Estate of Wilson v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 10 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-457-BAS-DEB |
| Parties | THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL WILSON by and through its successor-in-interest PHYLLIS JACKSON, and PHYLLIS JACKSON, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
On February 14, 2019, Michael Wilson died from heart failure. ("Compl.," ECF No. 1.) For an unspecified time prior to his death, Wilson was incarcerated at San Diego Central Jail. He collapsed in his cell, was transported to UCSD Medical Center, and passed away. (Id.) Plaintiffs—Wilson's estate and his mother Phyllis Jackson—bring suit against the County of San Diego, William Gore, Alfred Joshua, Barbara Lee, and various Doe Defendants (jail staff). Plaintiffs dismissed Joshua from the suit, and the County, Gore, and Lee now move to dismiss the complaint. ("Mot.," ECF No. 12.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Motion ("Opp'n, ECF No. 13) to which Defendants replied ("Reply," ECF No. 15). The Court finds resolution of this matter is suitable without the need for oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion.
At the time of his death, Wilson was 32 years old and had hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a condition that "can cause shortness of breath, chest pain, fainting, heart palpitations, heart murmurs, an irregular and rapid heart rate known as atrial fibrillation, mitral valve problems that caused blood to flow backward into his heart, heart failure, and sudden cardiac death." (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Hypertrophic cardiomyopathy can be treated with medication and/or a pacemaker. (Id. ¶ 22.) Wilson had a pacemaker and was taking medications. (Id. ¶ 23.) The intake staff at the jail knew Wilson suffered from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, and "[p]er the Court's order" Wilson was to be monitored in the medical unit of the jail. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.)1 While in jail, Wilson started to have difficulty breathing, which his mother, Jackson, noticed during a phone call with him. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 29.) Jackson notified an official at the jail of Wilson's breathing difficulty, and other members of Wilson's family also called the medical unit of the jail to alert them of Wilson's "worsening condition" and that he needed to be taken to the hospital to avoid sudden cardiac death. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.) Plaintiffs allege these calls were "ignored" and no one called for medical staff or placed Wilson in the medical unit. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 33.) On February 14, 2019, Wilson collapsed, and the jail staff began resuscitation efforts and transported him to the hospital, where resuscitation efforts continued, but Wilson died. (Id. ¶ 34.) Per the medical examiner, Wilson died from "sudden cardiac death due to acute congestive heart failure that was caused by his hypertrophic cardiomyopathy." (Id. ¶ 35.)
Plaintiffs allege the jail staff gave Wilson no medication for his condition and instead gave him cough syrup. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.) Plaintiffs allege a "systematic failureto adhere to the written policies and procedures with respect to providing adequate health care to inmates in the San Diego County jails" and a systematic failure "to investigate incidents of medical neglect, staff misconduct, and deaths in the Jail." (Id. ¶¶ 43, 44.) Plaintiffs allege a long-standing "custom and practice of improper and inadequate investigations; cover-up of misconduct; and failure to discipline and train deputies and medical staff." (Id. ¶ 46.) In support of these assertions, Plaintiffs list previous deaths and injuries that occurred in the San Diego County jails that they claim to be a result of neglect and misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 48-87.) Plaintiffs bring five causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (), as well as claims for wrongful death, negligence, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Defendants the County, Gore, and Lee move to dismiss the third through ninth causes of action.
A complaint must plead sufficient factual allegations to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a Tack of a cognizable legal theory' or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Gore is the Sheriff of the County of San Diego and Lee is the Medical Administrator for the Sheriff's Department. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12.) Plaintiffs allege Gore is responsible for supervising the Sheriff's Department employees and Lee is responsible for supervising the medical and nursing staff. (Id.)
"A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 'if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.'" Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). This causal connection can be established "by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)). A supervisor may be held liable if he implements a "policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citation omitted). A supervisor may also be liable under section 1983 for failing to train subordinates when the failure amounts to deliberate indifference. Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants Gore and Lee were personally involved inthe violations against Wilson; rather, Plaintiffs proceed under the latter form of supervisorial liability. Defendants first move to dismiss the claims because Plaintiffs do not name "any specific policy or event created at the hands of Sheriff Gore and Ms. Lee by which Mr. Wilson was denied complete access to his health medication." (Mot. at 5.)
Plaintiffs liken this case to Starr v. Baca. There, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted for deliberate indifference when the plaintiff alleged a supervisor's 1) knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions; 2) knowledge of the culpable actions of his subordinates, and 3) the supervisor's inaction—which taken in totality amounted to acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. 652 F.3d at 1208. In analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleading, the court held: "It is somewhat tedious to recount the many allegations in the complaint detailing what [the defendant] knew or should have known, and what [the defendant] did or failed to do" because the detailed, factual list of prior examples in support of the claim was so lengthy. Id. at 1209. The plaintiff alleged seventeen prior incidents and reports that put the defendant on notice of injuries substantially similar to the plaintiff's, and the plaintiff alleged the action or inactions of the defendant in response to each incident. Id. at 1209-12.
The Court agrees Plaintiffs have done something similar here. Plaintiffs provided a list of inmates who died or became ill while in a County jail, which Plaintiffs deem to be "examples of failure to coordinate and share critical medical information among personnel" and they allege the examples demonstrate "the customs and/or policies of the Sheriff's Department which sent the message to staff that negligence, dishonesty, and improprieties will be tolerated by the Department, even when a death results." (Compl. ¶¶ 56-57.) Plaintiffs also point to a report prepared by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care ("NCCHC") on its Standards for Health Services in Jails; the report detailed the essential standardsthe Central Jail failed to meet. (Id. ¶ 62.) Some of these standards concerned medication for inmates and the jail's polices regarding the ordering and dispensing of medicine. (See, e.g., ¶¶ 68, 71.) With this, Plaintiffs have adequately pled that the alleged conduct that occurred in Wilson's case is part of a pattern or practice of denying certain inmates medical care or failing to document the need for medical care, which may...
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