Estate of Swift v. Bullington
| Decision Date | 03 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | 32,180.,Nos. 32,176,s. 32,176 |
| Citation | 309 P.3d 102 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF David SWIFT by Ricky SWIFT, Personal Representative, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Nicole BULLINGTON, Respondent–Appellee, and Ricky D. Swift and Mary L. Swift, Petitioners–Appellants, v. Nicole Bullington, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lori Bauer Apodaca, Los Lunas, NM, for Appellants.
New Mexico Legal Aid, Inc., Petra E. Rogers, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} In this consolidated appeal, we address whether a personal representative of a decedent's estate has standing to bring an action for an adjudication of parentage under the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 40–11A–101 to –903 (2009). In the proceedings below, the district court dismissed a paternity action filed by Ricky Swift, the personal representative of the estate of his son, on the basis that a personal representative lacks standing under the UPA to bring an action to adjudicate paternity. Upon dismissing the paternity action, the district court also dismissed a separate action for grandparent visitation privileges that was brought by Ricky Swift and Mary Swift in their capacity as the putative grandparents of the child.
{2} We hold that a personal representative has standing as a representative authorized by law to bring an action to adjudicate parentage pursuant to Section 40–11A–602(F) of the UPA. See id. (). Because the district court concluded otherwise, we reverse its dismissal of both the paternity action as well as the grandparent visitation action.
{3} David Swift (Swift) was the putative father of a child whom Respondent–Appellee Nicole Bullington (Mother) gave birth to in September 2010. Swift committed suicide approximately six months prior to the birth of the child. On December 9, 2010, Swift's father, Ricky Swift (Personal Representative), in his capacity as the personal representative of his son's estate, filed a petition in district court seeking an adjudication of the child's paternity. Hand-written on the face of the petition was the statement that “the [e]state basically wants to clarify whether David Swift is the father [of the child]” and “seeks genetic testing.” Attached to the petition was a document filed in a separate probate proceeding establishing Ricky Swift's appointment as Personal Representative of his son's estate.
{4} Mother filed a motion to dismiss the Personal Representative's petition to establish paternity, arguing that the Personal Representative lacked standing to maintain such a proceeding under the UPA and the New Mexico Uniform Probate Code (Probate Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 45–1–101 to –404 (1975, as amended through 2011). Mother further asserted that, under New Mexico law, a cause of action to establish paternity does not survive the death of the putative father. The district court subsequently held a hearing on Mother's motion to dismiss, at which time the court requested that the parties fully brief the issue of the Personal Representative's standing under New Mexico law. After briefing was completed, the district court held a second hearing at which it entered an oral ruling dismissing the paternity action based on its determination that the Personal Representative lacked standing. A written order was later entered dismissing the paternity action.
{5} In addition to the paternity action above, Ricky Swift and his wife, Mary Swift, filed a separate action in district court seeking grandparent visitation privileges with the child. The district court dismissed the grandparent visitation action at the same hearing as the paternity action. The written order dismissing the visitation action stated that the case was being dismissed because it was “premised on standing which does not exist.”
{6} Separate appeals were filed from the district court's dismissal of the paternity action and the grandparent visitation action. The appeals were consolidated by this Court, and we now address each appeal in turn.
{7} The UPA governs determinations of parentage in New Mexico. Section 40–11A–103(A). Section 40–11A–602 of the UPA specifies that the following individuals or entities have standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage:
A. the child;
B. the mother of the child;
C. a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
D. the support-enforcement agency;
E. an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; or
F. a representative authorized by law to act for a person who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated or a minor.
In this case of first impression, the putative father of the child passed away prior to the child's birth and the filing of the parentage action in district court. The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the Personal Representative of the putative father's estate had standing to bring the parentage action under Section 40–11A–602(F) as “a representative authorized by law to act for a person who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased[.]” On appeal, the Personal Representative argues that the district court erroneously determined that a personal representative lacks standing within the meaning of Section 40–11 A–602(F) and also erred in determining that a paternity action does not survive the death of the putative father.
{8} Whether a party has standing to bring a claim is a question of law that we review de novo on appeal. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Lakeside Veterans Club, Inc., 2011–NMCA–099, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 569, 263 P.3d 911. “Where the Legislature has granted specific persons a cause of action by statute, the statute governs who has standing to sue.” San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass'n v. KNME–TV, 2011–NMSC–011, ¶ 8, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884. In determining whether a personal representative has standing to bring a parentage action under the UPA, “[t]he entire statute is to be read as a whole so that each provision may be considered in its relation to every other part.” Id. ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We begin by examining “the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different meaning was intended.” Disabled Am. Veterans, 2011–NMCA–099, ¶ 13, 150 N.M. 569, 263 P.3d 911 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “When a statute contains language that is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{9} As noted above, Section 40–11A–602(F) of the UPA grants standing to maintain a parentage action in district court to “a representative authorized by law to act for a person who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased[.]” Based on the plain language of this provision, we conclude that the district court erred in determining that a personal representative of the estate of an individual who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a parentage proceeding—in this case, the putative father—does not qualify as a “representative authorized by law” under Section 40–11 A–602(F). It is generally well established that a personal representative is an individual legally authorized to act on behalf of a decedent. See Black's Law Dictionary 1416 (9th ed.2009) (defining “personal representative” as “[a] person who manages the legal affairs of another because of incapacity or death”). This Court has stated that “[i]n probate law, [the term] ‘personal representative[ ]’ refers generally to persons with the duty of settling and distributing a decedent's estate under the supervision of a court, and includes executors and administrators.” In re Estate of Sumler, 2003–NMCA–030, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 319, 62 P.3d 776;seeNMSA 1978, § 45–3–703 (2011) (). The Probate Code further provides that “[e]xcept as to proceedings that do not survive the death of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in New Mexico at the decedent's death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of New Mexico and the courts of any other jurisdiction as the decedent had immediately prior to death.” Section 45–3–703(E) (emphasis added). Thus, based on the general duties and powers of a personal representative to act on behalf of a decedent, it is readily apparent that a personal representative qualifies as a “representative authorized by law” to act on behalf of a decedent within the meaning of Section 40–11A–602(F).
{10} We observe that at least one other state that has adopted the UPA has found that a personal representative of a putative father's estate has standing to bring an action to adjudicate parentage. In R.F. v. M.M., 2010 ND 195, ¶ 3, 789 N.W.2d 723, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered a case where a grandfather in his individual capacity filed an action to establish paternity of an alleged grandchild and to obtain grandparent visitation privileges. The grandfather later amended the action to clarify that he was also bringing the paternity action in his capacity as the personal representative of the estate of his son, the putative father of the child. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the grandfather, as the personal representative, had standing to bring the paternity action under the North Dakota UPA standing provision that is identical to Section 40–11A–602. R.F., 2010 ND 195, ¶¶ 6, 13, 789 N.W.2d 723. Although Mother argues that R.F. is distinguishable because the respondent in that case conceded that the grandfather had standing...
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Urias v. Nieto
...to sue under a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Estate of Swift ex rel. Swift v. Bullington, 2013-NMCA-090, ¶ 8, 309 P.3d 102. "Where the Legislature has granted specific persons a cause of action by statute, the statute governs who has standing to sue." San Juan Agric. ......