Estate of Rowell v. Walker Baptist Med. Ctr.
Decision Date | 30 January 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:11-CV-3439-RRA |
Parties | ESTATE OF VINCENT L. ROWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WALKER BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This is an action "to vindicate the constitutional rights of . . . Vincent L. Rowell," who died in the Walker County Jail on October 6, 2009, allegedly as a result of injuries received in the custody of law enforcement officers.1 Plaintiffs are Linda Rowell and Victor Pickett, the parents of the decedent, and Horacia Pickett, the personal representative of his estate. Their amended complaint asserts federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several municipal, county, and state law enforcement officers for violation of Mr. Rowell's Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force, and his Eighth Amendment right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.2 Plaintiffs also assertsupplemental state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for negligence, wantonness, and wrongful death.3
The action was commenced on September 22, 2011, and the original complaint alleged that 4 In fact, a petition for letters of administration of the Estate of Vincent L. Rowell, deceased, had not then been filed with the Probate Judge of Jefferson County, and Horacia Pickett was not appointed personal representative of the Estate until September 26, 2011: that is, four days after this action was commenced;5 and, nine days before plaintiffs' amended complaint wasfiled on October 5, 2011.6
Further, plaintiffs' amended complaint was docketed only one day prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-5-410(d) (1975) ( ).
The Magistrate Judge to whom this action was assigned concluded, on the basis of the foregoing facts, that plaintiffs lacked "standing" on the date the action was filed and, therefore, that this court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction.7 Upon receiving the Magistrate Judge's report recommending the dismissal of all claims, this court reviewed the entire file and reached an independent conclusion sustaining plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate's report and recommendation.8
The case now is before this court a second time, on defendants' motions to reconsider the opinion rejecting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss this action for lack of "standing."9
I. ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION
When rejecting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, this court relied on the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The facts of the Hess case were materially similar to the facts of the present case, with one significant difference. In Hess, the real party in interest — the duly appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate — was not added as a plaintiff to the action until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. In contrast, in the present case, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the personal representative of the decedent's estate the day before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
On the date that the Hess opinion was entered, the relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provided that:
Hess, 689 F.2d at 981. Accordingly, the Hess panel held that the claims in that case were not time-barred, because the administratrix had been properly substituted as the real party in interest in accordance with Rule 17(a). Id. at 982.
Based upon the holding in Hess, this court's prior opinion reasoned that the question of whether plaintiffs' amended complaint related back to the date on which the original complaint was filed is an issue that is governed by federal, and not state, law.15
Defendants attempt to distinguish Hess by noting that, in 1991, Congress amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which governs the relation back of pleadings, and that the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reexamined the issue in Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). On the basis of those intervening events, defendants argue that the Hess opinion is no longer controlling, and that the relation back of amended pleadings now is governed by state law, and not federal law.16 Defendants believe that plaintiffs' amended complaint was a "nullity" under Alabama law, because there was nothing to which it could relate back.17 Thus, defendants seek reconsideration of two discrete issues:
The brief submitted by plaintiffs' attorneys in opposition to defendants' motion is utterly devoid of relevant argument or legal authority.19 "'It is not a court's task to research legal arguments on a party's behalf.'" Costa v. Sam's East, Inc., No. 11-0297, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109833, *14 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2012) (quoting Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). Even so, this court has reviewed cases post-dating the 1991 amendments to Rule15(c), and upon consideration of those authorities, defendants' motion for reconsideration will be denied.
III. DISCUSSION PART A:
The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)
The language of that portion of Rule 17(a) upon which the decision in Hess v. Eddy turned had been added by amendments that became effective on July 1, 1966, more than sixteen years before the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. The relevant language remained the same for another quarter-century, until the amendments that because effective on December 1, 2007, which were intended to be stylistic only. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee's note (2008) () . The text of the Rule was reorganized, and the relevant language now is found in subsection (a)(3), which reads as follows:
(3) Joinder of the Real Party in Interest. The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (2013). Clearly, there is no substantive distinction between the relevant language of Rule 17 as it was written in 1982 and today.
IV. DISCUSSION PART B:
The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)
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