Estate of Vertin, Matter of
Decision Date | 30 January 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 11014,11014 |
Citation | 381 N.W.2d 199 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Marjorie A. VERTIN, Deceased. Michael J. WELSH, Appellant, v. ALUMNI ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, Appellee. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Wheeler, Wolf, Peterson, Schmitz, McDonald & Johnson, Bismarck, for appellant Michael J. Welsh; argued by Steve Latham.
Johnson, Johnson, Stokes, Sandberg & Kragness, Wahpeton, for appellee Alumni Ass'n of North Dakota State School of Science; argued by Simone M. Sandberg.
Attorney Michael J. Welsh appeals from two county court orders denying him attorney fees in addition to $7,954.98 already allowed him and ordering him to repay to the estate any amount paid him in excess of that amount. We affirm.
On May 25, 1984, the county court ordered the Estate of Marjorie A. Vertin, Deceased, to pay Welsh, one of two attorneys 1 employed by the personal representative to assist in the administration of the estate, the sum of $7,954.98 "as compensation for services rendered during the probate of the estate." 2 A final report and account filed by the personal representative on February 4, 1985, indicated a disbursement of $10,000 to Welsh for legal fees. An amended final report and account indicated the following disbursements to Welsh:
The Alumni Association of the North Dakota State School of Science, residuary devisee under Vertin's will, objected to the amended final account and asserted, among other things:
A hearing, at which the personal representative was the only witness to testify, was conducted on April 15, 1985. An almost completely illegible document purporting to be a bill from Welsh in the amount of $1,583.25 "in addition to the amount shown on the final accounting," was received as an exhibit. The court found, among other things, that:
The court ordered that Welsh receive no more than the $7,954.98 originally allowed, that he return any amount paid in excess of that, and that he receive no further attorney fees from the estate. The order was later modified to require repayment no later than May 9, 1985.
Welsh has raised the following issue on appeal:
"Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to award Michael J. Welsh attorney's fees for legal services provided to the estate of Marjorie A. Vertin?"
As a fiduciary acting on behalf of persons interested in an estate, a personal representative may use estate funds to pay reasonable compensation to persons employed to advise or assist him in the administration of an estate. See Secs. 30.1-18-03(1) [UPC Sec. 3-703(a) ], 30.1-18-11 [UPC Sec. 3-711], 30.1-18-15(21) [UPC Sec. 3-715(21) ], and 30.1-18-20 [UPC Sec. 3-720], N.D.C.C. The reasonableness of the compensation of any person employed by a personal representative may be reviewed by the court. Section 30.1-18-21 [UPC Sec. 3-721], N.D.C.C. We have recognized a number of factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. See, e.g., First Trust Co. of North Dakota v. Conway, 345 N.W.2d 838 (N.D.1984); Matter of Estates of Kjorvestad, 287 N.W.2d 465 (N.D.1980); Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266 (N.D.1977); Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Victims Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774 (N.D.1976). Implicit in those decisions is a requirement that the attorney have rendered some necessary or beneficial legal services and that there be some evidence that such services were rendered and that the compensation therefor is reasonable.
We will not overturn a decision on reasonable attorney fees "absent a clear abuse of discretion." Matter of Estates of Kjorvestad, supra, 287 N.W.2d at 470. An abuse of discretion, which is " 'an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court' ... never is assumed and must be affirmatively established." Nygaard v. Robinson, 341 N.W.2d 349, 360 (N.D.1983).
In our view of the record, there was no evidence, other than the personal representative's unsupported assertions, to show that Welsh rendered any necessary or beneficial services to the estate other than those for which the county court had already ordered the estate to compensate him in the amount of $7,954.98. The trial court was not presented with any evidence upon which to base any additional attorney fees. 3 Under these circumstances, Welsh has not affirmatively established that the court abused its discretion.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
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