Estep v. United States Smith v. Same

Citation90 L.Ed. 567,66 S.Ct. 423,327 U.S. 114
Decision Date04 February 1946
Docket NumberNos. 292 and 66,s. 292 and 66
PartiesESTEP v. UNITED STATES. SMITH v. SAME
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

The duty to report for induction in accordance with draft board's order includes duty to submit to induction, and breach of such duty is a crime as defined by provision of Selective Service Act making criminal a willful failure to perform any duty required of a registrant by the act or the rules and regulations made under it. Selective Training and Service Ac of 1940, § 11, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 311 Mr.Hayden C. Covington, of Brooklyn, N.Y., for petitioners.

Mr. Irving S. Shapiro, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305, we held that in a criminal prosecution under § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 894, 50 U.S.C.App. § 311, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311, a registrant could not defend on the ground that he was wrongfully classified and was entitled to a statutory exemption, where the offense was a failure to report for induction into the armed forces or for work of national importance. 1 We found no provision for judicial review of a registrant's classification prior to the time when he had taken all the steps in the selective process and had been finally accepted by the armed services. The question in these cases is whether there may be judicial review of his classification in a prosecution under § 11 where he reported for induction, was finally accepted, but refused to submit to induction.

Estep's local board classified him as I-A, i.e., as available for military service.2 Sec. 5(d) of the Act exempts from training and service (but not from registration) 'regular or duly ordained ministers of religion.' Under the regulations those in that category are classified as IV-D.3 Estep, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, claimed that he was entitled to that classification. The local board ruled against him. He took his case to the appeal board which classified him as I-A.4 He then asked the State and National Directors of Selective Service to appeal to the President for him.5 His request was refused. The local board thereupon ordered him to report for induction. He reported at the time and place indicated. He was accepted by the Navy. But he refused to be inducted, claiming that he was exempt from service because he was an ordained minister of the gospel.

He was indicted under § 11 of the Act for wilfully failing and refusing to submit to induction.6 He sought to defend on the ground that as a Jehovah's Witness he was a minister of religion and that he had been improperly denied exemption from service, because the classifying agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to classify him as IV-D. He also claimed that his right to an effective appeal had been denied because the local board unlawfully withheld certain relevant documents from the appeal board and included improper material in the record on appeal. The District Court rejected these defenses and did not permit the introduction of evidence to sustain Estep's contention. The jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to imprisonm nt for a term of five years. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, on a divided vote. 3 Cir., 150 F.2d 768.

Smith, like Estep, is a member of Jehovah's Witnesses. He claimed exemption from all service on the ground that he was a minister of religion. His local board placed him in Class I-A, as available for military service. His classification was affirmed by the appeal board. On appeal to the President his classification was again affirmed. The local board then ordered him to report for induction. He reported to the induction station, was accepted by the military, but refused to be inducted, claiming he was exempt from service because he was a minister. He was inducted against his will and later was held for trial by a general court-martial for disobedience of military orders. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied, Smith v. Richart, D.C., 53 F.Supp. 582. While his appeal was pending, we decided Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737, 88 L.Ed. 917. He was thereupon released from military custody and indicted for violation of § 11 of the Act. At the trial he sought to attack the classification given him by his local board, claiming, among other things, that it acted without any foundation of fact, discriminated against him because he was a Jehovah's Witness, and denied him the right to make full proof of his claim that he was a minister of religion. The court ruled that no such defense could be tendered. Smith was found guilty by the jury and a sentence of three and one-half years was imposed. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. Smith v. United States 4 Cir., 148 F.2d 288.

The cases are here on petitions for writs of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented.

Congress entrusted the administration of the Selective Service System to civilian agencies, not to the military. It authorized the President to create and establish a Selective Service System and to establish civilian local boards and appeal boards to administer it. § 10(a)(2). The Selective Service System was designed to 'provide for the classification of registrants and of persons who volunteer for induction under this Act on the basis of availability for training and service.' Id. Congress specified certain restricted classes for deferment7 or exemption from service, including in the latter, as we have said, 'regular or duly ordained ministers of religion.' § 5. The President was authorized to provide for the deferment of other classes by rules and regulations.8 § 5 (e). And the local boards 'under rules and regulations prescribed by the President' were granted the 'power within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to the right of appeal to the appeal boards herein authorized, all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or deferment from, training and service under this Act of all individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards.' § 10(a) (2). The Act makes no provision in terms for judicial review of the actions of the local boards or the appeal boards. For § 10(a)(2) states that the 'decisions of such local boards shall be final except where an appeal is authorized in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe.'9

By the terms of the Act Congress enlisted the aid of the federal courts only for enforcement purposes. Sec. 11 makes criminal a wilful failure to perform any duty required of a registrant by the Act or the rules or regulations made under it. An order to report for induction is such a duty; and it includes the duty to submit to induction. Billings v. Truesdell, supra, 321 U.S. at page 557, 64 S.Ct. at page 746, 88 L.Ed. 917. Sec. 11 confers jurisdiction on the district courts to try one charged with such offense. But § 11 is silent when it comes to the defenses, if any, which may be interposed.

Thus we start with a statute which makes no provision for judicial review of the actions of the local boards or the appeal agencies. That alone, of course, is not decisive. For the silence of Congress as to judicial review is not necessarily to be construed as a denial of the power of the federal courts to grant relief in the exercise of the general jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon them. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 23 S.Ct. 33, 47 L.Ed. 90; Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 36 S.Ct. 2, 60 L.Ed. 114; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559, 88 L.Ed. 733. Judicial review may indeed be required by the Constitution. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938. Apart from constitutional requirements, the question whether judicial review will be provided where Congress is silent depends on the whole setting of the particular statute and the scheme of regulation which is adopted. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 301, 64 S.Ct. 95, 97, 88 L.Ed. 61. And except when the Constitution requires it, judicial review of administrative action may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses.

The authority of the local boards whose orders are the basis of these criminal prosecutions is circumscribed both by the Act and by the regulations. Their authority to hear and determine all questions of deferment or exemption is, as stated in § 10(a)(2), limited to action 'within their respective jurisdictions.' It is only orders 'within their respective jurisdictions' that are made final. It would seem, therefore, that if a Pennsylvania board ordered a citizen and resident of Oregon to report for induction, the defense that it acted beyond its jurisdiction could be interposed in a prosecution under § 11. That case could be comparable to Tung v. United States, 1 Cir., 142 F.2d 919, where the local board ordered a registrant to report for induction without allowing him the appeal to which he was entitled under the regulations. Since § 10(a)(2) makes the decisions of the local boards final 'except where an appeal is authorized' under the regulations, the defense was allowed in the criminal trial.

Any other case where a local board acts so contrary to its granted authority as to exceed its jurisdiction10 does not stand on a different footing. By § 10(a)(2) the local boards in hearing and determining claims for deferment or e emption must act 'under rules and regulations prescribed by the President.' Those rules limit, as well as define, their jurisdiction. One of those regulations forbids the local boards from basing their classification of a registrant on a discrimination 'for or against him because of his race, creed, or color, or because of his membership or activity in any labor, political, religious, or other...

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