Estill v. Cnty. of Shasta

Decision Date31 July 2018
Docket NumberC077513
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties Renee ESTILL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Michael A. Scheibli, Michael A. Scheibli, Redding, Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, and John G. Heller, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of James A. Wyatt, James A. Wyatt, Redding, Best Best & Krieger, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Kira L. Klatchko, Irene S. Zurko, Lann G. McIntyre, and James R. Ross, Santa Rosa, for Defendants and Appellants.

M. Christine Davi, City Attorney (Monterey) for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

MAURO, Acting P. J.Renee Estill submitted a government claim against the County of Shasta and others, specifically representing that she first became aware of the alleged incident on September 9, 2011. The County accepted Estill's representation and denied her claim on the merits. Because it accepted the claim as timely, the County did not warn Estill to seek leave to present a late claim. This lawsuit followed.

During Estill's deposition, however, defendants learned she was aware of the alleged wrongdoing as early as 2009. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment primarily on the ground that Estill's government claim was untimely, but later granted her motion for a new trial, ruling there are triable issues of fact as to whether defendants waived their defense of untimeliness because the County did not warn Estill that she should seek leave to present a late claim pursuant to Government Code section 911.3, subdivision (b).1 Defendants appeal from the order granting Estill a new trial, and Estill cross-appeals from the judgment in favor of defendants.

After oral argument in this case, we asked the parties for supplemental briefing on the application of equitable estoppel in this context. We conclude that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form. And in this case, based on the entire appellate record, including the supplemental briefs, we conclude Estill is estopped from asserting that defendants waived their defense of untimeliness. She represented in her government claim that the incident of wrongdoing occurred in September 2009, but that she "first became aware" of the incident on September 9, 2011. She included an attachment to her government claim in which she could have explained what she had learned in 2009 and 2010 about the alleged misconduct, but she did not mention her prior knowledge. Thus, the record indicates she intended for the County to rely on her representation in the government claim, and the County did in fact rely on the representation. Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court's order granting Estill's motion for a new trial and affirm the judgment entered in favor of defendants.

BACKGROUND

Estill was employed by the Shasta County Sheriff's Office and worked at the Shasta County Jail. In July 2009, the Sheriff's Office initiated an internal affairs investigation regarding allegations that Estill had improper communications with an inmate. Later that year, Estill learned that correctional officers were discussing her investigation and not maintaining confidentiality.

On September 29, 2009, the Sheriff's Office served Estill with a notice of charges in support of proposed termination. Estill was then mistakenly denied entry into the jail based on the belief that she had been fired. Estill realized jail staff had improperly received information about her and she complained. Throughout the remainder of 2009, she learned about others who were inappropriately discussing her internal affairs investigation.

Estill had a prediscipline administrative hearing, and around that time or right after her employment was terminated, she heard about rumors regarding the parentage of her son and further discussions about her internal affairs case. Her employment was terminated effective January 11, 2010, and her administrative appeal was denied on September 10, 2010.

Between January 11 and July 21, 2010, Estill heard more comments about the parentage of her son. She also heard that people unconnected to her internal affairs investigation were talking to Sheriff's Office employees about her and her case.

Estill served the County with a government claim on February 23, 2012. The claim said the date of the incident was September 2009, but Estill represented that the date she "first became aware" of the incident was September 9, 2011. The claim alleged that on September 9, 2011, an employee of the Sheriff's Office revealed to Estill that a specified Sheriff's Captain had told Sheriff's Department employees about the nature of an investigation regarding Estill from September 2009 through the Fall of 2010. The claim alleged gossip and rumors had been spread, a hostile environment had been created, and Estill had been harassed.

The County denied Estill's claim and informed her, "Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim (see Government Code Section 945.6 )." Estill filed a complaint against defendants within six months of the County's notice, asserting causes of action for violation of her federal and state constitutional rights to privacy, invasion of privacy/intrusion into private affairs, defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. During Estill's deposition, defendants learned she was aware of the alleged wrongdoing as early as 2009.

The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded Estill's first cause of action asserting a federal right to privacy failed on the merits, and her remaining causes of action were barred because she did not file a government claim within six months of the accrual of those causes of action. However, the trial court subsequently granted Estill's motion for a new trial on the second through sixth causes of action, concluding triable issues of fact exist as to whether section 911.3 applies to impose on defendants a waiver of their defense that Estill did not timely present a government claim.

Defendants appeal from the order granting Estill a new trial. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(4).) Estill cross-appeals from the judgment. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m).)

DISCUSSION

I

Defendants contend the trial court should have denied Estill's motion for new trial because Estill presented her government claim more than two years after her causes of action accrued. Because the trial court granted Estill a new trial based on a question of law, we review the order de novo. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859-860, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ; Doe v. United Air Lines, Inc . (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504-1505, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 541.)

Suspicion of one or more elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, generally triggers accrual. ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc . (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 ( Fox ).) It is enough if an individual has notice or information of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on inquiry. ( Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 398, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 ( Norgart ) [a plaintiff must seek to learn the facts necessary to bring the cause of action and cannot sit on his or her rights].) Here, Estill filed her government claim more than six months after her second through sixth causes of action accrued. Those causes of action allege violation of Estill's state constitutional right to privacy, invasion of privacy, defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on (1) disclosure of her confidential personnel records and private information, and (2) false statements that she had sex with inmates and that her son was fathered by an inmate and not her husband. It is undisputed Estill was aware in 2009 and 2010 that information from her internal affairs investigation case had been leaked and was being discussed by people at the Sheriff's Office and other agencies. On this record, Estill's second through sixth causes of action accrued by July 2010.2 At that time she knew information from her internal affairs investigation had been leaked, she had a strong suspicion regarding the source of the leak, and she was aware people were making allegedly defamatory statements about her and her son.

Although Estill argues she did not discover the true nature of her claims until she learned the identities of the alleged wrongdoers on September 9, 2011, ignorance of the identity of a defendant does not delay accrual of a cause of action because the defendant's identity is not an element of a cause of action. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 ; Norgart, supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 398-399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 [the plaintiff may allege she is ignorant of the name of a defendant, designate the defendant as a Doe defendant, use the machinery of discovery to identify the defendant, amend the complaint when the defendant's true name is discovered and serve the complaint on that defendant within three years of its filing].) As her deposition testimony showed, Estill had reason to suspect that someone had done something wrong to her long before September 9, 2011.

Estill did not file a claim until February 23, 2012, more than six months after her causes of action accrued. Accordingly, she cannot maintain a claim for damages against defendants unless there is an...

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