Estrada v. United States

• Decision Date: 09 January 2023
• Docket Number: C22-3013-LTS,(Crim. CR20-3012-LTS)
• Parties: ADRIAN ESTRADA, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

ADRIAN ESTRADA, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. C22-3013-LTS

(Crim. No. CR20-3012-LTS)

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division

January 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before me on Adrian Estrada's motion (Doc. 1) to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255. Estrada alleges he is entitled to relief based on six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of an unconstitutional sentence. On initial review, I found that these claims should proceed. Doc. 2. Pursuant to my order, Estrada's prior counsel filed an affidavit (Doc. 3) in response to Estrada's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Government filed a response (Doc. 6) and Estrada filed a reply (Doc. 7). I find that an evidentiary hearing is required with regard to one issue. All other issues are resolved herein.

II. BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2020, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Estrada and others with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Crim Doc. 6. On April 9, 2021, Estrada pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine which contained 50 grams or more of actual (pure) methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

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841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Crim. Doc. 173. On September 17, 2021, I sentenced Estrada to 180 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Crim. Doc. 215.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain relief, a federal prisoner must establish:

[T]hat the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [that the judgment or sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack

Id.; see also Rule 1 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings (specifying scope of § 2255). If any of the four grounds are established, the court is required to “vacate and set the judgment aside and [to] discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

When enacting § 2255, Congress “intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.” Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Section 2255 does not provide a remedy for “all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather:

Relief under [§ 2255] is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice

United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 (“[T]he permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack . . . is severely limited[.]”). A collateral challenge under § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (“[W]e have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge may not do service

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for an appeal.”). Consequently, “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Evidentiary hearings on [§ 2255] motions are preferred, and the general rule is that a hearing is necessary prior to the motion's disposition if a factual dispute exists.” Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). “The district court is not permitted to make a credibility determination on the affidavits alone.” Id. at 1206; see also United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[The] district court abused its discretion when it credited the attorney's affidavit over the petitioners without first holding an evidentiary hearing.”). However, no hearing is required “where the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.” See New v. United States, 652 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Estrada asserts six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of an unconstitutional sentence. I will address each claim in turn.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

1. Applicable Standards

To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must prove that his attorney's representation “was ‘deficient' and that the ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'” Walking Eagle v. United States, 742 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Deficient” performance is performance that falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 158, 163 (2012) (citation omitted), that is conduct that fails to conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Matters of trial strategy are generally entrusted to the professional discretion of counsel and they are “virtually unchallengeable” in § 2255

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proceedings. Loefer v. United States, 604 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2010). Counsel is not constitutionally ineffective because of the failure to raise a “relatively sophisticated” and “counter-intuitive argument.” Donnell v. United States, 765 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2014). However, “[s]trategy resulting from lack of diligence in preparation and investigation is not protected by the presumption in favor of counsel.” Holder v. United States, 721 F.3d 979, 994 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

To establish “prejudice,” a movant must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163 (citation omitted). “Reasonable probability” means “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. That requires a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different result. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Ultimately, a showing of “prejudice” requires counsel's errors to be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 104 (citation omitted).

Since a movant must show both deficient performance and prejudicial effect, a court reviewing ineffective assistance claims need only address one prong if either fails. See Williams v. United States, 452 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2006). Additionally, each individual claim of ineffective assistance “must rise or fall on its own merits,” meaning that courts should not take into account the “cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors in determining Strickland prejudice.” Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 528 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have repeatedly rejected the cumulative error theory of post-conviction relief.”).

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2. Specific Claims

a. Improperly Informing Estrada About Sentence Exposure and Improperly Advising Him to Plead Guilty

Estrada argues that he initially told his attorney that the factual allegations against him were false and he wanted to proceed to trial. However, his attorney persuaded him to enter a guilty plea based on the following:

• Because Estrada was Hispanic and his coconspirators were all white, he would likely lose at trial where his coconspirators would be testifying against him and the jury would likely be comprised of white people

• A guilty verdict at trial meant that Estrada would be looking at a sentence of at least 20 years

• By pleading guilty, he would be looking at about five years in prison rather than 20 years if he risked going to trial

Estrada's attorney denies that he ever made any of these statements to Estrada. Doc. 3. He states that based on Estrada's concerns about race being an issue during trial, he explained the jury selection process to Estrada and noted he could ask potential jurors about any biases they may have toward Hispanics and strike them from the jury.

With regard to a potential sentence, Estrada's attorney denies that he ever told Estrada that he would be able to receive less than a 10-year sentence and that he, in fact, informed Estrada that he had no options to receive a sentence below the 10-year mandatory minimum. Id. at 2-3. He states that Estrada's decision to plead guilty was his own and he did not pressure him in any way. Id. at 2. He adds that it was his impression that Estrada changed his mind regarding trial after reviewing the evidence in the case, including recordings of one of the cooperating witnesses that captured an inculpatory phone call between the witness and Estrada. The attorney also notes that Estrada acknowledged at the plea hearing that he was subject to a 10-year mandatory

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minimum, which was consistent with the attorney's representation that the lowest possible sentence Estrada could receive was 10 years.

The Government relies on Estrada's counsel's affidavit and the transcript from the plea hearing to argue there is no evidence that counsel improperly advised Estrada about his potential sentence. It contends that even if counsel improperly advised him, the court properly informed...