Estrada v. State
| Decision Date | 28 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D00-4401.,2D00-4401. |
| Citation | 787 So.2d 94 |
| Parties | Jose ESTRADA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jose Estrada appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Estrada alleged in his motion that he is entitled to be resentenced pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court summarily denied Estrada's motion finding that his sentence could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. Id. For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Estrada pleaded guilty to armed trafficking in amphetamine and conspiracy to traffic in amphetamine and was sentenced under the 1995 guidelines to 105 months' prison. The scoresheet under which he was sentenced reflected a range from 69 to 115 months. A 1994 scoresheet prepared with the same offenses yields a range of 40.8 months to 68 months. Thus, it would appear that Estrada would be entitled to resentencing under Heggs.
In its response filed in the trial court, the State asserted without explanation or clarification that Estrada's 105 month sentence could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure and that Estrada was therefore not entitled to Heggs relief. The trial court apparently accepted this assertion at face value and denied Estrada's motion simply referring to the State's response to support its order. A review of the 1994 scoresheet prepared by the State reveals that in order to argue that Estrada was not entitled to Heggs relief, the State added a discretionary drug trafficking multiplier which was not included on Estrada's original 1995 scoresheet.
There is no indication whether the trial court approved the State's addition of this multiplier or simply overlooked it. In any event, Estrada was not given an opportunity to object to it. Although Estrada did in fact file a reply in the trial court calling the court's attention to the State's addition of the multiplier, that reply was not considered by the trial court because it was received after the trial court's order was rendered.
We first note that even if this had been a matter of the State simply correcting an error on the original scoresheet, the procedure followed would have been impermissible and a violation of Estrada's right to procedural due process. Although it is proper for the State to correct the original scoresheet in determining whether a defendant is entitled to resentencing under Heggs, the State must explicitly advise the trial court when it does so. Martinez v. State, 770 So.2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The court must then afford the defendant an opportunity to respond to and to contest any corrections. Id. In these situations it may be advisable for the trial court to appoint counsel to represent the defendant. Id.
The instant case, however, does not involve the correction of a scoresheet error but instead involves the inclusion of a discretionary multiplier. Rule 3.702(14) provides that the multiplier may be applied at the discretion of the sentencing court, not at the discretion of the assistant state attorney preparing the scoresheet. The State may not therefore add this multiplier to summarily defeat a Heggs claim; rather, the multiplier could only be added, if at all, by the trial court on resentencing.
We conclude, however, that the trial court may not add this discretionary multiplier when resentencing a defendant pursuant to Heggs. Although a trial court may, on a violation of probation, revise a scoresheet to include prior convictions that were mistakenly omitted from the original scoresheet, Roberts v. State, 644 So.2d 81 (Fla.1994), we do not believe that this authorizes a trial court, in correcting a sentence, to add a discretionary multiplier that it originally declined to impose. In determining that erroneously omitted prior convictions could be added for sentencing on a violation of probation, the supreme court reasoned that there was no reason to perpetuate an error and award "a defendant something to which he is not entitled." Id. at 82. The court further noted that because the defendant was being...
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Trotter v. State
...So.2d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Estrada v. State, 787 So.2d 94, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The conflict issue involves whether, upon remand for resentenc......
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Aponte v. State
...Unlike the concurring opinion, we find that the decisions in Kingsley v. State, 682 So.2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) and Estrada v. State, 787 So.2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) are distinguishable from our holding in the instant case. In Kingsley, the defendant appealed a final judgment and sentence......
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Trotter v. State
...sentencing). Trotter contends that the multiplier could not be assessed at his second sentencing hearing citing to Estrada v. State, 787 So.2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) wherein the Second District held that the trial court is not authorized to add a discretionary multiplier to a defendant's sco......
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Olsen v. State
...of the changes, and the trial court must afford the defendant the opportunity to respond to or contest any changes. Estrada v. State, 787 So.2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Here, the additional points were raised for the first time on Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, the trial court......