Estate of Presgrave v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 27 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-96.,86-96. |
| Citation | 529 A.2d 274 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Katie W. PRESGRAVE, Charles L. Wilkes, Personal Representative, Appellant, v. Robert J. STEPHENS, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Ronald L. Early, with whom Elizabeth S. Adams, Bethesda, Md., was on the brief, for appellant.
Charles L. Richards, Silver Spring, Md., for appellee.
Before MACK and ROGERS, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Senior Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for rule to show cause, and determining that appellee Robert J. Stephens is the legal owner of two certificates of deposit and a checking account. Appellant Charles L. Wilkes, the legal representative of the estate of Katie W. Presgrave, contends that the trial court erred in (1) rendering a final judgment on the merits after a show cause hearing; (2) failing to give appellant adequate notice of the court's intention to render a final judgment on the merits; and (3) determining that during her lifetime Katie W. Presgrave intended to confer a present interest in the disputed assets in appellee. We hold the procedural error was harmless and the record supports the trial court's finding that appellee met his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended to make an inter vivos gift of the accounts to him. Accordingly, we affirm.
Appellee Stephens was the nephew of decedent Katie W. Presgrave. Stephens' relationship with his aunt had been a close one — he visited her frequently for thirty-five years, helped her with her errands, and generally took care of her. During her lifetime Ms. Presgrave purchased two certificates of deposit at Columbia First Federal Savings and Loan which were jointly titled in the names of "Katie W. Presgrave or Robert J. Stephens subject to the order of either or the survivor," and opened a checking account at American Security Bank in the names of herself and Stephens.
Following Ms. Presgrave's death, appellant Wilkes filed a petition for abbreviated probate, D.C. Code §§ 20-304 and 20-312 (1981), the will was admitted to probate and Wilkes was appointed the personal representative of the estate.1 He thereafter asked Stephens to turn over to the estate the two certificates of deposit and the checking account. When Stephens refused, Wilkes filed a petition for an order to show cause on August 29, 1985, on the ground that the accounts were assets of the estate jointly titled for the convenience of the decedent, and requested that Stephens be directed to turn them over to the estate. An order to show cause was issued six days later directing Stephens to show on October 21, 1985 why he should not disclose and turn over to Wilkes all assets he had which belonged to the estate. On that date, Stephens filed an answer in which he asserted that the accounts belonged to him as the surviving joint tenant, and requested that the show cause order be dismissed, or, alternatively, that a hearing be held to establish ownership of the accounts; he also requested a jury trial.2
A hearing on the order to show cause was held on November 1, 1985.3 Counsel for Wilkes and Stephens were present. Stephens stated at the outset he would present evidence that the decedent intended to give him a present interest with a right of survivorship in the accounts, and thereby overcome the presumption of convenience accounts on which Wilkes was relying. Stephens then testified, was cross-examined by Wilkes and also presented two witnesses: another nephew of the decedent, and a close friend and neighbor of the decedent. Wilkes limited his presentation to calling Stephens' wife as a witness regarding a letter Stephens had written to Wilkes in connection with an attempt to settle the dispute, and to arguing that the estate was entitled to the monies in the accounts because Stephens had failed to meet his burden of proving the decedent's intent to pass a present interest under Davis v. Altmann, 492 A.2d 884 (D.C. 1985).
The trial judge credited Stephens' testimony and, relying on Davis v. Altmann, ruled that Stephens had shown the decedent's intent to give him a present interest in the accounts by clear and convincing evidence. The judge asked Stephens to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law incorporating her findings, and he submitted a proposed order establishing his title to the assets. Wilkes thereafter submitted a proposed order allowing Stephens to retain possession of the accounts and setting a trial date for determining the issue of legal title. In a cover letter, Wilkes stated that it was his belief the show cause hearing was never intended to determine legal ownership and was not the proper forum for that determination. On November 29, 1985, the trial judge signed an order dismissing the rule to show cause and declaring Stephens the owner of the accounts.
D.C.Code § 20-702 (1981) provides in pertinent part that, "The personal representative [of an estate] may maintain an action to recover possession of any property of the estate or to determine the title to any property of the decedent's estate." The probate statute also authorizes the personal representative to petition the court for permission to act in any matter relating to the administration of the estate. Id. § 20-742(a).4 However, the statute refers to a rule to show cause only in the instance of a lost will, id. § 20-304(f)(4), and the rules of the Probate Division do not refer to a rule to show cause. Neither the federal nor the Superior Court rules of civil procedure provide for rules or orders to show cause. United States v. Rollnick, 33 F.Supp. 863, 865 (M.D.Pa. 1940).5 A number of federal cases hold that a rule or order to show cause should be treated as a motion, or a notice of motion under FED.R.CIV.P. 7(b) since the notice of motion serves the same purpose as a rule.6 This court will look for guidance in interpreting our rules to federal cases interpreting federal rules which are similar to our own.7
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 7(b)(1) and FED.R. 7(b)(1) are identical in stating that an "application to the court for an order shall be by motion." The federal rule also provides that the written notice of motion may fulfill the requirement that the motion be in writing. A similar provision does not appear in Super.Ct.Civ.R. 7(b)(1) because it is inconsistent with local motions practice. See Comment to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 7. Therefore, federal cases holding that a petition for a rule to show cause should be treated as a notice of motion are inapposite. The federal cases holding that such a petition should be treated as a motion are nonetheless persuasive. Nothing in the statute or rules suggests that the nature of probate proceedings requires a different conclusion. Super.Ct.Prob.R. 10(a), 107(a) (). However, because Wilkes' petition was not accompanied by the points and authorities required for motions under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 12-I(e), it does not qualify as a motion under Super. Ct.Civ.R. 7(b). The question remains whether the petition can properly be treated as a pleading under Rule 7(a).8
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 3, which is identical to the federal rule, states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court." "Under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(a) and (e), a complaint is sufficient so long as it fairly puts the defendant on notice of the claim against him." Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C. 1985). See also Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(f) (). Since Wilkes' petition for rule to show cause which sought the relief provided in § 20-702, supra, was the first document filed in that regard, and put Stephens on notice of the claim against him, the petition could properly be deemed a mistakenly labeled complaint. Farmer v. Farmer, 526 A.2d 1365, 1369 (D.C. 1987) (); Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F.Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978) (dictum);9 see Scott v. District of Columbia, supra, 493 A.2d at 323; Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 487 n. 8 (D.C. 1984) (); Edmund J. Flynn Co. v. LaVay, 431 A.2d 543, 549 n. 5 (D.C. 1981) ().10
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(a) provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and . . . a demand for judgment for the relief to which he [or she] deems himself [or herself] entitled.11 These requirements help to ensure that the defendant is adequately put on notice of the claim. See Scott, supra, 493 A.2d at 323. Stephens' answer to the rule to show cause, asserting that he was the legal owner of the accounts and asking for dismissal of the rule or a hearing on ownership of the accounts, demonstrates that he was on adequate notice of Wilkes' claim.
The twist in this case, however, is that it is not the defendant who is challenging the sufficiency of the complaint, but rather the party who filed the petition for a rule to show cause. Wilkes claims on appeal that he never intended for the trial judge to determine the legal title at the show cause hearing, but only intended to "secure possession of the assets pending resolution of the disputed ownership." The record does indicate that the petition, rule and format of the hearing were in the style of a show cause proceeding, see supra note 6, with Stephens presenting his evidence first at the hearing. However, the hearing record makes it clear that Wilkes was satisfied to rely on the presumption that the accounts were convenience accounts, and not joint accounts, to establish a prima facie case. Further, when the proceedings are considered as a whole it is clear that Wilkes intended for the court to determine...
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