Eubanks v. State

• Decision Date: 16 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-KM-00110-SCT
• Citation: 341 So.3d 896
• Parties: Joseph EUBANKS v. STATE of Mississippi
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

341 So.3d 896

Joseph EUBANKS

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2020-KM-00110-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 16, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH EUBANKS (PRO SE)

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER, WILLIAM M. MALLETTE, JULIE HOWELL ADDISON

EN BANC.

GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Joseph Eubanks appeals his conviction of simple assault domestic violence. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On February 15, 2017, Shakeara Harris filed domestic violence charges against Eubanks. Harris alleged that Eubanks choked her, making it hard for her to breathe. Eubanks was arrested and released on bond. Harris received treatment at Baptist Memorial Hospital in Oxford.

¶3. Eubanks was indicted for aggravated domestic violence in June 2017. He was later convicted of simple assault domestic violence in January 2020. Eubanks was sentenced to six months in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with six months suspended and 364 days of unsupervised probation. He now appeals and argues (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated, (2) the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the nurse practitioner's testimony, (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (5) the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, (6) his due process rights were violated, and (7) the trial court erred by giving a simple assault domestic violence jury instruction.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Eubanks's right to a speedy trial was violated.

¶4. The following is a timeline of applicable events:

February 15, 2017 - Arrest

June 5, 2017 - Indictment

July 5, 2017 - Arraignment (Defense Counsel Present)

September 12, 2017 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for October 17, 2017)

December 7, 2017 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for January 18, 2018)

January 4, 2018 - Substitution of Defense Counsel

February 23, 2018 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for April 26, 2018)

June 1, 2018 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for July 5, 2018) June 20, 2018 - Motion for Discovery of Information Necessary to Receive a Fair Trial

June 26, 2018 - Entry of Appearance (New Defense Counsel)

June 28, 2018 - Substitution of Defense Counsel

August 6, 2018 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for October 22, 2018)

November 29, 2018 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for January 4, 2019)

March 1, 2019 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for April 4, 2019)

March 26, 2019 - Harris's Active Duty Military Orders (Active Duty Effective June 10, 2019)

May 30, 2019 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for July 11, 2019)

July 3, 2019 - Eubanks's Motion for Speedy Trial

July 15, 2019 - Eubanks's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial

July 16, 2019 - Eubanks's Motion to Quash Indictment with Prejudice

August 28, 2019 - State's Request for Subpoenas

September 10, 2019 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for January 7, 2020)

September 13, 2019 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for October 14, 2019)

November 19, 2019 - State's Petition to Secure the Attendance of a Witness from Without the State of Mississippi

November 19, 2019 - Trial Setting (Trial Set for January 7, 2020)

December 18, 2019 - State's Request for Subpoenas

December 20, 2019 - State's Request for Subpoena

January 3, 2020 - State's Request for Subpoenas

January 7, 2020 - Trial

¶5. "Review of a speedy trial claim encompasses the fact question of whether the trial delay rose from good cause." DeLoach v. State , 722 So. 2d 512, 516 (Miss. 1998). "Under this Court's standard of review, this Court will uphold a decision based on substantial, credible evidence." Id. (citing Folk v. State , 576 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991) ).

¶6. "An analysis of [Eubanks]’s constitutional right to a speedy trial must be made apart from his statutory right." Franklin v. State , 136 So. 3d 1021, 1032 (Miss. 2014) (citing Simmons v. State , 678 So. 2d 683, 686 (Miss. 1996) ).

A. Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial

¶7. "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords an accused ‘the right to a speedy and public trial ....’ " Ben v. State , 95 So. 3d 1236, 1242 (Miss. 2012) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI ). "That right is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1967) ). " Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 likewise guarantees criminal defendants the right to ‘a speedy and public trial ....’ " Id. (quoting Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26 ).

¶8. "[Eubanks]’s assertion of a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial must be evaluated in accordance with the analysis established by Barker v. Wingo [, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972) ]." Franklin , 136 So. 3d at 1032. "Four factors must be considered and weighed: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) whether the defendant timely asserted his right, and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay." Id. at 1032-33 (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). "No one factor is dispositive of the question.

Instead, the totality of the circumstances is considered." Jefferson v. State , 818 So. 2d 1099, 1106 (Miss. 2002) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

1. The Length of Delay

¶9. "[Eubanks]’s right to a speedy trial attached at the moment of his arrest." Franklin , 136 So. 3d at 1033 (citing Simmons , 678 So. 2d at 686 ). "A delay of eight months or more triggers a presumption of prejudice that requires a full analysis under Barker ." Franklin , 136 So. 3d at 1033 (citing Johnson v. State , 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 2011) ). Approximately thirty-five months passed between Eubanks's arrest and trial. As a result, "the delay is presumptively prejudicial, and the burden of persuasion must shift to the State to show good reason for the delay." Id. (citing Johnson , 68 So. 3d at 1242 ). But "when the delay is presumptively prejudicial, that does not mean that actual prejudice to the defendant exists. Rather, actual prejudice is determined at a different point in the Barker analysis." Franklin , 136 So. 3d at 1033 (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Johnson , 68 So. 3d at 1242 ). This factor weighs in favor of Eubanks.

2. The Reasons for Delay

¶10. When analyzing the reasons for delay, we should consider that

different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.

Murray v. State , 967 So. 2d 1222, 1230 (Miss. 2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

¶11. There is no evidence of intentional delay by the State. The record reflects that an overcrowded docket contributed to much of the delay. While the State concedes that no cases were brought to trial during the period of delay, the State notes that "that [wa]s not because the State [had not] set trials and gotten to the brink of trying a case just to have a defendant plea on the eve of trial." The State asserts that multiple cases were consistently set for trial throughout the terms of court and that it actively prepared for those trials, but the cases were ultimately resolved shortly before trial. This delay should be weighed against the State, but only slightly. Id. (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). The seven-month delay caused by Harris's absence for military duty should not be weighed against the State, nor should any delay caused by Eubanks's multiple changes in counsel.

¶12. This factor weighs in favor of Eubanks.

3. Whether Eubanks timely asserted his right.

¶13. "Although it is the State's duty to insure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right." Taylor v. State , 672 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Miss. 1996) (citing Wiley v. State , 582 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991) ). "This Court has held that this factor weighs against a defendant who waits a significant amount of time after arrest to demand a speedy trial." Bateman v. State , 125 So. 3d 616, 630 (Miss. 2013) ; see also Noe v. State , 616 So. 2d 298, 301 (Miss. 1993) (defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial "nearly an entire year following his arrest" weighed against him); Wall v. State , 718 So. 2d 1107, 1113 (Miss. 1998) (defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial "merely two months before he received a trial" weighed against him).

¶14. Eubanks filed a motion for a speedy trial on July 3, 2019. In that motion, he asserted his right to a speedy trial. But while Eubanks asserted his right, he did so untimely. Indeed, Eubanks did not assert his right to a speedy trial until more than two years after he was arrested and indicted. And Eubanks was tried within six months of his speedy-trial-right assertion.¹ Because Eubanks waited a significant amount of time to assert his right to a speedy trial, this factor weighs against him. See Bateman , 125 So. 3d at 630.

¶15. The dissent asserts that "[p]unishing defendants for not immediately asserting their right to a speedy trial is contrary to Barker ...." Diss. Op. ¶ 76. But Barker "emphasize[d] that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." Barker , 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. While Eubanks asserted his right to a speedy trial, he did so more than two years after he was indicted, approximately six months before he was tried, and after Harris had received active duty military orders. Despite the dissent's assertion, Eubanks is not being "[p]unish[ed]...