Estate of Revis by Revis v. Revis, No. 2647

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: HOWARD; HOWELL, C.J., and HUFF
• Citation: 326 S.C. 470,484 S.E.2d 112
• Parties: ESTATE OF Mitchell Reid REVIS, by his duly appointed Personal Representative, Dorothy F. REVIS, Appellant, v. Louella M. REVIS and Mitchell Revis, Respondents. . Heard
• Docket Number: No. 2647
• Decision Date: 03 December 1996

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484 S.E.2d 112 326 S.C. 470 ESTATE OF Mitchell Reid REVIS, by his duly appointed
Personal Representative, Dorothy F. REVIS, Appellant,
v.
Louella M. REVIS and Mitchell Revis, Respondents. No. 2647. Court of Appeals of South Carolina. Heard Dec. 3, 1996.
Decided March 31, 1997.

Page 114

[326 S.C. 474] Tom W. Dunaway, III and J. Kirkman Moorhead, both of Dunaway & Associates, Anderson, for appellant.

Theodore A. Snyder, Jr., Walhalla; and William B. Long, Jr., Greenville, for respondents.

HOWARD, Judge:

This is an action brought by the personal representative of the estate of Mitchell Revis (Revis), deceased, for the return of life insurance proceeds paid to his estranged second wife, Louella Revis (second wife), following his death. The case was referred by consent to the master-in-equity with finality. The master ruled that a separation agreement executed between Revis and his second wife four years prior to his death which contained only general release language was not a contractual relinquishment of her entitlement to life insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary following his death. We agree and affirm.

FACTS

Mitchell Reid Revis was first married to Dorothy Revis, who appears in this suit as the personal representative of Revis's estate. ¹ They were married on May 25, 1966 and divorced in October of 1981. Revis then

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married Louella Revis in 1984. They separated on September 21, 1988, but were never divorced. On November 11, 1988, Louella and Mitchell Revis entered into a "Complete Property and Support [326 S.C. 475] Settlement Agreement" which was later incorporated into an order of the family court.

The property settlement agreement did not specifically mention life insurance. It did contain the following language:

[T]he parties hereto now consider it to [sic] their respective best interests to settle between themselves all matters in issue and all matters heretofore arising or hereafter to arise from their marital union and [the parties] have reached a permanent and complete agreement and now wish to reduce their agreement to writing and desire that it shall constitute the total agreement between them with respect to all matters relating to alimony, property division, custody, support, attorney's fees, and all other matters which were raised or could have been raised between the parties hereto, other than the issue of divorce itself....

The property settlement agreement also provided:

The Husband and Wife hereby releases [sic] the other of all claims of support, maintenance and alimony, and also all rights and claims of property, inheritance, descent, distribution and administration in the estate of the other, real, personal or mixed, now owned or hereafter acquired, and all other rights or claims growing out of the marriage relation of the parties....

... The parties hereby acknowledge that they are in exclusive possession of the separate and marital properties to which they are entitled, and hereby release and relinquish any and all right, title and interest in and to the personal, real, and mixed property of the other. Further the parties each release and relinquish any and all right, title and interest, including but not limited to all title and equitable interest, which each may have in any other property, monies, checking and savings, stocks, certificates of deposit, investments, business interests and ventures of any nature, and in any and all properties owned by or in the name of the other....

By this language the estate maintains Louella Revis relinquished any interest she had in Revis's insurance policies.

After entering into the agreement, Mitchell Revis made no changes in his existing life insurance policies, pension, or health insurance plans. However, he did designate his adult [326 S.C. 476] son as the beneficiary of a newly purchased $250,000 life insurance policy.

When Revis died, life insurance proceeds of $282,000 were paid to his second wife as the named beneficiary. Dorothy Revis subsequently brought this action as personal representative for the return of the proceeds. Revis's heirs are his son from his first marriage and a daughter born after his first marriage but before his second marriage.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This is a declaratory judgment action brought to determine the interests of Louella Revis and the heirs of Mitchell Revis in certain life and other insurance proceeds. Declaratory judgment actions can be either legal or equitable, depending upon whether law or equity would have had jurisdiction, absent the declaratory judgment procedure. Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991). To make this determination we look to the main purpose of the action as determined by the complaint. Insurance Fin. Servs., Inc. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 289, 247 S.E.2d 315 (1978). The main purpose of this action as determined from the complaint is the recovery of life insurance proceeds paid to Louella Revis.

Generally, an action on a life insurance policy is a legal action involving a question of contract law. Rickborn v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 291, 468 S.E.2d 292 (1996). Thus, for example, where the action involves the question of the entitlement of a widow to life insurance proceeds after she has caused the death of her spouse, the action is one at law. Wilson v. Wilson, 312 S.C. 172, 439 S.E.2d 323 (Ct.App.1993), rev'd on other grounds, 319 S.C. 370, 461 S.E.2d 816 (1995).

In an action at law, tried without a jury, the judge's findings will not be disturbed

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unless they are without evidentiary support. Townes Assocs. Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976). A judge's findings are equivalent to those of a jury in an action at law. Id.

[326 S.C. 477] DISCUSSION

It is settled that an insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurance company, and the terms are to be construed according to contract law. Rickborn, 321 S.C. 291, 468 S.E.2d 292. An insured's designation of the beneficiary of his or her life insurance policy is a contractual matter between the insured and the insurer. Id. Consequently, divorce in and of itself has generally been held not to affect or defeat one spouse's rights as a designated beneficiary in a life insurance policy on the other spouse's life, absent a change in the designation of the beneficiary or a provision in the life insurance contract providing for the ineligibility of the beneficiary if the couple is not married at the time of death. See Duncan v. Investors Diversified Servs. Inc...