Estate of Villanueva v. Youngblood

• Decision Date: 22 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2D05-3112.,2D05-3112.
• Citation: 927 So.2d 955
• Parties: ESTATE OF Reinaldo VILLANUEVA, by and through Rosalina VILLANUEVA as Personal Representative, Appellant, v. T. Patton YOUNGBLOOD, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 955

927 So.2d 955

ESTATE OF Reinaldo VILLANUEVA, by and through Rosalina VILLANUEVA as Personal Representative, Appellant, v. T. Patton YOUNGBLOOD, Appellee.

No. 2D05-3112.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 22, 2006.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 2006.

Kennan George Dandar of Dandar & Dandar, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

T. Patton Youngblood, Jr., pro se.

ANDREWS, MICHAEL F., Associate Judge.

The Estate of Reinaldo Villanueva seeks review of a final summary judgment entered in favor of T. Patton Youngblood in this automobile accident case. Reinaldo Villanueva was killed when his car was hit by a 1996 Lexus LS400 owned by Youngblood and driven by one Teddy Aponte.¹ Because none of the exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine were established in the trial court as a matter of law, summary judgment in favor of Youngblood was improper. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

The record in the trial court established that Youngblood was given ownership of the Lexus, which had been titled solely in his wife's name, in a final judgment of dissolution that was entered on November 14, 2002. On December 4, 2002, Youngblood took the Lexus to Extreme Auto Sales & Accessories, Inc., and consigned it there for sale. Youngblood had discussions with one of Extreme Auto's principals, Teddy Aponte, about the sales price for the Lexus; however, there were no discussions between Youngblood and Aponte about the use of the Lexus while it was on consignment. Youngblood assumed that he was consenting to Extreme Auto using the Lexus solely for test drives by prospective purchasers, but he never expressly limited Extreme Auto's use of the Lexus to this purpose. After dropping the Lexus off at Extreme Auto, Youngblood did not expect to regain possession of it; rather, he expected to receive solely the sales proceeds.

On December 24, 2002, Aponte took the Lexus from the Extreme Auto lot and drove it to his home. From there, he drove it to visit several friends and to purchase beer before heading to his sister's house for a Christmas party. On the way to the Christmas party, Aponte was involved in the accident that killed Mr. Villanueva. Aponte testified at deposition that he decided to take the Lexus home that night for safekeeping because there had been some incidents of vandalism on the Extreme Auto lot. Youngblood testified that he would never have consented to this type of use had he known of it.

After the accident, the Estate sued a number of parties, including Youngblood as the alleged owner of the Lexus. Following significant discovery, both the Estate and Youngblood filed motions for summary judgment. The Estate sought summary judgment based on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and Youngblood's status as the owner of the Lexus. Youngblood sought summary judgment on three grounds: the "shop" exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the theft or conversion exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and Youngblood's alleged lack of consent to Aponte's use of the Lexus. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Youngblood without providing a specific reason for doing so, and the Estate appealed.

DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE

Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine was first applied to motor vehicles by the supreme court in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). The doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another. Id. at 632. The doctrine was judicially adopted based on public policy concerns:

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation. If Florida's traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today's high-speed travel upon crowded highways. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with very few exceptions.

Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla.1990)).

As the supreme court noted in Aurbach, there are very few exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The legislature has created a statutory exception for automobiles leased under long-term leases if the lessee meets certain insurance requirements. See § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). The courts have created three additional exceptions: the "shop" exception, see Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So.2d 792 (Fla.1978); the theft or conversion exception, see Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1993); and the "bare naked title" exception, see Aurbach, 753 So.2d at 62. In all situations other than these, an owner who authorizes someone else to operate the owner's vehicle, whether by express or implied consent, has a nondelegable duty to ensure that the vehicle is operated safely. Aurbach, 753 So.2d at 62.

As is evidenced by these limited exceptions, the supreme court has been very hesitant to create new exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. In Kraemer, the supreme court specifically refused to create a judicial exception for long-term lessees, noting that it was "loath to engraft upon this doctrine a further exception." 572 So.2d at 1365. Subsequently, the supreme court reiterated its "long-standing rejection of any judicial exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Florida." Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla.1996). Thus, at this point, it appears that the supreme court has determined that the creation of any further exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine should be left to the legislature. Cf. Kraemer, 572 So.2d at 1367.

THE "SHOP" EXCEPTION

The Estate's primary contention on appeal is that summary judgment in favor of Youngblood was improper under the "shop" exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because the facts of this case do not fall within the contours of that exception as explained by the supreme court. We agree.

In Castillo, the supreme court created the "shop" exception for those situations involving "automobile service agencies." 363 So.2d at 793. In doing so, the supreme court stated:

Our decision to pare back the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in service station and repairman situations stems from considerations of both social policy and pragmatism. An automobile owner is generally able to select the persons to whom a vehicle may be entrusted for general use, but he rarely has authority and control over the operation or use of the vehicle when it is turned over to a firm in the business of service and repair. Moreover, an owner often has no acceptable alternative to relinquishing control of his vehicle to a service center, after which he has no ability to ensure the public safety until the vehicle is returned to his dominion. Persons injured by the acts of garage and service repair agencies are not, however, without protection for their losses. They can and in logic should look to the perpetrator of the injury, who frequently is better able to use due care and to insure against the financial risks of injury.

Id. Since then, the supreme court has noted that the "shop" exception applies "only to the vehicle's negligent use during servicing, service-related testing, or service-related transport of the vehicle." Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla.1988). Courts have generally refused to expand the scope of this exception, to the point of refusing to apply it when the vehicle is being driven to or from the repair facility rather than during the course of the repairs themselves. See, e.g., id. at 427 (refusing to extend the shop exception when a cleaning company employee had picked up the owner's car and was driving it to the cleaning facility); Grilli v. Le-Bo Props. Corp., 553 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (following Michalek and refusing to apply the shop exception to accident that occurred when cleaning company employee was returning car to owner); Lopez v. DeMaria Porche-Audi, 395 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

In this case, Youngblood did not turn the Lexus over to an "automobile service agency" for repair or service. Rather, he consigned the Lexus to a used car dealer for sale. While Youngblood argues that Extreme Auto was providing the service of selling the car, all of the cases applying the "shop" exception have involved servicing or repairing the motor vehicle itself—not providing a service to the owner. For the "shop" exception to retain its meaning, it cannot be extended to a bailment by the vehicle owner to any entity other than a service or repair shop. Instead, it must be limited to those situations specifically contemplated by the supreme court. Thus, because the facts of this case do not fall within the "shop" exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, summary judgment in favor of Youngblood on this basis was improper.

We do agree with Youngblood that some of the policy reasons behind the "shop" exception apply equally to the consignment of a car for sale. In both cases, the owner turns the car over to another and relinquishes control to that entity. In both cases, the owner has no...