Etape v. Napolitano, Civil Action No. DKC 2005-1404.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. DKC 2005-1404. |
| Parties | Max Alobwede ETAPE v. Janet NAPOLITANO<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Jason Daniel Medinger, Larry D. Adams, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Janet Napolitano.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this naturalization action are: (1) Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Paper 88); (2) Defendant's motion to seal (Paper 87); and (3) Plaintiff's motion to strike (Paper 98). The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment and motion to seal will be granted, and Plaintiff's motion to strike will be denied. As a result, Plaintiff's petition for naturalization will be denied.
The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Max Alobwede Etape was born in the Republic of Cameroon and arrived in the United States on a student visa in 1980. He filed an application for naturalization with the Washington, D.C., District Office of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, United States Department of Homeland Security ("USCIS"), on April 2, 2003. Plaintiff appeared for his initial interview at the USCIS District Office in Baltimore, Maryland, on September 9, 2003. The application was continued in order for USCIS to obtain additional information, which Plaintiff subsequently submitted. On May 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), contending that more than 120 days had elapsed since his examination and that USCIS had not yet rendered a decision on his naturalization application.2
While his complaint in this court was pending, USCIS denied Plaintiff's naturalization application on the ground that he lacked good moral character, as required to become a United States citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively, for summary judgment. (Paper 13). This court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that its ability to consider Plaintiff's § 1447(b) petition depended on Plaintiff's underlying naturalization application remaining undecided by the USCIS. (Paper 42). Because USCIS had denied Plaintiff's application, the court determined that Plaintiff's § 1447(b) petition was moot. Plaintiff appealed the decision, which was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.2007). The Fourth Circuit determined that § 1447(b) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district court, thereby depriving USCIS of jurisdiction to adjudicate an application unless the district court instructs it to do so.
Following the Fourth Circuit's reversal, this court held a status conference to discuss how the case should proceed. (Paper 53). Plaintiff's counsel represented that he wanted to pursue a possible settlement with USCIS. USCIS responded that it would reconsider its denial of Plaintiff's naturalization application if, upon investigation of the legitimacy of certain foreign documents Plaintiff submitted in support of his naturalization petition, it determined they were genuine. The case was then referred to Magistrate Judge William Connelly to oversee the investigation of these documents.
In December 2007 and January 2008, Special Agent Miguel Eversley, a United States Department of State investigator based at United States embassy in Cameroon, conducted an investigation into the documents Plaintiff had submitted in support of his petition. At the conclusion of his investigation, Agent Eversley determined that three of Plaintiff's documents were forgeries: (1) an adoption certificate dated February 27, 2006, and purportedly signed by Maitre Achuo Sylvanus; (2) an adoption decree ruling dated May 12, 1983, and purportedly signed by Judge Ndoke Cole; and (3) a letter purportedly written by Jean-Baptiste Hangheu, the Commissioner of Emi-Immigration in Buea, Cameroon.
The adoption certificate states that Plaintiff was adopted on May 12, 1983, by Emmanuel Mekole Etape and Edna Ni Dungu. (Paper 38, Ex. 1). The certificate was purportedly issued by Judge Ndoke Cole and signed by Maitre Achuo Sylvanus, Registrar-in-Chief. Pursuant to his investigation, Agent Eversley spoke directly with Mr. Sylvanus and presented a copy of the adoption certificate purportedly containing his signature. According to Agent Eversley, Mr. Sylvanus proceeded to "laugh in amazement," explaining that the signature was not his and that he was not the Chief Registrar for the court, as the document alleged. Mr. Sylvanus then provided samples of his signature and the court's seal for purposes of comparison. Agent Eversley compared these samples with the signature and seal on the adoption certificate submitted by Plaintiff and concluded that Plaintiff's adoption certificate was a forgery.
The adoption decree ruling includes much of the same information as the adoption certificate, and was purportedly signed by Judge Ndoke Cole of the Manyu High Court. To determine the validity of this document, Agent Eversley met with Isaac Tambi, Chief Registrar of the High Court, Manyu Division, in the city of Mamfe. Mr. Tambi informed him that there had never been a judge named Ndoke Cole assigned to the Manyu High Court. Based on this information, Agent Eversley determined that the adoption decree was also a forgery.
In support of his naturalization petition, Plaintiff also submitted a letter purportedly written by Jean-Baptiste Hangheu, the Commissioner of Emi-Immigration of Buea. (Paper 36, Ex. 3). The letter, dated March 6, 2006, appeared to have been written in response to Plaintiff's request, in July 1993, for a copy of an application Plaintiff submitted for a Cameroonian passport in June 1993. When Agent Eversley met with Mr. Hangheu and showed him the letter, Mr. Hangheu stated that he had never worked in Buea, had never worked in the Office of Immigration, and that the signature on the letter was not his own. Mr. Hangheu then provided three samples of his actual signature for comparison. (Paper 88, Ex. 14).
Agent Eversley subsequently traveled to the city of Buea and met with Henry Nkengasong, Chief of the Office of Immigration. Mr. Nkengasong confirmed that Mr. Hangheu had never worked in that office. Mr. Nkengasong then reviewed the letter, observed grammatical errors and the use of outdated letterhead, and stated that the letter had not been issued by his office. For comparison, Mr. Nkengasong provided copies of the letterhead and government seal that were used by the Office of Immigration in Buea at the time the letter was purportedly written. Based on all of this information, Agent Eversley determined that the letter had also been forged. He then created a report of his investigation and submitted a declaration describing the above findings. (Paper 88, Ex. 13).
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on January 12, 2009, arguing that Plaintiff lacked the good moral character required to become a United States citizen. (Paper 88).3 Defendant attached to her motion numerous exhibits, including Agent Eversley's report, declaration, and copies of the sample seals and signatures that Agent Eversley obtained pursuant to his investigation in Cameroon. On May 1, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike evidence supporting Defendant's motion for summary judgment (paper 98), as well as papers opposing Defendant's summary judgment motion (paper 99). Appropriate replies have been filed and the matters are ready for resolution.4
It is well-established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1979). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 785 (1993).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir.1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element ... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in...
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