Etape v. Chertoff, Civil Action No. DKC 2005-1404.

Decision Date15 August 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. DKC 2005-1404.
Citation446 F.Supp.2d 408
PartiesMax Alobwede ETAPE v. Michael CHERTOFF.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Nicholas Wyckoff Woodfield, Robert Scott Oswald, The Employment Law Group PLLC, Washington, DC, for Max Alobwede Etape.

Jennifer Ann Wright, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Michael Chertoff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this naturalization action are: (1) the motion of Defendant Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment (paper 13); (2) the motion of Defendant to seal the motion to dismiss and all accompanying documents and related filings (paper 12); (3) three motions of Plaintiff Max Alobwede Etape to strike (papers 20, 36, 37); and (4) the motion of Plaintiff to stay the decision on Defendant's motion to dismiss and to permit additional discovery (paper 35). The issues have been briefed, no hearing deemed necessary, and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6.1 For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted. Plaintiff's motions to strike and his motion to stay will be denied as moot. Defendant's motion to seal will be denied.

I. Background

The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff filed an application for naturalization with the Washington, D.C., District Office of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, United States Department of Homeland Security ("CIS") on April 2, 2003. On September 9, 2003, Plaintiff appeared for his initial interview at the CIS District Office in Baltimore, Maryland. The application was continued in order for CIS to obtain additional information. Plaintiff submitted additional documentation on October 6, 2003. On May 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), contending that more than 120 days had elapsed since Plaintiff's examination and he had not received a decision from CIS on his naturalization application. Plaintiff requests that after an evidentiary hearing to determine his eligibility, the court approve his application, or alternatively, that the court remand the application to CIS with instructions to approve.2 (Paper 1).

On October 18, 2005, while Plaintiff's complaint was pending, CIS denied Plaintiff's naturalization application because of a lack of good moral character. Defendant then moved to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56. (Paper 13). Defendant also moved to seal the motion to dismiss, along with the supporting memorandum, all exhibits, and the opposition and reply briefs filed in conjunction with Defendant's motion. (Paper 12).

On January 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike certain evidence used to support Defendant's motion. (Paper 20). On July 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the court's decision on the motion to dismiss, requesting additional time for discovery. (Paper 35). Plaintiff filed two additional motions to strike on July 27, 2006, one pertaining to Defendant's use of certain evidence in the reply (paper 36), and one regarding arguments raised in the reply (paper 37).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, CIS had not adjudicated his application and the relief requested in this court included direction to CIS to do so. While the case was pending, CIS did what Plaintiff sought—it adjudicated his application. The question then naturally arises as to how, if at all, the adjudication by CIS affects the nature of this proceeding and the jurisdiction of the court. The parties have espoused somewhat meandering positions on this issue. Because, however, the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be implicated, it is incumbent on the court itself to examine the issue in full: "A federal court has an independent obligation to assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will `raise a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.'" Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir.2005) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)).

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Defendant argued in a footnote to his original motion that "to the extent the basis of Plaintiff's Complaint for declaratory relief is based on the allegation that [CIS] failed to adjudicate his naturalization application, that claim is moot." (Paper 13, at 2). Plaintiff responded that his claim is not moot because the filing of the complaint in this court vested exclusive jurisdiction here to decide on a course of action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Thereafter, in a footnote to the reply, Defendant appeared to agree that the complaint is not moot:

Defendant did not argue that this case was moot and the Court did not have jurisdiction to review the case. As stated in its motion, the District Court's review is de novo and in essence, the Judge sits as the naturalization examiner. Motion page 2. The footnote contained on page two of the motion was intended to reference only any potential claim requesting this Court to instruct the Defendant to act on the application. As defendant admits in his Opposition to Defendant's Motion that he is not asserting any such action, that argument is itself moot.

(Paper 34, at 9).

As will be discussed below, Rule 12(b)(1) provides the proper basis upon which to dispose of Plaintiff's claim. See Kia v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 175 F.3d 1014, No. 98-2399, 1999 WL 172818, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar.30, 1999) (unpublished table decision); Sze v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 153 F.3d 1005, 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1998); Farah v. Gonzales, No. 05-1944, 2006 WL 1116526, at *1-2 (D.Minn. Apr.26, 2006).

Jurisdiction is an essential component necessary for ruling on the merits of any case:

"Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) . . .. The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter "spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States" and is "inflexible and without exception." Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884).

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envir., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). "Subject-matter jurisdiction ... is an Article III as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign." Constantine, 411 F.3d at 480, 411 F.3d 474 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "`no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court,' and ordinary principles of consent, waiver, and estoppel do not apply." Id. (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099). Moreover, when a complaint is moot, it "cannot present an Article III case or controversy and the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it." Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1318, 164 L.Ed.2d 48 (2006); see also Lux v. White, 99 Fed.Appx. 490, No. 03-2051, 2004 WL 1238342 (4th Cir. June 7, 2004) (holding that a district court properly dismissed a claim on the grounds that it was moot, and therefore there was no subject matter jurisdiction); Mobley v. Acme Markets, Inc., 473 F.Supp. 851, 858 (D.Md. 1979) ("mootness [is] derived from the Constitution, specifically Article III, which requires a `case or controversy' as the fundamental ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction.").

[7-9] Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are governed by Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly exists in the federal court. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1999). In a 12(b)(1) motion, the court "may consider evidence outside the pleadings" to help determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case before it. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991); see also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647. The court should grant the 12(b)(1) motion "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.

Plaintiff contends that his claim is not moot because, once he filed the complaint in this court, the court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on a course of action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Accordingly, he argues that CIS was without jurisdiction to deny the naturalization application and the October 18, 2005, denial is void. Plaintiff relies on the language in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), as well the decision in United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc), to support his argument. (Paper 21, at 6-7).

In the context of a naturalization proceeding, Congress has prescribed two instances in which a district court has jurisdiction. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) allows an individual who submitted an application for naturalization to request a hearing before a district court when CIS has delayed deciding the application:

If there is a failure to make a determination [on a naturalization application] under section...

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