Estate of Prickett v. Womersley
| Citation | 885 N.E.2d 619 |
| Decision Date | 10 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 71A03-0710-CV-488.,71A03-0710-CV-488. |
| Parties | The ESTATE OF Margaret H. PRICKETT, Deceased, Appellant-Respondent, v. Marilyn Prickett WOMERSLEY, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate Court; The Honorable Peter J. Nemeth, Judge; Cause No. 71J01-0302-ES-92.
Jeffrey P. Smith, David K. Hawk, Hawk, Haynie, Kammeyer & Chickedantz LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
William L. Wilson, Bernard E. Edwards, Jr, Anderson, Agostino & Keller, P.C. South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-respondent Estate of Margaret H. Prickett (the Estate) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding appellee-petitioner Marilyn Prickett Womersley's claim for compensation and reimbursement "for the time that [she] spent attending to [her mother's] needs." Appellant's Br. p. 3-5. The Estate contends that Womersley's request for compensation was time-barred and that the trial court erred in denying its motion to strike certain affidavits that Womersley filed in opposition to the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Estate argues that summary judgment should have been granted in its favor because the designated evidence established as a matter of law that that the services Womersley provided to Prickett were gratuitous. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On February 14, 2003, Prickett died at the age of ninety-four. In October 1999, Prickett had been adjudged "an incapacitated person" by the St. Joseph County Probate Court. In particular, it was determined that Prickett was "an incapacitated person in that she [was] unable to manage in whole or in part her property and [was] unable to provide self-care." Appellant's App. p. 37. As a result, the probate court ordered the establishment of a guardianship with regard to Prickett's person and property.
First Source Bank (First Source) was appointed guardian of the estate, and Real Services, Inc., and M. Carolyn Prickett Gutman were appointed co-guardians over Prickett's person. During the pendency of the Guardianship, Womersley and Prickett lived together.
On May 15, 2003, Womersley filed a $545,967.78 claim against the Estate, alleging that she was entitled to:
1. Reimbursement for money that claimant spent out of pocket to take Margaret H. Prickett to Canada for the month of September 2000. ($2,701.40).
2. Reimbursement for money that claimant spent out of pocket over a twenty-nine (29) month period as requested by Margaret H. Prickett for various expenses and related matters. ($11,395.73).
3. Reimbursement for money that claimant spent out of pocket as requested by Margaret H. Prickett during the period from September 2001 to August 2002 for various expenses and related matters. ($13,271.81)
4. Reimbursement for money that claimant spent for rental expense for home in Tampa, Florida as requested by Margaret H. Prickett for the period of January 2000 through May 2000. ($4,300)
5. Reimbursement for money that claimant spent out of pocket for rental of an apartment in Fort Wayne, Indiana as requested by Margaret H. Prickett from mid-July 1999 through mid-August 1999. ($1637.45)
6. Legal fees incurred by claimant with respect to litigation as requested by Margaret H. Prickett concerning Margaret H. Prickett. ($4,281.40)
7. Claim for personal services rendered by claimant to and on behalf of Margaret H. Prickett as requested by Margaret H. Prickett for the period of one thousand one hundred forty-five (1,145 days) beginning in October 1999 and ending in January 2003. ($508,380.00)
Id. at 24-27. Womersley attached a document to the claim dated May 9, 2000, entitled "Statement of Margaret H. Prickett" (Statement), which was purportedly signed by Prickett. The statement read:
I, Margaret H. Prickett, realize that I am under Guardianship because of my age and that my daughter, Marilyn K. Prickett, has faithfully resided with me and has taken care of my needs since October 14, 1999.
It is my desire that my Guardian, First Source Bank of South Bend, Indiana compensate my daughter, Marilyn, at a rate that is comparable in the industry for home health care, and I further request the court to approve a fair and reasonable rate for all of the time that Marilyn has spent in attending to my needs.
Id. at 27. Following Prickett's death, the probate court entered an order on December 16, 2004, approving First Source's final accounting and terminating the guardianship.
On December 13, 2006, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Womersley's claim should be denied as a matter of law. More specifically, the Estate asserted that the expenditures and services that Womersley had provided to Prickett were gratuitous, and that her claims were time-barred.
Womersley opposed the Estate's summary judgment motion and submitted affidavits that were executed by attorney Edward Chapleau and his employee, Cheryl Stewart, as part of her designated evidence. Among other things, Chapleau asserted that he drafted the May 9, 2000, Statement "based upon [Prickett's] instructions." Id. at 66. Chapleau also averred that he was present when Prickett executed the Statement, and he believed that Prickett had been "well aware of what she was doing and her intentions when she executed the [S]tatement." Id. Chapleau attested that "nothing about [Prickett's] appearance or behavior on May 9, 2000 led [him] to question her competency." Id.
Stewart averred in her affidavit that she witnessed Prickett execute the May 9, 2000, Statement. Id. at 69. It was Stewart's opinion that, "based upon . . . Prickett's statements and demeanor, [Prickett] was well aware of what she was doing and her intentions when she executed the Statement." Id.
Thereafter, the Estate moved to strike both affidavits, claiming that they were "inadmissible in that they contain testimony that is: (1) subject to the attorney-client privilege; and (2) conclusory . . . and amounted to improper opinion." Id. at 71, 73. Following a hearing on June 7, 2007, the trial court denied the Estate's motion to strike the affidavits, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
In the summary judgment order, the trial court determined that the designated evidence supported a conclusion that Prickett requested services from Womersley and that it was Prickett's desire that Womersley would be paid for those services. The trial court also concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the services that Womersley provided to Prickett amounted to necessaries. Finally, the trial court determined that Womersley's claims were not time-barred because the mere fact that the claims were not settled and allowed by the probate court before the guardianship was terminated by Prickett's death should not deprive Womersley from enforcing her claims against the estate. In other words, the trial court found that whatever claim Womersley had against the guardianship would automatically have transferred to the estate "inasmuch as . . . Prickett died before the final account in the guardianship was approved." Id. at 14. At the Estate's request, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction over the appeal on November 5, 2007.
The Estate contends that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted because Womersley's claim for reimbursement and payment for the services she provided to Prickett must be "disallowed as untimely and improperly filed in the probate estate." Appellant's Br. p. 16. Specifically, the Estate maintains that the probate court's order terminating the guardianship was a final judgment and Womersley's claim must fail because she did not seek to set the judgment aside within one year for illegality, fraud, or mistake or by appealing the order within thirty days of the judgment entry.
In support of its claim, the Estate directs us to Indiana Code section 29-3-10-1, which provides that
(b) Upon order of the court, a guardian shall pay from the protected person's property for which the guardian is responsible any claim against the protected person's property, that the court determines has merit.
. . .
(d) Any person having a claim against the protected person or the protected person's property or against the guardian as such may file the claim with the court at any time before the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and, upon proof of the claim, procure an order for its allowance and payment from the guardianship property.
(Emphasis added).
As set forth above, subsection (b) of the statute does not require a claim for personal services rendered in a non-fiduciary capacity to a protected person to be filed in the guardianship estate rather than in the subsequent probate estate of the deceased protected person. Thus, Womersley's claims are not precluded on this basis. We also observe that Indiana Code section 29-3-10-1(d) does not require a claim to be filed against the guardianship estate in light of the provision that a claim "may" be filed "with the court . . . before the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." See Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 380 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) ().
Also instructive on this issue is Peters v. Hanlin, 220 Ind. 175, 41 N.E.2d 604 (1942), where an individual, Mary Franks, was deemed mentally incompetent and placed under a guardianship. More specifically, Franks's sister, Ella Hanlin — who was not Franks's guardian — agreed to care for Franks. From 1935 until Franks's death in 1940, the guardian made no payments to Hanlin during the time that she cared for Franks. Following Franks's death, an estate was opened and an administrator was appointed. Hanlin filed her...
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