeathed or devised to the survivor or survivors by will, except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to the survivor [279 Mont. 89] and never to have belonged to the decedent

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when the surviving joint tenant is a spouse or issue of the decedent. In all other cases, the full value of the property shall be taxable, except the portion thereof that originally belonged to the survivor and as to which the decedent had made no contribution; if the decedent had made a contribution to the ownership of the property, the amount of the contribution shall be taxable.

(3) This section shall not be construed to repeal or modify the provisions of 72-16-301(3).

Section 72-16-303, MCA (1987), did not require the surviving joint tenant to provide evidence of contribution toward the joint tenancy. Section 72-16-303, MCA (1989), contains two significant changes to § 72-16-303, MCA (1987), applied by this Court in Dwyer. First, it requires a surviving joint tenant to prove either previous ownership or payment of consideration before tax exemption applies. Second, the 1989 Legislature repealed § 72-16-303(3), MCA (1987), which specifically referred to transfers in contemplation of death under § 72-16-301, MCA (1987). Section 72-16-301(3), MCA (1987), provided:

Every transfer by deed, grant, bargain, sale, or gift made within 3 years prior to the death of the grantor, vendor, or donor of a material part of his estate or in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof and without a fair consideration in money or money's worth shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this section, but no such transfer by deed, grant, bargain, sale, or gift made before such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death....

However, application of the 1987 statute was inappropriate because all questions regarding inheritance tax must be determined as of the date of the decedent's death. Burr v. Department of Revenue (1978), 175 Mont. 473, 476, 575 P.2d 45, 47. Here, Emelio passed away in 1991, subsequent to these statutory changes; this made the District Court's application of Dwyer to the analysis of this case erroneous.

In this case, as in Dwyer, Emelio was a joint tenant with right of survivorship with one other person in each of the nineteen joint tenancies. In Dwyer, we held that the taxation of joint tenancies with right of survivorship not made in contemplation of death was based upon the decedent's portion of ownership. Dwyer, 771 P.2d at 96. However, modifications to § 72-16-303, MCA, made by the Legislature[279 Mont. 90] in 1989, have changed the way this Court must analyze transfers of joint tenancies.

Although a 50% taxation of the joint tenancies would have been appropriate pursuant to this Court's holding in Dwyer, the statute now requires joint tenants to pay tax on the full value of the property they receive upon the death of the other joint tenant unless they are able to prove that they either provided adequate consideration or previously owned the property.

As of 1989, § 72-16-303, MCA, states:

(1) Whenever any property is held by two or more persons in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the right of the survivor or...