Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College

• Decision Date: 09 April 1929
• Docket Number: No. 2805.,2805.
• Citation: 31 F.2d 869
• Parties: ETTLINGER v. TRUSTEES OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

31 F.2d 869 (1929)

ETTLINGER v. TRUSTEES OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE.

No. 2805.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

April 9, 1929.

Robert H. Talley, of Richmond, Va. (Edward F. Eldridge, of Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellant.

A. W. Patterson, of Richmond, Va., and W. C. Armstrong, of Front Royal, Va., for appellee.

Before PARKER, Circuit Judge, and McDOWELL and SOPER, District Judges.

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This action was instituted in the court below in behalf of one Reginald Ettlinger, hereafter called the plaintiff, against the Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, Inc., as defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him when the Randolph-Macon Military Academy at Front Royal, Va., was destroyed by fire. The academy was owned by the defendant, and plaintiff was a student therein. He alleges that defendant was negligent in not maintaining the electric wiring and fixtures in the academy in proper condition, in not providing that building with adequate fire escapes, and in not maintaining a night watchman on the premises. The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant, and from a judgment thereon plaintiff has appealed.

The defendant is a nonstock corporation chartered and organized at the instance of the Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Virginia, for the purpose of carrying on the work of education. It operates a system of schools and colleges, not for the sake of profit, but for the education and enlightenment of the people. Its property has come to it through charitable gifts and bequests, and this together with what is received from tuition is used for the purpose of education. It makes special rates to sons of ministers and young men studying for the ministry and loans to needy and deserving students. A charge is made for board and tuition, but the amount realized therefrom does not by any means equal the cost of the work which is being carried on. The Military Academy at Front Royal was one of the schools operated by defendant, and plaintiff was attending it as a regular paying student.

On the 10th day of January, 1927, early in the morning, the academy building was destroyed by fire. Plaintiff was sleeping on the third floor, and when he awoke the fire had gained such headway, and the hall into which his room opened was so filled with smoke, that he could not reach a fire escape and was unable even to go from his room into the hall. He accordingly jumped from the window of his room to a blanket which was being held for him in the yard below, and in doing so received the injuries of which he complains. Verdict was directed on the ground that, being an eleemosynary institution, defendant was not liable for the negligence alleged.

We have reviewed the evidence carefully; and, even if we lay to one side the fact that defendant is an eleemosynary institution, we think that the verdict was properly directed, as the evidence failed to establish that plaintiff's injury was due to the negligence of the defendant or its employees. It was shown without contradiction that the defects in the electrical wiring and fixtures upon which plaintiff relied had been repaired prior to the fire. There was no evidence upon which a jury could have found that there was a duty on the part of the defendant to maintain a night watchman in the building or that the presence of such a watchman would have prevented plaintiff's injury. And it was shown that the building was equipped with fire escapes, approved by the proper public authorities, and that there were other means of escape from the third floor, which plaintiff could have utilized had it not been for the blinding smoke in the hallway. As he could not get beyond the door of his room on account of the smoke, additional fire escapes would have been as useless to him as those which existed, and their absence could not possibly be said to have been the proximate cause of his injury.

But we think, also, that the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the defendant was an eleemosynary institution and as such was not liable to plaintiff on account of the negligence of its officers, agents, or servants. "The eleemosynary sort of corporations," says Blackstone, "are such as are constituted for the perpetual distributions of the free alms or bounty of the founder of them, to such persons as he has directed. Of this are all hospitals for the maintenance of the poor, sick and impotent; and all colleges both in our universities and out of them." 1 Bl. Com. 471. It is clear that a corporation is to be deemed eleemosynary or charitable where its property is derived from charitable gifts or bequests and is administered, not for the purpose of gain, but in the interest of humanity; and an educational institution, established and endowed by private charity, falls clearly within the classification. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 633, 634, 4 L. Ed. 629, and argument of Mr. Webster at page 561 et seq.; Currier v. Dartmouth College (C. C.) 105 F. 886; Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179; Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103; McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529.

And it is equally clear both that the eleemosynary or charitable nature of an educational institution is not destroyed by the fact that it makes a charge for tuition, and that the payment of tuition by its students does not prevent their being considered beneficiaries of the charity. The evidence in this case is that the charges made by defendant cover only a part of the cost of carrying on its work; and it is a matter of general and common knowledge that the tuition and other charges of public educational institutions and those which are privately endowed are much lower than would be required to pay even their running expenses, being purposely made low so that education may be placed within the reach of those who need it. In a very direct and practical sense, therefore, not only are such institutions engaged in a work of charity, but the pay student as well as others is a beneficiary thereof. And, apart from the fact that what such a student pays does not equal the cost of his education, he is a beneficiary of the charity for the reason that but for the charitable gifts made to the institution and the charitable work which it is carrying on, it would not exist to serve him. These principles are settled by the overwhelming weight of authority. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital (C. C. A. 1st) 109 F. 294, 65 L. R. A. 372; Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025; St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22, 42 A. L. R. 964; Parks v. Northwestern University, supra; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141; Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42, 25 L. R. A. 602, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427; Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium & B. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1127; Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. St. 254, 75 A. 1087, 136 Am. St. Rep. 879; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512; Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 581; 5 R. C. L. 377.

Since, therefore, it appears not only that the defendant is an eleemosynary institution, but also that plaintiff was a beneficiary of the charity which it administers, we think there can be no question that defendant could not be held liable to him for the negligence alleged. "The courts are practically agreed that a charitable institution is not responsible to those who avail themselves of its benefits for any injuries they may sustain through the negligence or torts of its managers, agents and servants." See notes 139 Am. St. Rep. 900, 14 A. L. R. 572, 23 A. L. R. 923, 30 A. L. R. 455, 33 A. L. R. 1369, and 42 A. L. R. 971, and cases cited therein, and particularly Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Reprint 1508; Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n (C. C. A. 3rd) 247 F. 639; Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital (C. C. A. 1st) 109 F. 294, 65 L. R. A. 372; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist (C. C. A. 8th) 60 F. 365, 23 L. R. A. 581; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785, 23 A. L. R. 907; Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42, 25 L. R. A. 602, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392, 14 A. L. R. 563; Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179.

The case last cited is practically on "all fours" with the case at bar. There the plaintiff, a young girl, was a student at an academy in Tennessee which was maintained by an eleemosynary corporation. She was injured by jumping from a third story window when one of the academy buildings was destroyed by fire, and she charged the corporation with negligence in failing to provide the building with proper fire escapes. The court held that there was no liability, basing its decision upon the eleemosynary nature of the institution.

As stated above, the courts are practically agreed upon the rule of law applicable here; but they are by no means agreed upon the reason for the rule, and this disagreement has given rise to much discussion on the part of the courts themselves and of text-writers and annotators, as will be readily seen by reference to the above notes and authorities. We do not deem it necessary to choose...