Estate of Rowell v. Walker Baptist Med. Ctr.

Decision Date30 January 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 5:11-CV-3439-RRA
PartiesESTATE OF VINCENT L. ROWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WALKER BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action "to vindicate the constitutional rights of . . . Vincent L. Rowell," who died in the Walker County Jail on October 6, 2009, allegedly as a result of injuries received in the custody of law enforcement officers.1 Plaintiffs are Linda Rowell and Victor Pickett, the parents of the decedent, and Horacia Pickett, the personal representative of his estate. Their amended complaint asserts federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several municipal, county, and state law enforcement officers for violation of Mr. Rowell's Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force, and his Eighth Amendment right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.2 Plaintiffs also assertsupplemental state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for negligence, wantonness, and wrongful death.3

The action was commenced on September 22, 2011, and the original complaint alleged that "Heracio Pickett, Cousin, is the personal representative of his estate, which is pending in the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, Case No. (Pending). He sues in that capacity."4 In fact, a petition for letters of administration of the Estate of Vincent L. Rowell, deceased, had not then been filed with the Probate Judge of Jefferson County, and Horacia Pickett was not appointed personal representative of the Estate until September 26, 2011: that is, four days after this action was commenced;5 and, nine days before plaintiffs' amended complaint wasfiled on October 5, 2011.6

Further, plaintiffs' amended complaint was docketed only one day prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-5-410(d) (1975) (prescribing that wrongful death actions "must be commenced within two years from and after the death of the testator or intestate").

The Magistrate Judge to whom this action was assigned concluded, on the basis of the foregoing facts, that plaintiffs lacked "standing" on the date the action was filed and, therefore, that this court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction.7 Upon receiving the Magistrate Judge's report recommending the dismissal of all claims, this court reviewed the entire file and reached an independent conclusion sustaining plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate's report and recommendation.8

The case now is before this court a second time, on defendants' motions to reconsider the opinion rejecting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss this action for lack of "standing."9

I. ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION

When rejecting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, this court relied on the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The facts of the Hess case were materially similar to the facts of the present case, with one significant difference. In Hess, the real party in interest — the duly appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate — was not added as a plaintiff to the action until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. In contrast, in the present case, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the personal representative of the decedent's estate the day before the expiration of the statute of limitations.

On the date that the Hess opinion was entered, the relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provided that:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the

action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).10 The Hess panel held that the "plain language" of Rule 17(a)

clearly provides that when an action is brought by someone other than the real party in interest within the limitations period, and the real party in interest joins or ratifies the action after the limitations period has run, the amendment or ratification relates back to the time suit was originally filed and the action need not be dismissed as time barred.

Hess, 689 F.2d at 980 (emphasis supplied). The Hess panel emphasized that its interpretation of the language of Rule 17(a) was consistent with Supreme Court precedent,11 the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule 17,12 thecommentary in trusted treatises,13 and the decisions of most of the courts that had considered the issue.14 Id. at 980-81. Based upon those considerations, the Hess panel held that

Rule 17(a) sets forth a rule of procedure that is to be applied in the federal courts. The Rule provides that when an action is brought by someone other than the real party in interest, the suit need not be dismissed if the real party in interest subsequently joins or ratifies the action. The Rule further provides that such subsequent joinder or ratification by the real party in interest relates back to the time the suit was first filed. If the initial filing came within the applicable limitations period, the suit is not time barred. Most importantly, the Rule is to be applied even where the courts of the forum state have rejected the "relation back" doctrine. For this reason, we must conclude that the district court erred in applying Alabama law on the question of whether the doctrine of "relation back" would apply in this case. This is a federal civil rights action, brought in a federal court, and it is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that must apply.

Hess, 689 F.2d at 981. Accordingly, the Hess panel held that the claims in that case were not time-barred, because the administratrix had been properly substituted as the real party in interest in accordance with Rule 17(a). Id. at 982.

Based upon the holding in Hess, this court's prior opinion reasoned that the question of whether plaintiffs' amended complaint related back to the date on which the original complaint was filed is an issue that is governed by federal, and not state, law.15

Defendants attempt to distinguish Hess by noting that, in 1991, Congress amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which governs the relation back of pleadings, and that the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reexamined the issue in Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). On the basis of those intervening events, defendants argue that the Hess opinion is no longer controlling, and that the relation back of amended pleadings now is governed by state law, and not federal law.16 Defendants believe that plaintiffs' amended complaint was a "nullity" under Alabama law, because there was nothing to which it could relate back.17 Thus, defendants seek reconsideration of two discrete issues:

1. Whether, in light of the amendments to the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure occurring after Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), and the Eleventh Circuit's subsequent decision in Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), Alabama law governing the relation back of amendments is controlling?
2. Whether federal rules of procedure can be utilized to retroactively cure a jurisdictional defect caused by Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the substantive requirements of Alabama's wrongful death statute which are incorporated into federal law by operation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988?18

The brief submitted by plaintiffs' attorneys in opposition to defendants' motion is utterly devoid of relevant argument or legal authority.19 "'It is not a court's task to research legal arguments on a party's behalf.'" Costa v. Sam's East, Inc., No. 11-0297, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109833, *14 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2012) (quoting Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). Even so, this court has reviewed cases post-dating the 1991 amendments to Rule15(c), and upon consideration of those authorities, defendants' motion for reconsideration will be denied.

III. DISCUSSION PART A:

The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)

The language of that portion of Rule 17(a) upon which the decision in Hess v. Eddy turned had been added by amendments that became effective on July 1, 1966, more than sixteen years before the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. The relevant language remained the same for another quarter-century, until the amendments that because effective on December 1, 2007, which were intended to be stylistic only. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee's note (2008) ("The language of Rule 17 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only."). The text of the Rule was reorganized, and the relevant language now is found in subsection (a)(3), which reads as follows:

(3) Joinder of the Real Party in Interest. The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (2013). Clearly, there is no substantive distinction between the relevant language of Rule 17 as it was written in 1982 and today.

IV. DISCUSSION PART B:

The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)

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