Estavilla v. The Goodman Grp.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CV 21-68-M-KLD |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
| Parties | JEE IRENE ESTAVILLA, individually, and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. THE GOODMAN GROUP, LLC; COMMUNITY NURSING INC., d/b/a THE VILLAGE HEALTH & REHABILITATION f/k/a THE VILLAGE HEALTH CARE CENTER and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants The Goodman Group, LLC (“Goodman”) and Community Nursing Inc., d/b/a The Village Health & Rehabilitation f/k/a The Village Health Care Center's (“Village Health”) (collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jee Irene Estavilla's (“Estavilla”) Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants' motion is granted for the reasons discussed below.
Village Health is a skilled nursing facility located in Missoula Montana and is a subsidiary of Goodman, which manages The Village and several other senior communities across the United States. (Doc. 5, at ¶¶ 2-3). Estavilla, a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, is a registered nurse and former employee of Village Health. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 1).
On August 19, 2015, Village Health sent a conditional offer of employment to Estavilla, who was residing at the time in Cebut City, Philippines. (“Offer Letter”) (Doc. 5, at ¶ 6; Doc. 9-1). Village Health offered Estavilla employment as a registered nurse at its Missoula facility, with a base compensation rate of $25.52 per hour. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 7; Doc. 9-1, at 2). The Offer Letter advised Estavilla that in order for her to be eligible for employment, Village Health would need to sponsor her as an employment-based immigrant and she would have to meet the immigration requirements of the United States. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 8; Doc. 9-1, at 3). Village Health also agreed to advance other compensation and costs, including: (1) an initial incentive payment in the amount of $1, 000; (2) meals, lodging, and utilities for the first three months of Estavilla's employment; and (3) the costs associated with Estavilla's immigration to the United States. (Doc. 5, at ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 9-1, at 3-4).
The Offer Letter explained that Village Health would “expend in excess of $20, 000.00 USD to enable you to have this employment opportunity, ” with the “specific figure for the Advanced Amount [to] be determined following your completion of the RN Onboarding Program and any additional worksite orientation at the Facility.” (Doc. 9-1, at 4-5). The Offer Letter further advised Estavilla that the Advanced Amount “is considered an advancement, ” but one half of the Advanced Amount would be forgiven after two years of employment with Village Health, and the remainder would be forgiven if she remained employed with Village Health for three years. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 12; Doc. 9-1, at 5).
Also relevant here, the Offer Letter stated that “failure to make restitution or meet any of your obligations under the terms of this letter” would be reported “to the Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service and/or Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency under applicable immigration fraud statutes.” (Doc. 9-1, at 6). In addition, the Offer Letter contained a non-compete clause stating that if Estavilla did not remain employed for three years, she agreed that she would not work for “any health care or assisted living facility” in Montana “for a period of twelve (12) months after termination of employment. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 39; Doc. 9-1, at 6).
Estavilla signed the Offer Letter on August 21, 2015, and Village Health reaffirmed the offer on or about July 3, 2017. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 17; Doc. 9-1, at 2 & 7). Estavilla moved to Montana and began working for Village Health on or about November 6, 2017. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 18).
Estavilla's obligation to repay the Advanced Amount was documented in a promissory note in the amount of $26, 642.47. (“Promissory Note”) (Doc. 9-2). Estavilla alleges Village Health forced her to sign the Promissory Note, which contained provisions similar to those set forth in the Offer Letter. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 19). Estavilla further alleges that she signed the Promissory Note about three months after she moved to Montana, but at the request of Village Health she back-dated it to November 6, 2017. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 20). Estavilla claims “this was the first time she learned that the funds were considered an ‘advance' and not a gift or other consideration for her to uproot her life in the Philippines and move to Montana.” (Doc. 5, at ¶ 20).
Estavilla worked for Village Health until May 24, 2019, when her employment was terminated. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 21). Because Estavilla was terminated after having worked for only 18 months, Village Health demanded that Estavilla repay the Advanced Amount in full. (Doc. 5, at ¶ 24). Estavilla was unable to pay that amount, and in early October 2019 Village Health commenced a lawsuit against her in Minnesota state court (the “Previous Litigation”).[2] (Doc. 5, at ¶ 24; Doc 9-4; Doc. 9-5). Village Health asserted claims against Estavilla for breach of contract and, alternatively, for unjust enrichment. (Doc. 9-4). Estavilla, who was proceeding pro se at the time, answered and counterclaimed for wrongful termination of contract. (Doc. 9-5). She also alleged affirmative defenses of “failure of consideration” and “discrimination and harassment.” (Doc. 9-5). Village Health prevailed on summary judgment, and on March 12, 2020 the Minnesota court entered judgment against Estavilla in the total amount of $28, 353.45. (Doc. 9-6). In doing so, the court determined that the Offer Letter was a “valid, binding contract” and that Estavilla's counterclaim was not supported by any evidence. (Doc. 9-6). Estavilla did not appeal this decision.
On May 11, 2021, Estavilla filed this putative class action in Montana state court on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. (Doc. 5). Defendants removed the case to this Court on June 3, 2021 based on federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1441. (Doc. 1). Estavilla alleges federal forced labor and trafficking claims pursuant to the civil remedies provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, 1594(a)(b), 1595. (Doc. 5, at 11-15). Estavilla additionally alleges state law claims under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-755, which permits a civil action under Montana's criminal statutes prohibiting human trafficking and involuntary servitude, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-702 and 45-5-703. (Doc. 5, at 16). Estavilla's Complaint also includes a declaratory judgment claim seeking a determination that the contractual venue and choice of law provisions contained in the Offer Letter are unenforceable. (Doc. 5, at 16).
Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A cause of action may be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) either when it asserts a legal theory that is not cognizable as a matter of law, or if it fails to allege sufficient facts to support an otherwise cognizable legal claim. SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court is to accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989).
The court's review under Rule 12(b)(6) is informed by the provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) which requires that “a pleading must contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must offer more than “‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action...” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1249 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). This means that the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. But if the complaint “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory, ” then dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” National Association of the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, v. California Board of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865 868 (9thCir. 1993). Additionally, “the court is not required to accepts legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably...
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