Eufaula Marine Power & Equip., LLC v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. (In re Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc.)
| Decision Date | 13 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | 2120980 and 2120981. |
| Citation | 142 So.3d 1182 |
| Parties | Ex parte SAFETY–KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC., and Safety–Kleen, Inc. (In re Eufaula Marine Power & Equipment, LLC v. Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc.) Ex parte Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc. (In re Roger Miller d/b/a Roger's Auto Service v. Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc.) |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Ed R. Haden and Gregory C. Cook of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham; and G. Lane Knight of Balch & Bingham LLP, Montgomery, for petitioners.
Submitted on petitioners' brief only.
In case no. 2120980, Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Safety–Kleen”), seek a writ of mandamus directed to the Barbour Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) ordering it, among other things, to vacate its denial of Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer an action— Eufaula Marine Power & Equipment, LLC v. Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc. (Barbour Circuit Court, CV–13–900030) (“the Eufaula Marine action”)—from the circuit court to the Barbour District Court (“the district court”). In case no. 2120981, Safety–Kleen seeks a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to, among other things, vacate its denial of Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer another action— Roger Miller d/b/a Roger's Auto Service v. Safety–Kleen Systems, Inc., and Safety–Kleen, Inc. (Barbour Circuit Court, CV–13–900031) (“the Miller action”)—to the district court. We grant the requested petitions and issue the writs.
The documents filed with this court pertinent to the disposition of the petitions establish the following. On April 3, 2013, Eufaula Marine Power & Equipment, LLC (“EMP”), filed in the circuit court a complaint against Safety–Kleen alleging misrepresentation, suppression, and unjust enrichment. EMP asserted that it had entered into a contract with Safety–Kleen, a company engaged in the business of leasing cleaning equipment, selling industrial cleaning supplies, and purchasing and reprocessing used oil. EMP further asserted that Safety–Kleen had added a “fuel surcharge” to some of EMP's statements; that those charges were nothing more than profit; that the cost of fuel was already built into Safety–Kleen's monthly charges; and that the “fuel surcharge” was unrelated to any fuel expense actually incurred by Safety–Kleen. EMP asserted that it had paid the allegedly fraudulent charge on multiple occasions, including four times in 2012.
As damages, EMP requested “all damages stemming from Safety–Kleen's wrongful act, including all applicable compensatory and punitive damages,” and “recovery of all monies improperly procured, plus interest.” Other than limiting its recovery to less than $74,500, EMP did not specify the amount of damages that it was seeking, and EMP did not request a jury trial in its complaint. EMP also filed discovery requests, including a request for video depositions of representatives of Safety–Kleen and a request for the production of documents.
On May 6, 2013, Safety–Kleen filed a motion, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12–11–9, seeking to transfer the Eufaula Marine action from the circuit court to the district court on the basis of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Safety–Kleen argued that the amount in controversy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court. On June 20, 2013, EMP responded to Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer by asserting that its claims sought damages in excess of the circuit court's jurisdictional base and arguing, in the alternative, that it needed to complete discovery in order to calculate its damages. On July 10, 2013, the circuit court denied Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer the action to the district court but indicated that it would reconsider Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer after discovery had been completed. Safety–Kleen timely filed its petition for a writ of mandamus relating to the Eufaula Marine action on August 20, 2013.
On April 3, 2013, Roger Miller, doing business as Roger's Auto Service (“Miller”), filed his complaint against Safety–Kleen, asserting claims of misrepresentation, suppression, and unjust enrichment arising from “late fees” charged to Miller by Safety–Kleen; Miller specified no monetary amount of damages in his complaint, but he sought to recover all damages stemming from Safety–Kleen's wrongful acts, including compensatory and punitive damages. Like EMP, Miller did not include a request for a jury trial in his complaint. Miller also filed discovery requests similar to those filed in the Eufaula Marine action. The Eufaula Marine action and the Miller action were consolidated by the circuit court for purposes of discovery.
On May 6, 2013, Safety–Kleen filed a motion seeking to transfer the Miller action to the district court on the basis of an insufficient amount in controversy. On June 20, 2013, Miller joined in EMP's response to Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer. On July 10, 2013, the circuit court denied Safety–Kleen's motion to transfer the Miller action to the district court, but it indicated that it would reconsider the motion to transfer after discovery had been completed.
On August 20, 2013, Safety–Kleen timely filed its petition for a writ of mandamus relating to the Miller action. On August 23, 2013, this court consolidated Safety–Kleen's petitions for a writ of mandamus ex mero motu. On August 26, 2013, this court ordered the circuit court to stay all proceedings in both actions pending further order of this court.
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala.2000).
Section 12–12–31(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part: “The district court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000).” Section 12–11–9, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: “If a case filed in the circuit court is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a district court ..., the circuit clerk or a judge of the court where the case was filed shall transfer the case to the docket of the appropriate court....” Alabama caselaw has consistently construed § 12–11–9 to mean that a circuit court must transfer to the appropriate district court a case in which the amount in controversy is $3,000 or less and that a circuit court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to make any other orders in regard to such a case. See, e.g., Ex parte Owens, 533 So.2d 617 (Ala.1988); Culbreth v. Watson, 903 So.2d 127 (Ala.Civ.App.2004); and Gill v. Burrell, 876 So.2d 487 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).
Generally speaking, the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes “is determined by the amount asked for in the complaint.” Karrh v. Crawford–Sturgeon Ins., Inc., 468 So.2d 175, 177 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (citing C. Gamble & D. Corley, Alabama Law of Damages §§ 1–3 (1981)). When a plaintiff fails to specify in the complaint the amount of damages it is claiming, that failure does not automatically divest the circuit court of jurisdiction. See Ex parte Dennis, 681 So.2d 157 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). Rather, in determining subject-matter jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must be ascertained from bases other than the ad damnum clause of the complaint. Id. In Ex parte Phil Owens Used Cars, Inc., 4 So.3d 418, 423–24 (Ala.2008), our supreme court held that a court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction must consider the facts in the complaint as true unless controverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary showing that the court lacks personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff is then required to substantiate its jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent evidence, and the plaintiff may not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint. We cannot discern any reason why that same analysis would not apply when adjudicating a motion to transfer for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Safety–Kleen attached to its motions to transfer affidavits of a company representative establishing that EMP had paid $88.60 in fuel surcharges and that Miller had paid a single late fee of $25.00, although he had been invoiced for additional late charges that had been waived or otherwise credited to his account. Safety–Kleen argued that, under the theories of recovery respectively asserted by EMP and Miller, their special damages could not exceed $88.60 and $25.00, respectively. As for punitive damages, Safety–Kleen pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). Safety–Kleen argued that the circuit court would have to assume an award of punitive damages at a constitutionally impermissible rate of over 33 times the compensatory damages in the Eufaula Marine action and 120 times the compensatory damages in the Miller action in order to reach the threshold jurisdictional amount of $3,001. Through its filings, Safety–Kleen made out a prima facie case that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
Based on the materials filed by Safety–Kleen, the burden shifted to the respondents, as plaintiffs below, to present competent evidence establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of the...
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