Estate of Williams, Matter of, Docket No. 87858

Decision Date21 January 1988
Docket NumberDocket No. 87858
Citation417 N.W.2d 556,164 Mich.App. 601
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE OF Tommie WILLIAMS, Deceased.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[164 MICHAPP 602] David M. Caplan, P.C. by David M. Caplan, Detroit, for petitioner Betty Williams.

Temple & Cutler by Michael A. Weisserman, Southfield, for respondent Rosebud Williams.

[164 MICHAPP 603] Before DANHOF, C.J., and GRIBBS and JANSEN, * JJ.

DANHOF, Chief Judge.

Respondent, Rosebud Williams (Rose), appeals from a November 7, 1985, order of the Wayne County Probate Court, which removed her as personal representative of the estate of decedent Tommie Williams and determined that petitioner, Betty Williams, not Rose, was decedent's lawful spouse.

Decedent died intestate on July 15, 1984. Three days later, on July 18, 1984, Rose petitioned the court for commencement of probate proceedings, asserting that she was decedent's wife. Pursuant to her petition, Rose was appointed personal representative. On July 20, 1984, Betty petitioned the court to remove Rose as personal representative. Betty asserted that she, not Rose, was decedent's wife.

It is undisputed that decedent married four times. The factual dispute of the instant case centers on whether the decedent was equally prolific in obtaining decrees of divorce. The probate court found that decedent was negligent in this area and had divorced no one. However, decedent's third marriage (to Estelle) ended with the death of his third wife.

Decedent and Betty, his fourth wife, entered into a ceremonial marriage on January 7, 1974, at which time a marriage certificate was duly executed. The two lived together as man and wife until decedent's death in 1984. Betty testified when she married decedent it was her understanding that decedent had been married only once previously and that his former wife, Estelle, had died. Betty's marriage certificate supported her claim. It indicated only one previous marriage for [164 MICHAPP 604] decedent. The probate court found that Betty entered into marriage in good faith without knowledge of decedent's first and second marriages and without knowledge that decedent had not divorced his previous wives.

Betty testified further that she later learned that decedent had been married two other times. Decedent told her that Rose had divorced him and married another man. Betty contends that she did not learn of Rose's claim that decedent had not divorced her (Rose) until after decedent's death, when it was too late to remedy the situation.

In 1973, prior to their marriage, Betty and decedent purchased a rental home. However, the home was deeded in decedent's name alone. The rental home is the predominant estate asset. 1 Betty contended, and the probate court so found, that she contributed to the purchase price of the home from her personal funds, that both Betty and decedent were obligated on the mortgage, and that Betty contributed to the monthly mortgage payments. Betty asserts she would be unable to meet her obligations on the mortgage if the spousal intestacy share of the house and rents were awarded to Rose.

Rose testified that she married decedent on July 21, 1951, and presented a copy of the marriage certificate. During their marriage, Rose gave birth to a daughter, Bertina. Bertina's status as heir is not contested.

In a document filed with the probate court on July 18, 1984, when Rose sought appointment as personal representative, Rose acknowledged that [164 MICHAPP 605] she deserted decedent in 1957. Sometime after this separation, Rose learned "through hearsay" that decedent had divorced her. Rose testified that after decedent married Estelle, the third wife, she married John Lewis on December 14, 1968. Lewis died on March 22, 1970. Estelle died on February 12, 1972.

Rose testified that, when she was helping decedent with funeral arrangements for Estelle, she asked to see the divorce papers. Decedent responded that he had never divorced her. Rose testified that she had never divorced decedent. Thus, Rose argued that Betty could not be decedent's lawful spouse.

Rose also testified that after Estelle died she helped decedent care for three nephews and nieces of whom he was guardian. Rose suggested he hire a baby-sitter. Evidently, Betty was the baby-sitter decedent hired.

Decedent's first marriage was to Daisy Mae Jones, whom he married in Pickens County, Alabama, on December 1, 1945. In a brief filed with the probate court, Betty asserted that a diligent search had been made of the divorce records of two counties in Alabama where decedent and Daisy were known to reside and of the Wayne County divorce records and that no record of divorce had been found. Thus, Betty argued that decedent had not divorced Daisy and therefore Rose could not be decedent's lawful spouse. The problem with this argument was that it also impaired Betty's status as lawful spouse.

The probate court attempted to notify decedent's first wife of the probate proceedings. A letter, dated November 19, 1984, from a Detroit attorney appears in the file. It begins: "The 'real' Mrs. Williams is alive and well in St. Louis, Missouri." The attorney explained that an attorney from St. [164 MICHAPP 606] Louis had contacted him to investigate the situation and that he might be employed to assist in presenting Daisy's claim. The letter asserted without explanation that decedent and Daisy never divorced. However, despite the fact she was notified and indicated some initial interest, Daisy never filed an appearance in the probate proceedings.

On June 27, 1985, the probate court entered its opinion. The court held:

"This court finds that the decedent married both Petitioner [Betty] and Respondent [Rose] without first obtaining a divorce from his prior wives. This court further notes that Respondent and decedent had a child, Bertina, during their marriage. Also, this court notes that Respondent and decedent separated almost eleven (11) [sic; seventeen] years prior to decedent's marriage to Petitioner and that Respondent remarried during the time of their separation. Further, this court notes that Petitioner and decedent entered into a ceremonial marriage without her knowledge of decedent's prior wives. Additionally, this court notes that Petitioner contributed to the purchase of the rental property which is an asset of decedent's estate and has been making the mortgage payments since decedent's death. This court concludes that Petitioner is decedent's lawful spouse inasmuch as this court finds that her marriage to decedent was solemnized in good faith, without her knowledge of decedent's other marriages, they lived together as husband and wife since they entered their marriage in 1974, and they both contributed to the purchase of the rental property which is now an estate asset. Mogk v Stroecker, 243 Mich 668[;] 220 N.W. 730 (1928). This court recognizes the law favoring a subsequent marriage in the case at bar. To permit Respondent to come forward now and claim a spousal share would cause an injustice to Petitioner. In this case, Respondent herself remarried while decedent was [164 MICHAPP 607] still living. Secondly, Respondent waited over twenty (20) years until decedent's death, to come forward and assert her argument.

"This court holds that Petitioner is the lawful spouse of decedent, is entitled to act as personal representative of decedent's estate, and is entitled to her statutory share of decedent's intestate estate to which decedent's daughter, Bertina is also entitled."

On appeal, Rose first attempts to avoid the probate court's factual finding that decedent and Daisy never divorced. Rose asserts that Daisy failed to file an appearance or claim of the estate and introduced no evidence to rebut the claims of "any subsequent spouse." However, Daisy is not the only one who was entitled to introduce evidence on the validity of Rose's marriage. Betty, as a potential heir, could, and did introduce proof contesting Rose's claim of heirship. However, we find that the proofs relative to Daisy were insufficient to support the probate court's conclusion that decedent and Daisy never divorced. 2

In Michigan, where the validity of a marriage is attacked on the ground that one of the parties was married to another, a very strong presumption exists in favor of the validity of the second marriage. Doertch v. Folwell Engineering Co., 252 Mich. 76, 233 N.W. 211 (1930); Quinn v. Quinn, 4 Mich.App. 536, 145 N.W.2d 252 (1966). The presumption is not rebutted by testimony of the first spouse that, to the best of her knowledge, her husband never attempted to procure a divorce from her and that she had never received or been served with divorce papers, In re Adams Estate, ...

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    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • February 17, 1999
    ...second marriage. Id. at 177-78, 517 N.W.2d 281. The case cited in Pope as standing for the estoppel principle is In re Williams Estate, 164 Mich.App. 601, 417 N.W.2d 556 (1987). In Williams, estoppel applied because decedent's former wife "had deserted him and had married another without bo......
  • Rahnema v. Rahnema
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    ...871, 872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954) ("the strongest of the several presumptions applicable in annulment actions"); In re Williams Estate, 164 Mich.App. 601, 417 N.W.2d 556, 559 (1987) ("a very strong presumption"); Troxel v. Jones, 45 Tenn.App. 264, 322 S.W.2d 251, 257 (1958) ("one of the stron......
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